

**A Survey of Migration  
from Western Orissa to Telangana**

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## **Contents List**

### **Page No.**

<b>1. Acknowledgements</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>2. Introduction</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>3. Methodology</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>4. Understanding Rural Distress in Eastern India; Unraveling Networks of Veiled Hierarchies</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>5. The Uncivil and De-institutionalizing Labour Relations of Accumulation through Disuse</b>	<b>68</b>
<b>6. Developmental and Agency Challenge; Future Directions</b>	<b>78</b>
<b>7. Annexures</b>	
<b>(i) For Chapter 3</b>	<b>91</b>
<b>(ii) For Chapter 4</b>	<b>128</b>
<b>(iii) For Chapter 5</b>	<b>149</b>
<b>(iv) Photographs</b>	<b>150</b>
<b>8. References</b>	<b>180</b>

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## Chapter 1


### Introduction; Brick Kilns and the Nature of Labour Relations

#### 1.0. An Overview of the Brick Kiln Industry:

A status report on the brick kiln industry and its future trends has been brought out by Development Alternatives together with Shakti Sustainable Energy Foundation in 2012. This report observes that it is the 200,000 brick kilns located in the rural and peri-urban areas, operating predominantly in the informal sector and employing more than 12 million unskilled workers that cater to the requirement of bricks by the entire construction sector in India. An industry having the above characteristics which is growing at the rate of 4 percent per annum, has made India the second largest producer of bricks in the world next only to China.

The report goes on to point out that developed countries such as the UK, USA and other developed economies put together produce about 23 billion bricks, whereas in a country like China alone, 100 billion bricks are produced per annum.

**Fig-1.1**



Source: Development Alternatives Report, 2012

The report, further maintains that the Indian brick industry is comprised of 100,000 rural and peri-urban brick production clusters constituted predominantly by unorganized and small scale production units that use bull trench type of kilns to produce clay fired bricks whose value is estimated to be USD 70.8 billion. (2009 estimates).

Interestingly this report itself has three different figures with reference to total number of brick kilns in India viz., 200,000, 100,000 and 150,000. Presumably, the figures cut across a time period in between 2009 to 2012. Quite clearly what it suggests is that these are only guesstimates, at best, estimates available and quite bluntly this is the failure of the government in terms of keeping a count of the number of brick kilns operating. All the brick kilns certainly employ more than 20 workers. There is yet another figure provided by All India Brick & Tile Manufacturers Federation. In a letter dated 31<sup>st</sup> December 2007, addressed to Secretary, Ministry of Coal, this federation points out that there are **35,000 Chimney brick-kilns** and about **15,000 Small Brick-kiln Operators**, who are members of this apex body of the All Indi Brick Manufacturers. This figure might well be a gross underestimate but it could be the figure of those kilns that are part of this organization and operating legally. From the kaleidoscope of figures mentioned above what becomes clear is not only that the segment of the unregistered brick kilns operating illegally in India are very large but also that this industry itself has been expanding massively throwing up figures that seem to magnify in short spans of time. Why should this be a matter of worry is also pointed out by this very report. This report notes that the brick kilns which given their nature and size of operation fall under the ministry of micro, small and medium enterprises at the center and under the directorate of industries (department of industries) at the state level, however is estimated to be having the potential for generating revenues of over USD 4.8 billion catering to an estimated annual demand of 170 billion bricks per annum during the 9<sup>th</sup> plan. While the growth potential of the industry in value terms seems to be high and equally impressive is its potential for generating employment, the quality of the employment, especially with reference to the health and other hazards it poses for the labour in the absence of adequate protections is grave and needs interventions. The various sets of activities involved in the labour process are seen as being exposed to various forms of drudgery and risks. In terms of seasonality, the brick production extends well into the summer and most of the brick kilns are located in the open without any roof. Consequentially, most of the workers and especially moulders are exposed to the sun for long hours. Similarly, the bottom ash spread all across a brick kiln and especially coal breaking activities and manual feeding of coal into furnace, monitoring and regulating the fire, manual mixing of fly ash and clay are all activities that involve exposure to high concentrations of Respirable Suspended Particulate Matter (RSPM) as well as to extreme heat conditions. Apart from this, the loading and unloading activities usually involve carrying head-loads of 9-12 bricks at a time leading to several ailments especially amongst women. Neither precautionary protective gears nor hazard insurance covers are available to the workers.

In view of the abysmal conditions of work for the burgeoning numbers of labour employed in this sector, expansion of unregistered and establishment of illegal brick kiln units is a matter of concern. While it remains a fact that several registered organized enterprises could well be operating in violation of several labour laws in India, the missing numbers in case of the brick kiln units makes it all the more difficult for social intervention. India however is not an exception, the nature of labour relations in brick kilns internationally (especially south-Asia) has been a problematic terrain.

### **1.1. International Case Studies on Labour Relation in Brick Kilns:**

With reference to Nepal, a study by Krishna Upadhyaya (2004) notes that brick kilns were employing traditional bonded labour. The scholar points out that the ban imposed during 2000 on the Kamaiya bonded labour in Nepal which came about following several struggles including by organized bonded workers themselves had resulted in setting free the traditionally bonded labour. However it is observed that the government of Nepal has failed to provide adequate support for these households to ensure their rehabilitation. While several national and international agencies have volunteered to provide for some temporary help, more substantial interventions such as providing certifications and land to these households by the Nepalese government have been inadequate.

This paper further observes that in the recent past, the brick kilns in Kathmandu and the plains of Nepal have been employing male and female international migrant workers, predominantly from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh of India. These workers are recruited by middlemen who bring the workers across the borders after paying them advances. While it is observed that these workers are almost held in a condition of bondage until they repay the advance amount, several of these workers belong to age groups below 18 years.

In a judgment delivered by a division bench of the Nepal's Supreme court with reference to Writ Petition number 3027, in the year 2009, what could presumably be a reference to the brick kilns employing the ***international migrant workers*** from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh located in Kathmandu and surrounding areas, it has been stated that:

The judgment notes that the number of illegal brick kilns raising ecological and public health concerns is a result of the negligence of the government in regulating the industry. The judgment further notes that 89 percent of the 4900 metric tons of the Total Suspended Particulate Matter is to be attributed to the brick kilns. It is noted that people of all age groups suffer from a variety of diseases and there is an adverse impact on livelihoods, especially in terms of the impact on agriculture.

In a report for the WTO general council review of the trade policies of the People's Republic of China submitted by the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) in 2010, it is observed that in China:

The competent authority to regulate child labour in China is the Labour bureau, which could work in conjunction with public security officers, officers of the industry and commerce or trade unions. The report suggests that there can be different modes of carrying out inspection including; regular, irregular and extraordinary based on media or public reports. Despite publicizing the existence of child labour and discovery of hundreds of slave labour working in Shanxi brick kilns in 2007, barring a few prosecutions, it is observed that several officials responsible for such exploitation of migrant workers continued to remain in positions of authority.

The report also presents some estimates of forced child labour:

*According to Human Rights Watch (HRW) the work study schemes run by more than 400,000 middle and junior high schools run **work-study schemes** wherein during June 2007 it was identified that in the case of 500 children, they were made to work for more than 14 hours during summer. These children predominantly belonging to **migrant households** were kept under unhygienic conditions, under-fed and suffered drudgery induced health problems.*

The Xinjiang provincial government is identified by the human rights agencies as being the largest “employer” of children through its “work-study” programmes. Elsewhere scholars point-out that several of the workers employed in the Xinjiang province belong to **Hun and Uighur migrants** (Anthony Howell and C.Cindy Fan, 2011). *Many Uighur girls and women have been coerced into becoming labourers in eastern China's factories under false pretences and without regular wages. For registration reasons the government provides fake identification for these workers, and their families may be threatened if they react to their children's coercion.*

It is pertinent to observe that forced child labour is seen as existing in several economic activities and more importantly, brick kilns are mentioned as one of these activities. The report points out that:

*Child labour occurs in construction, brick kilns, forced begging, street vending, cotton farming, food production, mechanical work, or in electronics, toys, textiles and other factories producing for export. There have been reports of children being forced to assist in the annual harvesting of cotton with excessive hours and minimal payment in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and in Gansu Province. Often child labour cases are revealed due to tragic accidents and children may also be subject to violence or sexual abuse. **Many of the victims are migrant children whose families lack the resources and legal knowledge to pursue their cases.***

With specific reference to brick kilns that operate in China, it is observed that:

*In May 2007 several hundred children and mentally ill people were rescued from scores of brick kilns in Shanxi province, resulting in one of the biggest scandals in recent years. Despite the alleged strengthening of monitoring and oversight in February 2008, in Huangpi a brick kiln owner was found guilty of forcing 20 mentally retarded people into work. The incident was revealed by media after the kiln caught journalists' attention when a worker was killed by his co-workers. The "employer" paid the slaves the equivalent of a week's pay for the labour of a whole year. In May 2009 another brick kiln, in Anhui Province, was found guilty for forcing 32 retarded persons into work. **These were again predominantly rural migrant households according to the China Labour Bulletin's findings.** (<http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/shanxi-brickyard-scandal-and-child-labour-china>) .*

Quite clearly this report highlights the fact that it is much more difficult to measure estimates with reference to issues like forced labour given the limited transparency permitted by the Chinese system. However, the victims are predominantly rural migrant workers. The report argues that:

*Forced labour systematically occurs in China's penal institutions, with regard to prisoners sentenced by the criminal justice system to "reform through labour" and those undergoing the administrative punishment of "re-education through labour" which bypasses the criminal justice system altogether. Detainees in "re-education through labour" facilities are required to work, often for very long hours with little or no remuneration. Sometimes the prisoners are contracted out to non-prison enterprises. A China Labour Bulletin report points out that there are **274 million rural migrants in China** whose abysmally poor conditions and whose children's deprivation of health and education underlies the*

current massive growth China has been able to achieve. (<http://www.clb.org.hk/content/migrant-workers-and-their-children>).

*A report by the ILO on brick kilns in Afghanistan (2011) observed that the ‘Afghan brick kilns drew attention in March 2011 when a New York Times article claimed that NATO forces were using bricks made by children: “The use of child labour is also a concern of NATO forces in Afghanistan, particularly those involved in reconstruction programmes. Yet kiln owners and contractors say bricks made by children are routinely used in NATO projects.” Bonded labour, notably child bonded labour, is so pervasive in the brick kiln industry throughout South Asia that bricks for any project in Afghanistan, large or small, are de facto coming from kilns that utilise child bonded labour.... Although the relationship between brick kilns and NATO projects is unavoidably present, there is no direct link between brick kiln owners and NATO forces. Brick kiln owners rarely have contact with the final consumers of their bricks, as bricks may be resold several times before they reach their final destination’.*

This has also been the case with several production systems involving outsourcing. While it sounds a bit weird that the powerful states that back the NATO can track terrorists in hiding but cannot identify the brick kiln owners in the open employing bonded labour, the fact that it is difficult to keep a track of the owners however cannot be a reason to shrug the responsibility that rests on principle employers or economic beneficiaries, especially when they are agencies such as NATO claiming to stand for lofty ideals. It is even more weird that organizations like the ILO build such arguments. This perhaps is more a testimony of the power relations that ILO has with NATO rather than an appropriate line of argumentation expected from an organization whose mandate is to protect workers’ interests.

*This report further argues that ‘Adult men enter into situations of bonded labour in Afghan brick kilns voluntarily. While some may debate the voluntary nature of this decision, given the limited alternatives available, the 1930 Forced Labour Convention (no. 29) does not cover “situations of pure economic necessity, as when a worker feels unable to leave a job because of the real or perceived absence of employment alternatives.” Moreover, this report will demonstrate that the type of indebtedness found in most Afghan brick kilns may not be induced. This is in part due to Islamic rules and regulations, which prohibit interest on loans, and in part due to competition from other*



*brick kilns, which ensures better terms. In fact, multiple cases were found in which households regularly paid off debts, only to request another advance the following year’.*

In this instance, the ILO’s understanding does not seem to be any better than ordinary pedestrian understanding or any better than ideas held by dispassionate ill informed bureaucrats about what constitutes un-free labour. To analyse the problem of indebtedness among brick kiln workers in Afghanistan as emanating from credit market problems due to Islamic rules seems to be a misinterpretation, because this reasoning would not hold to the phenomena witnessed in several other parts of the world. Indebtedness and un-free labour is not a peculiar phenomenon of Islamic states. What seems to be a global problem pertaining to the mode of capitalist development witnessed in the poor economies cannot be made out to be a result of cultural specificity of Afghanistan. This report however notes that Afghanistan does not have specific laws prohibiting bonded labour but instead it has a law against compulsory labour which could be invoked.

This report is based on a survey done in two districts viz., Surkhroad district of Nangarhar province (with a total of 80 brick kilns) and Deh Sabz district of Kabul Province (with an estimated total of 800 brick kilns) were selected as the two locations for the survey for two reasons:

- i) Concentration of kilns:* both districts have high concentrations of brick kilns
- ii) Migratory patterns:* **significant numbers of brick kiln workers seasonally migrate between these two districts.**

The report notes that there are about 30-220 employees per kiln with 10-30 families living at the site of work. Further the total number of workers is estimated at 63000 in case of Deh Sabz and 8375 in the case of Surkhroad. The employment in brick kiln is seasonal extending upto six to eight months between spring to fall in case of Deh Sabz whereas in Surkhroad, the production is carried on throughout the year. an estimated 400,000 to 1,200,000 bricks per month per kiln are produced in these sites of research. 362 Afghanis (\$7.60) per 1000 bricks in Deh Sabz and 251 Afghanis (\$5.27) per 1000 bricks in Surkhroad are the wage rates. **Nangarhar, Kabul, Pakistan, Balkh, Laghman are identified as the major regions from where predominantly migrant workers are recruited into this labour market.** With reference to the nature of the contracts this report observes that:

‘*Jamadars* coordinate the contracts, which are almost always verbal. The contract is technically between the head of household and kiln owner; kiln owners emphasized this point in several interviews to avoid responsibility for employing children. However, there is a tacit agreement that members of the household will also be helping in the production of unbaked bricks – unless there

are no other household members fit to work in the kiln. Interviewed kiln owners admitted that *jamadars* evaluated the “productivity” of households (*i.e.* the number, age and ability of household members planning to work in the kiln) in order to determine the size of advances they would be capable of repaying. With reference to the social background of the brick kiln predominantly migrant workers, this report suggest that these workers belong to different social groups viz., Pashtun: 80%, Tajik: 12%, Pashahee: 6%, Arab: 2%. About 43% are adult males (> 18 years) whereas only 1% are adult females. Less than 18 years of boys and girls constitutes about 56 percent of the labour. 47% of the workers are below 14 years. Of these children, only 15% attend schools along with being employed. 83% of the workers have had no formal education. 83% of the workers are seen as being stuck in bondage because they have stated that they are working to repay the debt they owe the owner. 70% of the workers have stated tht they cannot work elsewhere until the current loan is repaid. 75% basic necessities and 63% health expenditures were the major reasons for incurring debts. 10-15 hours is the working day for six days a week, in some places throughout the year. The conditions of work can be assessed based on the fact that several workers in the brick kilns suffer from respiratory diseases (asthma, chronic chest infections, silicosis), exposure to toxic fumes (using wastes and tires as fuel), seasonal diseases including Malaria, physical injuries, heat-strokes, skin allergies, illnesses related to poor hygiene and sanitation, stunted growth, malnutrition and shortened lifespan, all of which have been recorded. High prevalence of food insecurity of workers while in brick kilns is recorded.

The report points out that amongst the brick kiln worker households, 98% have been formerly exiled (legally and illegally) in Pakistan and 2% Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The number of advances borrowed per household in the past five years is 3.6 times and the average outstanding debt is \$.2618. It is noted that most advances are taken for basic necessities, illness/medical expenses and for other social functions.

A study by A.Ercelawn and M.Nauman (2004) significantly draws our attention to the following contributions to the study of brick kilns and un-free labour in Pakistan. This paper points out that ***migrant workers and especially traditional low caste households predominantly characterize the brick kiln workers. While most of these workers are Muslims, a sizable number of workers are also Christians*** ([http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed\\_norm/@declaration/documents/publication/wcms\\_082028.pdf](http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@declaration/documents/publication/wcms_082028.pdf)). The study notes:

*Pioneering work for Pakistan was done two decades ago by Yameema Mitha, Karamat Ali, Nighat Said Khan and others, published as Patterns of Female Employment in Mining and Construction*

*Industries, Lahore, Systems Ltd, 1981 and Women in the Brick Kiln Industry, Lahore, ASR, 1989. More recent assessments are by Zahoor Awan in Bonded Brick Kiln Workers: 1989 Supreme Court Judgment and After, Rawalpindi, APFOL, 1998, and by Kevin Bales in Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy, London, ASI, 1999.*

This paper presents some estimates, it argues that:

*‘Until the Federal Bureau of Statistics completes its national economic census, only rough estimates are possible for the current number and distribution of brick kilns. Using the wide range of tax rates per kiln, sales tax revenues indicate between 4,500 and 28,000 kilns in 1998-99. Field interviews suggested 6,000 working kilns, with the vast majority in Panjab. Hence, as many as a million children, women and men workers are employed in this industry, most under conditions of debt bondage’.*

A quick overview presented by this paper suggests that most of the brick kilns are located in Multan, Lahore and Rawalpindi in the Punjab province and in Peshawar and Haripur in the North-Western Frontier Province and Hyderabad in Sindh Province. Most of the brick kilns operate on lease contracts. The kiln sizes in terms of quantity of output range from kilns producing 400,000 baked bricks to kilns that produce 1,100,000 bricks in chakkar of around a month. The sale price of bricks and tiles ranges from Rs.700 to Rs.2400 (Pakistani rupees) per 1000. ***Both single male Pathera migrants as well as those with families reside on-site.*** The activity sets identified in the labour process are known by their colloquial names viz., ; the makers of unbaked bricks: Patheras, followed by those who do kiln stacking and unloading, the Bharai and Nikasi walas and by those who bake bricks, the Jalai walas.

The paper points out that *‘a team of four to five Jalai walas gets a monthly total sum of Rs 15-20,000, with higher wages going to the more skilled Mistri, and to more skilled teams. In poorer areas, wages can drop for the group to Rs 10,000. For Bharai, Nikasi and Pathera work is paid at a rate per 1,000 bricks. Both Bharai and Nikasi workers are said to be earning Rs.100-150 per person. For the Patheras the wages ranged between Rs.80-150 per person’.* However, in the North-Western Frontier Province as well as for Afghan workers, the paper observes that the wages were always lower.

A study by Muhammad Javaid Iqbal (2006) provides us with a significant list of studies on the brick kilns of Pakistan. This study notes that *‘the incidence of bonded labor in brick kilns has been highlighted by many writers. Thomas (1995) while identifying urban and rural labor market*

segmentation has pointed out bonded labor as a main characteristic of rural labor markets. He termed it as an extreme form of labor exploitation in South Asia. **The migratory nature of the labour market is seen as an important dimension explaining the prevailing quality of labour relations.** Ercelawn (2004), Hussain (1990), Hamid (1993), Mitha et. al. (1989), ILO (2001), Bales (1998), Kemal (1994); all pointed out the existence of advances, “peshgi”, indebtedness and bondage in the brick kiln sector of Pakistan’.

This study argues that all the above studies have ‘conclude that large family size is an important factor contributing to loans. The debt usually piled up and could not be paid by the indebted families, thus carried over to generations as ‘eternal’ debt. There is also no dispute regarding the involvement and exploitation of women and children at the workplace. Sexual abuse, torture and beating at the brick kilns have also been reported’.

With reference to the social background of the workers, this study observes that ‘The brick-making labor comprises few castes such as, “Masalies”, “Odd”, Christian and Afghani; they are all poor and have low status in society. The bonded labor system can also be linked to socio-cultural division of labor (professions) prevalent in the Sub-Continent for centuries. **Migratory in nature, the labor retain unique features.** Ercelawn (2004) referred to it as “footloose” labor. The institution of “jamadar” (contractor or sub-contractor), as contended by Hamid (1993), Mitha et. al. (1989), ILO (2001), Bales (1998), Kemal (1994), and Ercelawn (2004), plays a pivotal role in the “peshgi” system. Jamadars do not only provide a link between labor and the brick kiln owners, as explained by Mitha et. al., but are also the main source of bonded labor by acting as guarantor “zamin” for the bonded laborer’.

With reference to the conditions of life and its social consequences the study observes that ‘the labor resides at the kiln in the houses constructed and owned by the owner. These localities lack basic amenities of life such as drinking water, sanitation etc. There hardly exists any schools near those vicinities. **The migrant workers live in isolation from the local population with their own culture, traditions and customs. Isolation from the local populace gives rise to crimes such as theft and gambling which are common.** Family size is large and the dependency ratio is very high. The low earnings are not enough to meet the requirements of large families. The families are caught in the vicious cycle of poverty and cannot afford even elementary education for their young ones. They lack initiatives and have no potential to migrate to urban areas for higher rewards due to indebtedness and socio-cultural norms. Children and women, being the most vulnerable segment, have to bear the brunt of the burden’.

A paper by Lelia Croitoru and Maria Sarraf (2012) notes the significance of brick kiln industry in Bangladesh. This paper observes that *‘Brick making is a significant activity in Bangladesh, albeit not formally recognized as an industry. With about 5000 operating kilns, brick making contributes about 1 percent to the country’s gross domestic product and generates employment for about 1 million people. The country is highly dependent on bricks for construction, primarily because of lack of stones. Construction industry has been rapidly rising at 5.6 percent per year, which led brick sector to grow annually at an estimated 2 - 3 percent over the next decade. This paper notes that ‘the brick cluster north of Dhaka includes 530 kilns that produce about 2.1 billion bricks. Most of them are Fixed Chimney Kilns (FCKs), which are located on lowlands’.* Several health disorders amongst the workers who happen to have the highest exposure to pollution due to brick kilns have been analysed by this paper. **Elsewhere with reference to the Bangladeshi brick kiln workers, it is reported that these are constituted predominantly by migrant and low paid workers.** (<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2797/601550ESW0P1110e00201100Color0FINAL.txt?sequence=2&isAllowed=y>)

Thus, debt bondage, migration and the related labour relations associated with brick kilns seems to be an international phenomena at least the above case studies show this with respect to the South-Asian experience. And with specific reference to India, there is significantly large literature on labour relations in brick kilns across different states.

## 1.2. State Level Case Studies on Brick Kiln Labour in India:

Gurucharan Singh Kainth’s (2009) study points out that ‘there are about 2 lakh workers working in 2500 brick kiln units spread across Punjab. This study has been conducted on the brick kilns located in Amritsar, Jalandhar and Ludhiana. Based on a sample study, this research notes that ‘the workers can be classified into ***Patheras (Ring side and Moulders predominantly from Uttar Pradesh and Chattisgarh), Zalaiwalas (Furnace activity predominantly from Bihar) and Nakasiwalas (Loading/Unloading, predominantly from Rajasthan).*** This study identifies certain broad characteristics of this labour. According to this study, 77 percent fell in the age group of 20-40 years. 91.5 percent of workers were male. 89 percent of the workers were married. 81.5 percent of workers belonged to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. 81 percent of the families had a size ranging from four to six members. 60.5 percent of the workers never had formal education and another 26 and 5.5 percent had education levels of 5<sup>th</sup> standard and 8<sup>th</sup> standard respectively and another 8 percent were matriculates. **While the migration is identified as being seasonal and temporary in nature for a period of 7 months. A significantly large proportion of 29.50 percent have joined**

the migration stream as recent as less than five years ago at the time of the study while an equal proportion had been in the migration stream for over 15 years. And yet another 25.50 and 15.509 percent of workers had been migrating ever since 6-10 and 11-15 years respectively.

Jan Breman (2010) has analysed the labour relations in the brick kilns of South Gujarat and a section of the labour studied in the fieldwork undertaken were also going to Bombay (Mumbai). There are certain important theoretical inferences drawn with reference to the nature of labour relations in this analysis. Some excerpts from this paper are given below, Jan Breman observes that **:Employers who recruit migrant workers for an entire season are an important source for binding labor in a relationship of indebtedness.** A wide variety of economic activities that take place in the open air make use of such “footloose labor” tied down in a cycle of production that begins at the start of the dry season and ends before the first rainfall... However, as the transformation of Western economies progressed in the late nineteenth century, the circulation of labor declined. On the one hand, increased and more regular employment reduced the pressure to migrate temporarily to work elsewhere, while on the other hand, industrialization made it possible for rural migrants to settle down in towns and cities. The mobility of labor in India, both rural-to-urban and intra-rural, started to gather momentum in the second half of the twentieth century. But the annual trek from village to distant worksite and back has not resulted in permanent settlement. The circulation of labor is going on, with no end in sight... In the vicinity of Chikhligam, labor from far away is mobilized for a variety of activities, including the sugarcane harvest, road building, sand digging, and working in stone quarries. But large groups of laborers from south Gujarat go in search of work elsewhere, mostly in brick kilns. For many years, middlemen acting on behalf of brick manufacturers have recruited members of the land-poor and landless castes from Chikhligam. I have defined the modality of employment to which they are recruited as neo-bondage. Let me first explain why I see this arrangement as a form of labor bondage. During the monsoon, when the subsistence deficit in the landless neighborhoods is at its most urgent because of lack of work and income, the recruiting agent arrives to hand out earnest money that commits the recipient to leave the village two or three months later to go work in the brick fields. When the migrants arrive at the worksite, the jobber or labor recruiter (mukadam) becomes the foreman of the gang he has contracted.

Just like the hali—the bonded farm servant who had to work for his master until the debt was paid off—the seasonal worker cannot leave the brick kiln until he has worked off the advance

payment. Once the debt has been cleared, he should be free to leave, but his wage is then held back after a deduction of a weekly amount to cover his daily requirements, and paid in a lump sum when he returns home at the end of the season. If he leaves the kiln prematurely, he loses the net balance of seven months' work. He can ask for a new advance in the meantime, but if he does, too often he may have very little left at the end, perhaps just enough to pay for the journey home. Sometimes the migrant may even leave the kiln with a debt if he has received a large advance from the owner or the mukadam—for example, to arrange for his own wedding or that of another family member—an advance that cannot be paid off with one season's work. I refer to this situation of indebtedness as neo-bondage because despite its resemblance to the previous practice of halipratha, there are significant differences. Both situations lead to loss of freedom of movement, but in the case of the seasonal migrants, the advance they receive binds them only for the season. The agreement is not, as with the halis, the start of a relationship that often lasts for life or is even kept intact from generation to generation. Secondly, it applies only to the laborer, whereas when a hali was employed, his wife and children were usually in the master's service, too. That is not necessarily the case for the brick makers. The jobber pays earnest money for the wives and children, depending on their productive capacity....The debt the migrants enter into commits them to obedience and a show of deference in the same way that the halis had to respect their dhaniyamo. The migrant workers, however, have much more opportunity to escape the grips of the jobber/gang boss, and this is perhaps the greatest difference between traditional bondage and neo-bondage. Often they are cheated by one or the other. They are not able to check the balance of pay they take home with them at the end of the season. Protesting against maltreatment or underpayment when they leave is ineffective. All they can do is choose a different jobber the next season and go to work at a different kiln.

The jobbers have to keep a constant eye on them to ensure that they actually stick to the agreement to leave when the time comes. Some laborers accept earnest money from more than one jobber. The jobbers protect themselves against such deceit or disloyalty by keeping in contact with each other and drawing up a blacklist of clients who do not honor their contracts.

Some of the observations of theoretical significance in the above work are taken up for discussion in the ensuing discussion on framework for analysis.

Swati Ghosh's (2009) study provides some evidence pertaining to the brick kiln production in West Bengal. This study notes 'In West Bengal around 3500 brick-manufacturing units provide

employment (officially) to more than 0.7 million people from the rural agricultural sector. Brick industry creates 50 jobs against an investment of 0.1 million rupees compared to 7 jobs in other small scale industries and only 2 jobs in large scale industries. (Source: Annual Report, 2003-2004, Bengal Brickfield Owners Association: 5). With reference to the background of the workers, according to this study, 'the labour force in the brickfields comprises of Hindu and Muslim, tribal and non-tribal, men and women. Land-poor low caste Hindu communities such as tanti, koeri, jadav, dusad, musahar, lohar, and oraon, munda and bhumij kol among tribal population predominate the pool of unskilled labour in the brickfields of this region. **While tribal workers are largely single migrant women, non-tribal workers move with families.** Muslim workers constitute 21 percent of the labour force of which 18.3 percent is landless labour from West Bengal engaged in unskilled work and the 2.7 percent from Uttar Pradesh are skilled labour working as firemen. **Whether skilled or unskilled, Muslim workers do not migrate with families.** Gender and age profile of the workforce are significant with respect to allocation of job, mode of payment and employment of children. Women constitute about 60 percent of the work-force. The tribal woman joins the brickfields at an average age of fourteen and most of the time she is an independent earner. But the non-tribal low-caste woman always remains a secondary earner, learning to mould bricks with her mother at the tender age of eight and later after an early marriage supplements family income working with her husband'.

With reference to the mode of recruitment and the linkage between social identities and the labour process, this study observes that '*Dadan*\_or the advance payment (as low as Rs. 2000 to as high as Rs.8000) seems lucrative to a worker who is without regular employment and already under economic pressure due to dearth of money in the village. The period of offering of the advance coincides with the time when price of the crop is at its maximum (around October) -- a month or two before the harvesting of the primary food crop (in mid-December). The *dadan*-workers are required to pay-off the advance by working for the contractor without any cash payment of wages. A meagre amount of money is paid for subsistence – known as *khora*ki -- during the period of production....Classification of job is not based on efficiency or physical strength needed to perform the task. Gendering of work and community based stereotyping is justified on account of difference in possession of skill and by place of origin. As a result of such division of labour, Hindu men from Medinipur district of West Bengal and Muslim men from Uttar Pradesh are employed as fireman as the most skilled labour required at the brickfields. Muslim workers from Murshidabad district are considered to be best suited for digging deep trenches along silted riverbeds. While the non-tribal male workers are engaged in arrangement of sunburnt bricks within the brick-kiln before firing that



requires a certain technical expertise, low-caste Hindu women of the family are engaged in brick making and tribal workers are engaged in laborious and unskilled job of loading and unloading of bricks'. ***The study further observes that 'tribal women migrating from Chakradharpur, Palamu, Ranchi or Hazaribagh in Jharkhand and non-tribal families from the villages of Chhapra, Purniya or Nawada in Bihar are located in different clusters within the enclosure.*** The short-term single male workers are housed in different location within the premise of the brickfield, apart from the accommodations of family labour and single women. It may be said that the spatial arrangement of the workers in different clusters at the site is a managerial strategy instrumental to isolate each group and maintain a close watch on the workers even beyond work schedule. In being located separately the workers would be reluctant to cross the 'natural' boundaries of language, religion and ethnicity with minimum interaction among themselves'.

With reference to the working conditions of brick kiln workers in West Bengal, this study notes that 'They receive only subsistence during production season, which amounts to Rs.120 to 150 per week per head, the remaining portion of their earning is retained for payment of debt. The amount earned over and above repayment of debt (if any) is paid at the end of the production season. The wage rate according to which payments are set, differ between men and women. While the wage rate for male worker is sixty rupees for moulding 1000 bricks, for female worker the rate is forty to forty-five rupees on the ground that women are 'slow' workers. The lower the piece-rate, more bricks are required to be produced by a family and the loan repayment extended over a longer stretch of time. The actual payment for both men and women ultimately depends on the provisional rate of commission charged from labours as desired by the supervisory staff. The element of personal discretion over payment enhances opportunities for tailored exploitation'.

***In yet another study, Swati Ghosh (2010) deals with migration into West Bengal in general with a focus on activities such as brick kilns.*** It observes that 'with the process of industrialization and urbanization from the beginning of early nineteenth century, economic migration was a significant phenomenon both for the poor people of the districts as well as the neighbouring states of Bengal. As the city grew, labour from the hinterland – largely from Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Orissa -- crowded in. with reference to the mode of recruitment and nature of the labour markets as well as the predominant activity sets into which migrants are recruited into, the study reveals that 'most of the migrants have little or no education and are engaged as unskilled workers. The recruitment of migrant labour is still organized through contractors in brick-fields, plantation and construction work, where debt- bondage mechanism predominates to initiate a circular movement at an interval that coincides with the fluctuations of labour demand. Classical

push factors that mark the bulk of inter-state migration to take place are: long term drought situation, hilly and dry land cultivation, land fragmentation, poverty and debt. Besides, debt-induced migration had always been and still is the most important factor for circular migration for poor Indian households. Gumla and Palamau districts of Jharkhand are highest senders of seasonal migrants to West Bengal who work largely in the brick-fields and road construction' (Jharkhand News 2008).

Alpa Shah's work on brick kiln migration from Jharkhand stands out as an exception in the plethora of experiences. While the scholar does not refute or challenge other works, but rather attempts at probing into an altogether different dimension of this process. The study maintains that 'I do not aim here to conduct an economic analysis of migration, nor do I contest the view of migrant labour at the brick kilns as part of an exploitative system of capitalist production. Indeed many migrants acknowledge that they are cheap labour for wealthy industrialists and that they expect to be cheated at the kilns. As Willis has proposed with regard to why working-class children in England want working-class jobs, . There really is at some level a rational and potentially developmental basis for outcomes which appear to be completely irrational and regressive. (1978: 120). In other words, I suggest that it is not contradictory to view brick kiln labour migration as exploitative, while also understanding that most migrants not only view their movement as a choice but also see the brick kilns as an important, if temporary, space away from the social constraints back home'. As a composite part of the research that exists on brick kiln migration, this study might be seen as presenting an additional dimension in that this migration does not only entail economic risk and insecurity but also extends to social and cultural risks and uncertainties. Looking at the processes in terms of the larger developmental questions it is therefore that this study concludes with the observations that 'the Jharkhandi anti-migration campaign partly reflects a desire to redefine Jharkhand as a tribal state and to re-imagine a .purer, *adivasi* state citizen. Opponents of migration, who see the kilns as a threat to the ideas of purity and regulation of the social and sexual tribal body, create a moral climate that paradoxically encourages many young people to flee to the brick kilns where they think people can live .freely. away from these regulations. **I suggest that these discourses of freedom point to transformations of power in which the new puritanism at home helps to reproduce the conditions for capitalist exploitation and the extraction of surplus value'. As always the choice that is often presented to the poorest of the poor seems to be one between multiple structures of dominance and in that sense presents itself with alternative injuries.**

Yet another study on Tamil Nadu by Isabelle Guerin (et.al) (2012) focused on brick kilns in the Tiruvallur and Kancheepuram districts (north-east of Tamil Nadu), where it is pointed out that a significant portion of the production of bricks is concentrated. The study adopted a comparative framework for analysis. The comparison is between two groups of workers. It is argued by this study that; 'two distinct groups of workers emerged, the first consisting of households coming mostly from dry areas (92 percent). They are economically better off, more often owning a piece of land and concrete houses, more jewellery, and often not experiencing food insecurity.<sup>2</sup> These households are bigger, older and less educated. Most are able to borrow outside the usual sources of pawnbrokers and landlords, and they more frequently combine brick kiln with agriculture on their own land for a living. The second group consists of households with the opposite characteristics. They mostly come from irrigated areas (98 percent) and are economically more vulnerable, with fewer assets, no land, poor housing and many suffering from food insecurity. Very few borrow from outside the usual sources, this perhaps indicating that their social network is restricted. These households are also younger, smaller and slightly better educated at both primary and secondary level.

***This study concludes that 'heterogeneous circulation patterns are both reflective and constitutive of differences in positions within the industry, degrees of bargaining power and thus differing working conditions. Workers' capacity to resist exploitation is extremely limited. This is even more the case for migrants coming from wetlands.*** Incomes are lower: according to our survey in 2004, the average wage per head and per season was 5,863 INR for workers from the wetlands as opposed to 7,656 INR from the drylands, namely 23 percent lower. Their working conditions and relationships are worse : child labour is more prevalent, housing conditions are poorer, workers have fewer days off, freedom of movement is highly limited, wage conditions are not transparent, and the workers complain more frequently of harassment and cheating problems. They are less frequently able to bargain, and those who try do so mainly as regards the advance, while workers from the dry zones negotiate wages'.

Finally, the recent India Exclusion Report 2013-14, has significant observations on unfree-labour in general and specifically with reference to the brick kiln industrial employment. This report observes that:

***'Labour bondage is a centuries-old practice that is assuming newer forms based on the prevalent social and economic structures of the day. Traditional forms of labour bondage, mostly observed in agriculture, involved several generations of the same family being bonded to the same household.***

*The element of patronage in traditional bonded labour arrangements also ensured some degree of social protection for the labourer. This feature is largely absent from newer forms of labour bondage, which are of a shorter duration and primarily an economic relationship. The employer now feels unfettered from even the feudal forms of protection of the bonded worker of the past, such as ensuring that the labourer's family does not starve. It is in many ways the worst of both worlds, of feudal and capitalist relations. Apart from agriculture, where both traditional and newer forms of bondage co-exist, bonded labour is now also found among workers in a wide range of nonagricultural sectors: stone quarries, brick kilns, sex workers, fishermen, forest labourers, bidi workers, carpet makers, weavers, head loaders and children in match and firework factories, among others.*

*Special bridge courses are run by the SSA, in partnership with Action Aid, for children of migrant brick kiln workers in Andhra Pradesh. Located near brick kiln sites, children in these courses are taught in their native Oriya language in order to overcome language barriers, and are also given a certificate of passing to ensure promotion to the next class in their local schools back home. Other such examples include bhonga shalas at brick kiln sites and shaker shalas at settlements of migrant sugarcane cutters, both in Maharashtra,<sup>73</sup> and bhatta schools in brick kilns in Jhajjar, Haryana.*

*In 2009, the report of the National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector (NCEUS) revealed shocking data about India's labour landscape. A vast majority of jobs created in recent years have been in the informal sector, outside of a legal framework for labour protection and social security. Out of every 100 workers, the report revealed, 86 work in the informal economy, producing half of India's economic output. The brick kiln sector in India is a perfect example of the employment of migrant labourers in highly exploitative labour arrangements. Employing about 8 million persons, this sector complements work in the agricultural sector by providing seasonal employment in the agricultural lean season, from October to March every year. Most workers migrate from the poorer states to the relatively more developed ones. States like Punjab attract about 1.4 million workers every year, and other major destinations include Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat. Typically, the industry works with migrant labourers, who look for assured work, as well as advances to meet the expenses at home, in the lean season. This is the gap that labour contractors fill, by providing advances varying from as little as `4,000 to as much as `40,000 per family, while employers extend these advances to the contractors directly. The existence of the labour contractors in this arrangement ensures that the employer–employee relationship between the principal employer, in this case the brick kiln owner, and the worker, is never established. It is*

*therefore unclear who is to be held accountable for the highly exploitative conditions under which these workers must make their living. There are no proper wage calculations, and advances are only settled by the contractor at the end of the six-month period. In the interim, the migrant workers are completely dependent on the labour contractor, living in extremely harsh working conditions and under constant threat of violence. In most cases, children accompanying their parents also work at the kilns, which deprives them of school education’.*

### **1.3. The Studies on Labour from Bolangir:**

In a report written jointly under the auspices of World Bank, DFID, NRI and Action Aid, by Tiago Wandschneider and Pravas Mishra, an analysis of the rural-urban continuum in Orissa with a focus on Bolangir is made. Quite clearly, the town has been more a mode of diversifying consumption, a simple market place and a center for accessing relatively improved social infrastructure rather than entities signifying economic development activity where towns would be emerging as growth poles driven by way of being centers of production based accumulation activity. Some excerpts from the report broadly present the main findings of this report. The report points out that:

*‘An overwhelming majority of respondents regard marketing as the single most important function of rural towns. Positive perceptions regarding the relatively important role of local towns in the marketing sphere reflect the lack of market opportunities at the village level, and suggest that being able to market outside the limited confines of the village and its surroundings impacts favourably on household incomes. However, given their very small size and relatively limited growth over the past decade, local towns in Bolangir District are unlikely to constitute significant and dynamic consumption or primary wholesale centres.*

*The provision of health services stands out as the second most important function of rural towns. This confirms dependency on towns for health services due to their unavailability at village level. The role of towns as input supply and employment centres are also considered important. Eight percent of interviewed households indicated employment generation as the most significant role of towns while 16 percent regarded it as the second most important. One possible reason why employment did not rank higher is because towns within Bolangir District offer very few opportunities for regular commuting due to their limited employment generation capacity. Finally, the fact that towns were not perceived to play an important role in the education sphere reflects the acute demand constraints in access to education.*

*Women and children have been found to be disadvantaged in accessing towns. Further, observations pertaining to caste discrimination are significant. The fact that no household from general castes accessed employment in towns is also significant, suggesting much lower levels of distress and therefore less need to look for employment opportunities outside the village economy. Greater access to land and asset ownership by general castes certainly plays an important role in reducing the need to migrate during times of distress.*

*While low levels of urban development pose significant constraints on rural development, ultimately they are a consequence of a stagnant and highly unequal village economy, which provides a very small market for production and consumption goods and generates limited surpluses for processing and trading, thereby failing to stimulate town-based economic activity<sup>12</sup>. In other words, rural towns rarely develop independently from their rural hinterland: as intermediary centres linking villages to the wider economy, they reflect economic development patterns in both spaces. Their formation and growth is intimately dependent on upstream and downstream development dynamics.*

*Local towns were found to provide limited employment opportunities, with many households having to migrate outside Bola ngir District in order to access jobs. They also play a minor role in the provision of education services to village households. Finally, it is unclear the extent to which local towns stimulate village level production and contribute to improved household incomes by serving as market outlets or channelling village production to other markets. Their small size and limited growth over the past decade suggest that they are not playing a very dynamic role in the marketing sphere.*

*Yet, even though they may not be acting as important growth centers, small local towns still provide critical services to village households, who depend to a large extent on the nearest block headquarter for accessing health services, inputs, finance and markets. Members from all caste groups benefit from interaction with rural towns, even if the gains are unevenly distributed. Male members from upper caste households benefit disproportionately, especially in terms of access to education and financial services. Women from all caste groups are at a clear disadvantage due to severe mobility constraints arising from social and cultural norms’.*

While the above paper has presented some of the reasons why labour from Bolangir are unable to find adequate employment in Orissa itself, in an Action Aid International report authored by Koy Thomson (et.al) (2005) based on primary level survey done on Bolangir migrants to Hyderabad

brick kilns, the grueling experience of workers being moved from the place of origin to the place of destination and the nature of their employment has been described. The report observes that:

*‘ Journeys are full of uncertainty and dread. As a migrant you lock up your homes, gather all of your belongings (clothes, rice, cooking utensils), and throw yourself to the mercy of the Sardar. First timers will have no idea where they are going. Bilasani, clinging to her small child, was crushed into a truck which gathered tens of other migrants from the neighbouring countryside, and drove to the railway station of Kantabhanji. Hundreds of others were huddled together on the platform, fending off the cold and gangs of thieving thugs. The Sardar got busy bribing police and railway officials to cover his lack of proper licence and to ensure that with his bulk tickets he could pack up to three hundred people in carriages meant for fewer than a hundred. Into its three unreserved compartments, in the five tense minutes of halt at Kantabhanji station, several hundred of the migrant workers, clinging desperately to their children and their small cloth bundles, were pushed in by the contractors’ agents. The Sardar arranged the cheapest route, which means a journey of three days instead of one. Bilasani stood for 18 hours, crushed, holding her child, with no water, food or access to lavatories. Fainting, severe diarrhoea, desperation and pain is common. Death releases some, according to the repeated testimonies of migrant communities. The journey is a no-man’s-land for social activism. You can’t have an office on a train. It is hard to work with completely exhausted and confused people if you only ever see them once, and at that fleetingly. The journey remains the time of most complete abandonment.*

*The brick kiln industry is simple, ruthlessly exploitative and highly evolved. It is profitable enough to get all relevant people to turn a blind eye to its illegality. ‘Officially’ nearly 100% of the brick kilns in Hyderabad are illegal. They simply do not have the licences to operate, or the necessary registration for migrant workers. None of the worker welfare requirements within the 1967 Interstate Migrant Workmen’s Act are met. Unofficially, a most influential web of landowners (who rent the land), politicians (who are often the landowners), policemen, labour and revenue officials (who all turn a blind eye), Panchayat officials (who may own land, kilns, or be Sardars), and a host of other petty and not so petty officials make lucrative ‘bonuses’ from the industry’.*

From 2005 to the current phase, have the official statistics and administrative interventions into the brick kiln industry improved? Have conditions of workers and quality of employment and labour relations changed for the better? These questions are addressed as part of this report.

Thus, if we look at the literature on brick kilns both at national level experiences which include, Punjab and Haryana in the north-west, Maharashtra and Gujarat in the West, Uttar Pradesh and

Delhi in the north, West Bengal, Bihar, Chattisgarh, and Jharkhand in eastern India, and erstwhile united Andhra Pradesh (now Telangana state) and Tamil Nadu in southern India which have something to do with the location of production or sourcing of labour in the brick kiln industry, or even from those reports focused on Orissa's Bolangir district a common thread emerges connecting almost all the experiences. Large number of common observations with reference to mode of payments and its interconnection with indebtedness and un-free labour, working hours, working and living conditions where labour laws or standards don't seem to have been adhered to etc., have been made. However, another important aspect common to all these inquiries is the predominance of inter-state migration of labour. This brings us into the larger debate on the theme of inter-state migration in India.

#### **1.4. The Contested Domain of Inter-state Labour Circulation :**

The Unorganised sector and informal employment even in the Private organised sector continue to play a significant role in the production and an even more critical role in the generation of employment in the Indian economy (NCEUS, 2008; NSC, 2012). Based on the NSS 66<sup>th</sup> round, Employment and Unemployment Survey, 2009-10, it is pointed out that 'organised employment accounted for only 16% of the overall employment in the economy. Even within this small segment, almost half of it is in the form of informal employment'. It is even more pertinent to note that the informal employment in organised manufacturing sector accounts for about 67% of its total employment. (Santosh Mehrotra, Ankita Gandhi, Partha Saha and Bimal Kishore Sahoo, 2013).

When the above mentioned statistics are read in combination with the data on migration, it makes a very interesting reading. The NSS 64th Round shows an increase in short-duration out-migration although there is a slight change in the concept<sup>1</sup>. There were an estimated 15.2 million short-duration out-migrants, of whom 12.9 million (85.1 per cent) were male, and 13.9 million (71 per cent) were rural out-migrants (that is, census-adjusted figures). While an overwhelming majority of these migrants were from rural areas, more than two thirds migrated to urban areas. And it is pertinent to note that the more distant urban destinations predominated - it is stated that 36.4 per cent of the out-migrants went to urban areas in other states (a total of 45.1 per cent went to other

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<sup>1</sup> New Definition for Temporary Migrant Households: The 64th Round considered the people who stayed away from their UPR for work / seeking work for a period between one month and six months as short-duration out migrants, provided further that they had stayed away for more than 15 days in any one spell.



states) and 22.1 per cent went to urban areas in other districts. But inter-state migration was more among males (47.9 per cent) compared with females (27.5 per cent) (Ravi Srivatsava, 2011).

With informalisation and flexibilisation, several micro-level studies having fair level of national representation show that albeit a small segment of the total long distance or inter-state migrants, nevertheless, a significantly large proportion of the contractual employment is constituted by long distance or inter-state migrant labour (Manjit Singh and K.Gopal Iyer, 1985; Karin Kapadia, Jan Breman and Jonathan Perry, 1999; J.Ghosh, 2005; G.Vijay, 2005; Deshingkar Priya and Farrington John, 2009; Jan Breman, 2010; Swapna Banerjee-Guha, 2010; Mohammad Talib, 2010). Predominantly the long distance or inter-state migration streams especially of low to medium skilled workers are mediated by social identity based networks (community and caste, family and kinship, ethnicity, linguistic and locale based) as a mode of migration. Once they come into existence, most often than not, the networks based mobility triggers-off chain migration streams, each stream associating itself with specialization in some industrial activities as a whole (entire labour process) or specializing in particular segments of the labour processes within certain other industries.

While analysts of particular persuasion may suggest that the mobility of rural masses from rural to urban areas and their entry into the organised sector employment in itself could signify an important landmark in the development process under the assumption that these are welfare enhancing rational choices, (Lewis, V.A, 1954; Todaro, Michael.P, 1977; Stark Oded and David Bloom, 1985; Lucas Jr, Robert.E, 2004). Any generalized interpretation of migration as a decision necessarily constituted by welfare enhancing outcomes based on behavioral assumptions without studying the mode of mobility and the conditions of employment as well as the conditions of life itself - especially of workers in the informal sector could be flawed.

One of the dominant approaches focusing on inter-state migration streams suggests that the circulation of labour is a phenomenon characterized by structurally driven conditions of inadequate subsistence and forced choices associated with dispossession, displacement and distress contributing to new forms of bondage in employment, precarious and sweatshop employment, vulnerability and insecurity driven subjugation of labour to over exploitation (Manjit Singh and K.Gopal Iyer, 1985; Karin Kapadia, Jan Breman and Jonathan Perry, 1999; J.Ghosh, 2005; G.Vijay, 2005; Jan Breman, 2010; Swapna Banerjee-Guha, 2010; Mohammad Talib, 2010). In effect, the above set of studies suggest that inter-state circular migratory processes manifest a development path structurally driven by exclusion of rural masses from the protections and privileges often associated with modern employment.

The critiques of this approach however disagree with this analysis. According to the scholars who critique the dominant approach, inter-state circular migration streams (with the exception of some industrial segments viz., brick kilns and construction) although may start off as a coping strategy but eventually evolves into an accumulative strategy (Deshingkar Priya and Farrington John, 2009). To cut a long story short, the critiques contend that inter-state circular migration is a development phenomenon suggestive of an inclusive process providing the impoverished rural masses with avenues for diversification of productive employment and ought to be treated as an income augmentation strategy. The nature of labour relations associated with migration or rather circulation have been controversial. An associated question pertains to the nature of labour relations associated with accumulation itself. The migration streams of brick kiln labour certainly present one of those sites where controversies about the nature of labour relations associated with migration and its connection with development as a rural-urban continuum become highly complicated. This seems to be an international phenomena at least with reference to South-Asian countries and more so with reference to India and therefore require a detailed analysis addressing both the international as well as specifically the Indian scenario.

#### **1.5. Accumulation and Migration; Primitive Accumulation, Accumulation by Dispossession v/s Accumulation Through Extra-Economic means :**

An article by Lerche (2011) analysed categories and processes relating to a spectrum of labour relations, spanning both those generally seen as 'unfree' or 'forced' as well as other 'low end' labour relations. Lerche maintains that: the forced/unfree – free labour dichotomy hinders a proper understanding of these labour relations for two reasons: firstly, there are serious problems in the way it is applied empirically, with all that it entails in terms of a geographically and politically skewed understanding of these labour relations and, secondly, it is a dubious theoretical categorization.

Lerche offers a substantive critique of the ILO's understanding of unfree labour relations. He argue that:

Un-free labour is theorized as a deviation from such standard free labour relations. Opposed to standard labour relations, forced labour relations are by definition 'exploitative'. They exist where market forces have been circumvented by the employer through the deployment of extra-economic force, and this enables the employer to undercut the market price of labour and to disregard the rights of labour. This is unique to unfree labour. The centrality of the use of non-economic force is

unfree labour relations is reflected in the overall ILO definition of forced labour as well as in the ILO conventions against forced labour, as they hone in on a) involuntary entry into the labour relation and, b) the retaining of labour through a 'menace of penalty', i.e., through force or threat of force.

According to the official ILO definition and thus also the definition of international conventions, it is only when both entry into and exit from the labour relations are conditioned by non-economic force that the labour relation is unfree. However, this is modified considerably when the concept is operationalised. Then only one of the following three criteria needs to be fulfilled :

- Forced entry;
- Retaining labour in an employment relation against his or her will;
- The employment can be left only at a great risk.

These three criteria Lerche argues cover conditions such as: entry through deception; the physical retaining of the worker; confiscation of identity papers; holding back part of wages; and for debt bonded labour contexts where debt repayment is not limited to a reasonable time or where the work of the debtor is not reasonably applied towards the liquidation of the debt labour. Based on this the ILO has calculated a minimum estimate of forced labour in the world of 12.3 million. Of these, 7.8 million are forced through 'private economic exploitation', as opposed to 'state or military imposed' forced labour (2.5 million), 'commercial sexual exploitation' (1.4 million) or 'mixed' (0.6 million).

The ILO is caught in a bind by the discrepancies between its theoretical model of free-unfree labour relations and the realities of such relations. Moreover, even minor changes to its theoretical approach are difficult. Such changes could involve either the relaxation of the boundary between freedom and unfreedom, or of the boundary between economic and extra-economic force. However, regarding the unfreedom-freedom boundary, to the ILO this is synonymous with the non-exploitation/exploitation dichotomy, so softening this boundary would involve a gradation of 'exploitation'. But as the liberal exploitation category is based on the negation of 'normal' free labour which per definition is non-exploitative, it follows that the exploitation/non-exploitation approach has to be dichotomous. In other words, the 'political' aspect of the labour relation ('freedom') would have to become unhinged from the economic aspects ('non-exploitation/exploitation').

For Marx, it is not exploitation that distinguishes unfree from free labour. Instead, Marx according to Lerche saw the free/unfree dichotomy as a core line of division between capitalist and pre-

capitalist exploitation. This formed an important part of his general argument regarding how capitalism differs from feudalism....free labour is a necessary condition for capitalism to develop. Unfree labour i.e., labour that is not free to choose employer (serfs, slaves etc.,) is deemed to be a pre-capitalist form of labour.

To invoke the idea of unfree labour under capitalism therefore according to Lerche runs counter to Marx's analysis. And therefore he suggests that some Marxists refrain from use of unfree labour in the capitalist context. Lerche refers to work of Mohan Rao wherein it is held that it is inconceivable that non-economic force can come into play in highly developed capitalism; free labour is axiomatic and present day unfreedom in countries in the south is explained as being due to the 'semi-feudal' character of such countries.

However, Lerche points out that several scholars including himself hold that present day 'unfree' labour relations are not pre-capitalist. Lerche invokes ideas and formulations of Jan Breman who Lerche points out argues that present-day unfree labour which he terms 'neo-bondage' is fully capitalist in the sense that, a) it is based on exclusively economic contract, stripped of pre-capitalist 'patron-client' vestiges linked to the need of landlords to enhance their power through such hierarchical social ties, b) it is now most often time bound (sometimes only for a season) as opposed to unlimited, c) it is organized by a labour contractor who hires and fires bounded labour along principles based on free labour markets, and, d) the bounded labourers are primarily migrant workers, not tied to employers through long lasting ties. Unfreedom under capitalism has the function of cheapening and controlling labour.

Lerche further goes on to argue that for Tom Brass and Jan Breman unfree labour is unique due to the presence of non-economic force. In addition, to Brass, this process constitutes de-proletarianization. However, for other scholars, unfree labour fulfils the same purpose as does labour relations such as putting-out system, employment of labour through labour sub-contractors, child labour and, at a societal level, oppression of labour rights, they create more docile and cheap labour force.

Away from the earlier debates located in historicism, transition of modes of production, there has been a resurgence of interest in understanding the nature of labour relations in the contemporary neo-liberal phase of the capitalist development. There have been several contestations in the debate on mobility of labour within the Marxist approach in contemporary

analysis in terms of interpreting the interconnection between mobility of labour and the nature of accumulation that the neo-liberal regime of capitalism generates.

For Marx it is observed the initial rise of capitalism is rooted in forceful dispossession of the rural masses thus creating wage labourers, thus, simultaneously with appropriation of the means of production by the capitalist class, free wage labour constituting the double freedoms get generated. The predatory mode of appropriation was also the case with colonial regimes. It is only after this phase conceptualized as the primitive accumulation that the more sophisticated depiction of the purely economic modes of transactions came into existence. In the more contemporary times, this framework has been re-invoked by scholars while discussing the forceful transfer of land and other common property resources from traditional livelihoods, social groups, economic activities to high valued activities. The role that the Indian state played in the transfer of land as part of the creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) for instance is an area where primitive accumulation as a conceptual frame has been employed. However, some analysts are in disagreement. Scholars like David Harvey have argued on the lines that invoking a concept like Primitive Accumulation which historically was identified with pre-democratic state and colonial states, to explain contemporary processes was anachronistic. And alternative David Harvey has proposed the concept of Accumulation through Dispossession. Some scholars have dwelled on distinguishing the primitive accumulation from Accumulation through Dispossession and the genealogy of this discourse.

Jim Glassman (2006) attempts at bringing conceptual clarity with reference to the alternative conceptualizations in terms employing the category of 'primitive accumulation' as against the more contemporary concepts such as 'accumulation by dispossession' as against 'accumulation through extra-economic' means (including force or violence).

*As with his earlier analysis of the commodity, Marx analyzes this phenomenon as a transformation of social relations. Primitive accumulation is for Marx, first and foremost, the 'historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production', transforming 'the social means of subsistence and of production into capital' and 'the immediate producers into wage laborers' (1967: 714).*

Commodity production for Marx signified a social transformation wherein the forceful usurpation of common property through individual acts of violence that preceded it was different from the parliamentary form of robbery that followed it. Thus, it is interpreted therefore that primitive accumulation for Marx was a characteristic feature of Capitalism confined to a particular although an indefinite period of time. The suggestion is interpreted as anticipating a normalized process of expanded reproduction supplementing the primitive accumulation with the rise of capitalism.

*One version of the debate over primitive accumulation in the 1970s that brought out this point focused on the ‘conservation-dissolution’ dialectic. Marx himself recognized that ‘the manufacture, properly so called, conquers but partially the domain of national production, and always rests on the handicrafts of the town and the domestic industry of the rural districts as its ultimate basis’. Thus, even where capitalist development destroyed one or another of these ‘in one form, in particular branches, at certain points, it calls them up again elsewhere, because it needs them for the preparation of raw material up to a certain point’ (1967: 748). Rosa Luxemburg had furthered this idea, offering an argument for the permanent necessity of primitive accumulation by suggesting that the crisis tendencies of capitalism identified by Marx made the constant conquest of non-capitalist territories for the expropriation of raw materials and the reinvestment of surplus a requirement for capitalist stability (Luxemburg, 1951; cf. Bradby, 1975).*

*In elaborating this matter, moreover, it is important to note the various forms of social labor that are not paid for totally by capital but are required by capital – from publicly funded infrastructure provision, subsidies to research and development, and publicly funded training and education of workers, to gendered and often racialized household labor, and policing and other activities connected to maintenance of capitalist property relations. These forms of labor are always central to capitalism, even in its most ‘mature’ forms. Within the autonomist Marxist tradition, recognition of the breadth and depth of these social reproductive activities and the ways they are integral to formally capitalist accumulation has led to the assertion that capitalism has reached a stage in which all activities are subsumed within what Mario Tronti calls the ‘social factory’ (Tronti, 1973). That is, all social activities are subsumed within processes that lead to the production and appropriation of surplus value by capitalists (cf. Dalla Costa and James, 1972; Bell, 1978; Cleaver, 1979; Negri, 1991). Seen in this way, the production of value that enters into the circuits of capitalist accumulation through the parasitization of formally non-capitalist processes is a deeply embedded feature of capitalism, going beyond the imperialist appropriation identified in earlier Marxist debates. Moreover, there is little reason to suppose that capitalists would wish to dispose of all formally non-capitalist processes of production and social reproduction (ie, directly commodify everything), since to do so would require capitalists to pay all the costs of reproducing capitalist social relations, including the requirements for developing an exploitable labor force. ( Jim Glassman(2006))*

Elsewhere it is argued by scholars like Tayyab Mahmud that:

*David Harvey coined the term accumulation by dispossession to signify that accumulation facilitated by legal and extra-legal non-economic means is an enduring condition of capitalism, rather than just its historical precondition. The construct signals that markets always rely on non-market forces, particularly legal orders and extra-legality, to disproportionately allocate power and resources to owners of capital.*

*...scholarship on endemic crises of capitalism, the political economy of growth, dependency theory, world systems theory, accumulation on a world scale, and articulation of modes of production, establishes that primitive accumulation is "a basic ontological condition for capitalist production, rather than just a historical precondition." As a result, "production of value that enters into the circuits of capitalist accumulation through parasitization of formally non-capitalist processes is a deeply embedded feature of capitalism." These interventions underscore the continuing role of coercive political forces in underwriting the purportedly extra-political realm of the market. They also alert us that capitalism, since its origins is a global phenomenon that often co-opts rather than displaces non-capitalist modes of production, and results in uneven development of different geographical zones within its ambit. The global geography of capitalism enables this accumulation by extra-economic means through a myriad of legal and extra-legal regimes that range from global to local, and from formal to customary. These insights highlight that primitive accumulation does not lead to complete proletarianization and that non-proletarian and semi-proletarian labor remains integral to capitalism.(Tayyab Mahmud, 2011)*

*...Expanding on this argument, Katharyne Mitchell, Sallie Marston, and Cindi Katz in fact argue against the very notion of a separation between the work of production and social reproduction (2004). From this perspective, gendered and racialized forms of household labor that have been conceived as part of the process of social reproduction are in fact integral to the overall process of production and accumulation. This makes alienation and appropriation of surplus value central to an even wider range of activities than those typically discussed under the heading of primitive accumulation. I follow the tradition of referring to the entire panoply of forms of accumulation by means other than expanded reproduction – the primitive accumulation discussed by Marx, new or ongoing forms of accumulation by dispossession, and the gendered and racialized forms of accumulation within social reproduction noted here – as ‘accumulation by extra-economic means’. Adding to the picture the extra-economic accumulation of (mainly) women’s unpaid social reproductive labor – including the varied forms of subjugation and social struggle that enable this – makes the geography of struggle against global capitalism appear yet more complicated. The geography of global capitalism embraces all scales and spaces, in complex ways, and this inherently*

*makes both understanding and struggling to overcome capitalist alienation deeply complicated. (as in Jim Glassman(2006)).*

Thus, while Glassman recognizes that there is a logic to accumulation that goes beyond dispossession, he associates it under the rubric of 'extra-economic means' with what Polanyi would characterize as fictitious commodities, albeit mediated by social structures. However, this approach also seems to be inadequate for the analysis of modes of accumulation happening in the global south. A further extension of this debate is found in Michael Levien.

Michael Levien (2011) in one of his studies focuses on the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and argues that :

*While land has always been the single most important asset in rural India, that land is also now increasingly desired by domestic and international capital looking for space to create factories, offices, residential townships, shopping complexes and various forms of infrastructure on a Private Public Partnership (PPP) basis. The contradiction between these sources of demand for land is intensified by the fact that farmers often find themselves poorly equipped to benefit from the kinds of economic activity for which their land is desired. So while the State's role in transferring land to private capital has increased with the onset of liberalization, farmer resistance to land dispossession has metastasized into a series of small wars across the sub-continent, with SEZ as a prime target.*

Michael Levien in course of this analysis differs with the characterizations made by both David Harvey and Glassman, Levien suggests that :

*Following Marx's analysis of primitive accumulation as accumulation in which 'conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder in short force, played the greatest part', we would expect Harvey to define accumulation by dispossession as the deployment of extra-economic coercion in the process of accumulation, as Glassman suggests in his overview of the movement from primitive accumulation to ABD. This would capture many of the examples of dispossession that Harvey provides, such as dams, SEZs, slum demolitions, and transfer of public wealth that Harvey sees as moving to the foreground of accumulation under neo-liberalism. However, Harvey fails to provide a clear definition of ABD in either *The New Imperialism* (2003) or *A Brief History of Neo-Liberalism* (2005) (he instead includes a list of examples and a few categories of processes). And while Glassman suggests that 'accumulation by extra-economic means' is the uniting thread of both primitive accumulation and ABD, Harvey explicitly rejects this, claiming that it is 'primarily economic rather than extra-economic' and 'is most importantly exercised through the credit system and financial power'.*



Levien propounds alternatively that:

*But if what constitutes ABD is its function in providing outlets for over-accumulated capital, this makes it indistinguishable from other 'spatial fixes' and the ordinary operations of capitalist expansion that he analyses elsewhere. The concept's specificity and utility is undermined, as it is no longer clear what ties together the various processes that he clubs under accumulation by dispossession and what makes them distinct from 'expanded reproduction'...consequently, I define accumulation by dispossession as the use of extra-economic coercion to expropriate means of subsistence, production or common social wealth for capital accumulation. It is the extra-economic character of accumulation by dispossession that distinguishes it from 'the silent compulsion of economic relations' that constitutes 'expanded reproduction' and that forces us to consider why and with what consequences this defining characteristic of pre-capitalist surplus expropriation seems to have reached new prominence under neoliberal capitalism...In the case of rural India today, I show ADB to be decidedly political process through which the State's coercive power is deployed to make a key condition of production – land – available for capital in a context where increasing demand confronts the barrier to accumulation represented by smallholding peasants and incompletely capitalist rural land markets. This conjuncture under neo-liberalism is giving rise to what I call a land broker State, which takes as one of its chief responsibilities the forcible transfer of agrarian land to capital for industrial, commercial and residential development...I show that the agrarian transformation generated by this specifically neoliberal form of ABD fails to productively transform the rural economy, actually leads to an expansion of pre-capitalist – or what Marx would call 'antediluvian' – forms of capital, and is constitutive of a process of knowledge – and capital-intensive development in which the labour-power of the dispossessed peasantry is largely irrelevant. The result is a capitalist transformation of the countryside – characterized by non-productive speculation and rentiership, the expansion of pre-capitalist exploitation and the creation of a marginalized pool of underemployed labour – that looks very little like anything predicted by Marxist theories of agrarian transition, and that suggest stark implications for rural India as it confronts increasing pressure of land commodification and the expropriating practices of land broker states.*

While Levien's observations are certainly very pertinent, especially that extra-economic force as coercion is crucial for the mode of accumulation that is underway in India, the essentialism associated with this coercion – in terms of analysis giving significance only to State and the economic objectives is a problematic. However, while both dispossession of land and the role of State seem to be crucial for Levien's analysis, this study shows that forms of coercion need not be limited to the State alone, but could extend beyond the State into the domain of the larger society in

terms of various forms of social power (Barabara Harriss White, 2003). Which also implies that the relationship between reproduction of coercive social power and expansion of accumulation are dialectically related to one another. Economic backwardness and uneven development and social, political, cultural and institutional under development get rationalized and peculiarly reinforced in this mode of development. This under development could carry with it elements of semi-feudalism in certain instances but need not necessarily be the case in order to reproduce coercion. Nancy Folbre (2009) for instance argues that the normative, moral codes governing processes of accumulation even in the United States have simply resorted to modified adoptions of the old patriarchal family structure as a matter of pragmatic convenience. Wherever semi-feudal structures exist, it is a cost effective strategy for accumulation to collude with such structures in order to exercise coercive force that could accentuate accumulation. Beyond this characteristic interconnectedness any further extrapolation would become polemical and rhetorical. Whether the coercion is a fall out of semi-feudal structures or whether they originate in a lumpen commercial economy (such as the modern Mafia, Gambetta, 1996), or whether it emerges in the brutality of a semi-fascist/fascist State (Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, 1979), the outcomes seem very similar; denial of democratic rights, lack of access to institutions and an extremely exploitative economic order.

Nature of governance, legality and associated regulatory roles of political and permanent executive also acquire peculiar characteristics under such a development process. In Levien's analysis for instance, the State as land broker becomes a pro-active agent in coercive transfer of lands from farmers to corporations, there can be equally extra-economic coercive outcomes in this mode of accumulation being propelled as a consequence to strategic inaction of the State while coercion is exercised by other agents. From a developmental perspective therefore, the peculiarity of the economies and the societies which lack generalized social norms, rule of law, market prices, abstract labour etc., perhaps require some analytical reconstruction of the mode of economic development. The role of social networks could perhaps have a clue to this developmental process and social networks need to be inquired into seriously. With reference to the earlier debates located in historicism, modes of production, and transition, as well as the more recent debates concerning the extra-economic means, and in the Marxist approach itself, social networks as a category has perhaps not been taken as seriously as it ought to have been and to that extent role of social networks seem to have been under theorized.

Social networks first of all imply that the social relations of production are not fully governed by the economic force alone since the economy is not fully embedded into anonymous, impersonal exchanges nor does it imply a competitive economy with free flow of resources, determined only by

economies. Approaches which analyse on the basis of an assumption that the social context being analysed is either a fully developed market or embedded fully in capitalist relations having a bearing only on the economic exploitation might ignore the role of aspects which have been well recognized such as trust, norms, networks etc., even by mainstream approaches as part of the so called Social Capital literature. Social networks present a peculiar mode where transactions are personalized and identities matter and transactions operate in limited circuits away from ideas of market prices or social averages determining values. While role of social networks in capitalist modes is theorized albeit mostly by non-Marxist approaches, to an extent, role of social networks has been taken into account while analyzing social discrimination (Thorat and Newman, 2010 ) which certainly do not look at non-economic forms of force as having only economic objectives – cost cutting or profit maximizing objectives. If big corporations show a casteist mentality in recruitment, it cannot be reasoned as a process fully explained by non-economic force as facilitating purely economic objective. In paradigms dealing with historicism, modes of production and transition analysis monopolization by rentier socially hegemonic classes has come close to the actual employing of social networks having analytical implications. Social structures of accumulation again is a concept which comes close to the idea of how social power and control is employed again towards maximizing surplus. Social networks could actually be an analytical frame where social modes of organizing production could be seen as an interface between multiple modes without essentializing either surplus/ profit maximization or power/hierarchical domination as constituting the object of the social order. Social networks could also effectively break other dualisms such as formal-informal, rural-urban, legal-illegal etc., Social network could be seen as a formation consequential to structural underdevelopment where social, cultural, political, symbolic forms of domination, hegemony etc., could be pursued as segmented objectives in limited social orders along side maximization of profits operating simultaneously as another segmented social order. This also explains how actual antagonisms embedded in these social realities could be circumvented wherein the contradictions may not play up in reality, since reality operates in segments which paradoxically become complimentary. If reminiscent semi-feudal structures or other distorted/perverse structures are useful in pursuit of profits, capital will not strive to bring about social and physical infrastructure, modernization, rationalization, scientific temper, rule of law, democracy or civic/citizenship discourses in forms that the above mentioned structures are transformed, it would rather find rationality in coexistence, collaboration, collusion etc., modes of accumulation would therefore have antinomies with reference to traditionally understood notions of development.

The existing research on social networks has certainly contributed to enhancing the scope for handling modes of social organization beyond the autonomous rational individuals, profit maximizing firms and perfectly competitive markets. This literature has also taken the discourse on social organization of economic activity beyond vertical integration and transaction costs explanations for hierarchical organizational analysis of firms. Networks are seen as auguring a new cooperative model of capitalism that strengthens complementarities of local governance structures and civic communities ensuring labour standards (Piore and Sabel, 1984). Networks have brought into debate the important role resources such trust and norms play in being able to create networks as rational economic instruments of organizing economic activity under conditions of imperfection (Grahame Thompson et.al, 1991; Arrow, 1998; Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin, 2000). Networks have also been seen as instruments of decentralizing development globally (Gereffi, Gary, John Humphrey and Timothy Sturgeon, 2005;). However, most of this literature rests on presumptuous analytical constructions capable of reasoning networks either as contingent modes to grapple with risks and uncertainties or as instrumentalist functionalities (also see Elinor Ostrom, 1997, for a functionalist interpretation of local community networks) or at best strategic informal contracts. Very few scholars have attempted at contextualizing the role of networks in the so called third world economies (Hubert Schmitz, 1990; G.Vijay, 2009). While there is no denial per se that contingent, functional as well as strategic reasons underlie network formation and sustenance, however, if one were to not take on board the asymmetries, power and control mechanisms, not merely informal but non-systemic modes of operation and functional segmentations, the analysis of networks (in case of migrant labour involving for instance; the networks of social actors in place of origin, intermediate or transit networks in course of travel, owners' networks, administrative and political networks etc., apart from workers' networks proper) of the variety in operation as part of the brick kiln industry and their role would not only be inadequate but might well be erroneous.

This study has generated evidence which seems to suggest that groups, coalitions, traditional hierarchies, political alliances and collusions (though may not be exhaustive) could be forms of networks which could generate asymmetries in economic interaction by way of employing various resources viz., caste, ethnicity, religion, regional/linguistic, political parties etc., based affinities in order to generate influences meant to circumvent rule of law and acquire coercive control not merely of land but of various factors of production as part of the brick kiln industry. Not merely the law but lawlessness and illegality are also forms of this mode of accumulation. Further, this study also seems to suggest that the rational instrumentalisation of networks might well be constrained by the

mode in which networks are being put to use in the current scenario. Networks in this sense represent modes of organizing production and societies signifying the problem of development of underdevelopment.

#### **1.6. Structure of this Report:**

Apart from this introduction this report is organized as follows. The second chapter gives details about the reasons for undertaking this research in the particular geographical settings chosen as sites of research for undertaking the surveys and case studies. The chapter also gives details pertaining to the research design, sample selection and methods used to collect data. This chapter further enlists the other secondary sources of data consulted by this report.

The third chapter focuses on the place of origin and the underlying reasons for the rise of the brick kiln chain migration stream. Rural distress especially in Eastern India has been in focus for various reasons. Apart from being a significant challenge for development, it has also come to be a region for flourishing radical left political movements. Analysts have been pointing to the interconnection that exists between the nature of the economic relations and the political conditions. While successive governments and policy frames have for long experimented with traditional developmental interventions, the much hoped outcomes were nowhere to be seen. Official statistics were satisfied showing decline in absolute poverty levels and relief from appalling conditions of deprivation. However, some of the local level realities within the sub-regions of Eastern India, especially the KBK region (Kalahandi, Balangir and Koraput) have come to signify a geography with a social reality that defies all the claims of the current development model. Even the official statistics recognize that the social reality in the region can but be characterized as distress ridden. While officialdom has been in a denial mode with reference to acknowledging that there is a policy failure, the rural production systems, labour markets, credit markets, product markets, input markets etc., seem to have been caught up in an overwhelming structural reality, that constrain progress. The social, political and economic power of the beneficiaries of the development mode has extended to almost engulf governance structures. There seems to be an inherent cynicism in the way that development has approached distress. The distress driven inter-state brick kiln labourers' migration stream from Balangir to Medak and Ranga Reddy districts in Telangana provides a window to draw insights about this development mode. This chapter while probing into this stream as its subject for study, however focuses on the conditions in the place of origin wherein seem to lie the much sought explanations for the chronic reproduction of rural distress.

The fourth chapter deals with the crucial inter-linking instrument and an institution – the networks. The networks have a complex role. At times networks act as organization of production, at times they act as the means of production and at times as means of subsistence. While a panoply of literature exists on networks, there seems to be a lacking with reference to the fixations underlying the analytics which makes this literature inadequate in terms of understanding the complexities involved in the nature of networks constituting the brick kiln workers' migration streams. This chapter attempts at unraveling these underlying complexities.

The fifth chapter focuses on the place of destination of the brick kiln chain migration stream of workers. Brick kilns continue to play a significant role as a backward-end material input suppliers to a segment of a volatile construction/realty sector. The brick kilns as production units are in fact intersection points for several forms of circulation. The labour moves from Orissa to Telangana where the brick kilns are predominantly located, so do the entrepreneurs, who move from Coastal Andhra Pradesh (especially Prakasam and Guntur), and within Telangana, especially in villages in and around Greater Hyderabad (Medak and Ranga Reddy districts), agricultural lands have moved away from farm activities to brick kiln activities. Underlying all these processes of circulation of various factors, seem to be certain similar developmental experience. The three elements that seem to be common to the development experience of all the three regions supplying different economic agents and resources are;

First, it is observed in this chapter that the circulation of not merely labour but various actors does not necessarily involve transfer of property rights over means of production (as is hypothesized by primitive accumulation or accumulation by dispossession frames) but rather involves a peculiar process characterized as accumulation by disuse.

Second, un-civility and deinstitutionalization in the mode of the economic activity is again a common feature of this economic activity. A systemic failure of regulation concerning credit markets, land, water, electricity, labour, common property resources etc., and the use of threat of violence (Mafia) is an important dimension of this development. Further, the rise of various ranks of middlemen who interconnect the village level power hierarchies, social networks of community and producers, local government as well as political representatives with various rentier classes (including certain regulatory agents). Thus, various forms of illegality is the condition in which this production system thrives – in effect the process manifests disuse of formal institutions;

Third, various forms of both economies as well as risks and uncertainties entail the natural, social, material and financial resources employed in the production activities controlled by each economic

agent in the rural agrarian economy. Under conditions of disuse, various flows of values towards a highly speculative realty-construction sector happens with both economies as well as risks and uncertainties resurfacing and generating a peculiar form of urbanization striving to preserve the value in circulation through artificially generated scarcities.

It is in the backdrop of these complex interconnections underlying this mode of accumulation by disuse that this chapter attempts at understanding the nature of circulation and the uncivil and deinstitutionalized production relations based on a case study of brick kiln industry undertaken in ten brick kilns at the place of destination in Medak and Ranga Reddy districts of Telangana.

The sixth chapter provides a summary of the findings and conclusions. It attempts at providing an insight into the possible directions in which the further development of the brick kilns industry could head for under the current regime of development. It further focuses on the kind of policy as well as social interventions required both in the places of origin as well as in the places of destination to improve the existing conditions of the workers and for a sustainable development of this industry so that brick kilns could be transformed from being *terror houses* currently to social production systems contributing to development.

## **Chapter 2**

### **Site of Research and a Note on Methods of Research**

#### **2.1. History of the Patna State and the Chain Migration Stream:**

In the engagement with contemporary Social, Political and Economic conundrums, History provides a clue to understanding the current social positioning of various actors, the nature of the social relations and the processes contributing to the emergence of particular economic structures, crucial for analyzing the problem at hand. Historical narratives are constructed from several alternative sources of evidence, each having its owing significance as a representation of the past. While travelogues, notes of historians of the times, commission reports, other official sources etc., have been the traditional sources of reconstructing history through interpretative analytical frames of historians, the write up that follows is based on oral histories based on testimonies of people who are part of the problematic reality at study. Considering the fact that each historical source has its limitations with reference to being mediated by socializations into value premises that might sometimes edge on prejudices, this narrative might also have similar limitations. Nevertheless, it's an attempt to construct the history of contemporary actors who are both the subjects and objects of this analysis by those having an eye into the history amongst themselves.

The current geographical area of Chhattisgarh and Western Orissa were originally the princely states of Garjat and Patna. After transfer of power in 1947, the state of Patna was merged with Orissa. Patna has a relatively recent history of agriculture. Cultivation as a dominant socio-economic practice started here mainly around 100 years back, when the Agariyas, known to be skilled cultivators, were settled here by the king. However, what was the condition of agriculture prior to that is not very clear. The Agariyas were the people who cleared large patches of forest and started organised agriculture. According to some estimates, the amount of land under irrigated agriculture was about 35% around this time. This irrigation infrastructure was largely built and maintained by the local communities without any state intervention and control. But the king of Patna was soon to learn the tricks of the trade from the British colonial rulers. In 1946, the state of Patna started taking over these public irrigation projects – a process that only gained in momentum after 1947. This led to a peasant uprising whose main political agenda was to gain back public control over irrigation. Narratives about this peasant revolt can be found in the Patna Deepika newsletter and in the Cabinet meeting



resolutions. Under pressure from the people, the cabinet of the king decided that only State-funded irrigation projects would be controlled by the state. Incidentally, the lack of understanding of the uprising by the state is quite telling, particularly one of the narratives states that these people like fish in their meals, which is why they are trying to get control over these reservoirs and canals, many of which were rich fishing areas. However in January 1948, Patna was merged with Orissa, which led to essentially bulldozing of the community control over water bodies by the entire state machinery, mostly through the Panchayats. Once the state took over, the maintenance of these projects met with fatal blows. Many of the water bodies were converted to fisheries for state revenue. The current agricultural figures show that only around 5% of cultivable land in western Orissa is under irrigation.

Another major historical event was the drought of 1965. This led to acute food shortage and hunger deaths. Under desperate circumstances, the administration opened up the jungles for people, for relief measures. This might have been an unavoidable decision in those circumstances, but it led to indiscriminate felling of trees, and the rise of a forest mafia controlled by the Marwaris and Gujaratis, together with the Forest Department. While the Gujaratis controlled the trade in tendu leaves, the rest of the forest produce were managed by the Marwaris. The migration of people from western Orissa started mostly after the 1965 drought. Initially it was the dalits who started migrating to the cities of Raipur and Hyderabad, mostly because their local employment was the worst affected, and they were the most severely exploited class because of caste discriminations. This is why out of the handful of people who reaped some economic benefits out of this migration over the years, the dalits seem to be the majority. Yet another key aspect around this issue of migration is on the legal side of things, namely the Inter State Workmen Act (ISWM) of 1979. It was seen as a progressive piece of legislation when it first came, in terms of provisions such as the temporary residence of the workers should be near the site of work, and stipulations in terms of working hours, payment of travel by the employer, etc. But soon people figured out that firstly it was only a regulatory legislation and was not preventive or prohibitive, secondly it was qualitatively not very different from the already existing legislations like the Minimum Wages Act, the Workmen Compensation Act (1923) and the Payments of Wages Act (1936). Moreover it came to be misused by the administration and the law enforcers as and when they wished. Around the issue of licensing, the initial sections of people who got the wrong end of things were the workers themselves who had no clue about the kinds of documentation required, and were regularly harassed and looted

by the police for not having proper papers. It took a lot of effort on the part of some activists and progressive lawyers to shift the focus on to the employers themselves. In terms of working hours, the Act did not mean much because brick-making involves working in only certain specific hours of the day such as before noon and after sunset, because otherwise the bricks develop cracks due to the sun. In terms of residing near the worksite, it anyway had to be the case because of the unusual working hours. It could not regulate the employment of children in the work because they are used to flip the bricks since the heavier adults doing it would again lead to cracks. The sardars get around the travel allowance stipulation by just paying for unreserved fare on long distance trains. All in all, the ISWM did not mean much. Moreover, it fails to reflect the effects of other employment related legislations such as NREGS, resource-ownership related legislation such as FRA, and other fundamental rights such as Right to Education, etc. Speaking of legislations, the Orissa Relief Code has a provision that if there is news of migration in any public media, the Collector should ensure that work is provided to those people. But no Collector in the history is ever known to have used this. The principal nodal point from where the migration takes place is a small town called Kantabanji in Bolangir district. The town was established fairly recently, after a railway track was built in 1936. The main reason for existence of the town initially was that the king of Patna used to take his train from here. Soon, perhaps because of the north Indian origins of the ruling Singhdeos (For instance, the last king and later Chief Minister of Orissa, Rajendranarayan Singhdeo was born to a Punjabi mother and brought up in Kharsua, Jharkhand), Marwaris and Gujaratis started flocking to this hitherto unknown town. The local businesses were soon to be taken over completely by these communities, which continues till today's date. The key businesses are around forest produce, liquor industry, processing of crops, textiles, stones, medicines, etc., most of which are run illegally without any license. After many of these industries were nationalized, the Marwaris again became the contractors for the state. Thus, the effect of nationalization has been nothing more than introduction of some hollow legalities, and reorganization of the same business class.

Of course the history of the region would be incomplete without the history of land struggles. During the time of the king, every village of Patna state had a "Gaontia" or a village head who was also the local feudal lord, with an army of service providers for the king, such as the washerman, gardener, etc. In return the Gaontia was not paid by the state in cash, but was given rent-free land. After the merger with Orissa, these lands were re-acquired by the State,

along with other zamindari lands, using pre-1947 laws like the Patna State Land Revenue Act and the Patna State Tenancy Act. There was a lot of debate around the issue of how to use this land. Later Nandini Satpathy declared that this land be distributed to the landless, through the Gram Panchayats. Although the land was distributed accordingly (each landless family getting only about 0.5 or so acres of land), the land records were not corrected. In the early 1990s, the Gaontias filed a case asking for rights to these lands on the basis of existing outdated land records, won the case, and started harvesting. The indigenous people did not have any reason to distinguish between the State administration and the judiciary, and were left confused and disappointed with this dual nature of the same State first assigning lands to them, and then taking it back with the stroke of a pen. Helped by a progressive lawyer, Adv. B.P. Sharma, they however filed an appeal against the judgment, leading to the setting aside of as many as 60 such ex-parte orders, which means around 600 landless families. It was around this time that the Singhdeos won the elections, and the same old ruling dynasty was re-established in the area, this time through a formal democratic process. The Gaontias, mostly STs, OBCs and General Castes (there are no Dalit gaontias), formed the "Gaontia Sangh", started having regular meetings, to many of which Singdeo would come and participate. Thus the pre-1947 linkage of the local ruling class of the Gaontias and the State of Patna was re-established within the Constitutional framework, and the both of them together once again marginalized the landless (Sukhwasi in the local terminology). Although the Gaontia Sangh weakened over time and the landless are now harvesting crops from these lands, the records are still not set straight. The ruling class is still intact as the Gaontias are still the local ruling and economic elite, and the Singhdeos are still in Parliamentary power.

This is the local political economy which forms the framework in which this mass migration needs to be understood. On the one hand we have the feudal ruling elite still ruling the villages, particularly the revenue villages, where the feudal relations are still necessarily intact though there is no corvee or feudal militia anymore. The ruling family during the times of the princely state still supplies the legislators both at the state and the central levels. The village economy is completely controlled by the upper caste landlords, money lenders, traders and political heads. The Marwaris in the Kantabanji area have built a strong politics around Hindutva, through organizations such as Brahman Samaj, etc., which further alienates the indigenous people socially, culturally and politically. All this and the State and mafia control over vital natural resources like forest and water, completely sweeping away historic community

ownership, form the basic premise for class relations, and the basis for the economic decisions made by the landless and marginally landed. The above, coupled with neo-liberal anti-farmer agricultural policies, efficiently drives people out of their homes.

## **2.2. Overview of Case Study Villages:**


The Sites of Research – Origin & Destination :

This study has been conducted in both the place of origin of the migrant workers which is Bolangir in Odisha as well as the place of destination viz., Ranga Reddy in Telangana. In the place of origin, the respondents included; households, contractors, money lenders, various government servants viz., Collector, sub-Collector, Revenue Inspector, Assistant Labour Commissioner, grassroots level organizations, Political activists, NGOs etc.,

In the place of destination, the respondents included, households of workers, Joint Labour Commissioner, Owners of brick kilns, farmers, sarpanch, activists etc.,

### **2.2.1. Sample Design and Sample Sizes for Primary Household Level Survey at Place of Origin :**

In each of the villages chosen for case studies, a first round of survey was conducted to get basic structural characteristics of the total households. These structural characteristics were with reference to: the size of current landholdings and identification of landless households, Regular, Irregular migration behaviors of households and non-migrant households, the Social background of the households. Based on this structural information total households were classified.



For example in Bahabal village there were in all 64 households. Of these 64 households, the universe of the village with reference to the structural details was as follows:

**Table 2.1**

Category	Scheduled Castes			Scheduled Tribes			OBCs			General/Other Castes				
Land/Migration ↓ →	RM	IM	NM	RM	IM	NM	RM	IM	NM	RM	IM	NM	Total	Sample Chosen
>50 acres				1									1	1
>20-50 acres								1					1	1
10-20 acres				2	5							3	10	3
>5-10 acres				11									11	3
>3.5 – 5 acres				2									2	1
1.5 – 3.5 acres				4	2	12	3						21	4
< 1.5 acres	6	1		8	1		2						18	4
Land Less	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	nil	
Total	6	1		28	8	12	5	1				3	64	
Sample Chosen	1	-		8	2	2	3					1		17
RM-Regular Migrant					IM- Irregular Migrant					NM -Non-Migrant				

Source: Field Study Data 2013-14


Thus, as the above table suggests, it was a stratified purposive sampling that was resorted to. The sample thus is almost proportionally representative of various combinations of the structural factors used to stratify the universe. After having drawn this sample and identified the respondent household, the next phase was to proceed towards carrying out a survey.

### **2.2.2. Sample Design and Sample Sizes for Primary Household Level Survey at Place of Destination :**

The sampling technique adopted in the place of destination was first to identify about 10 brick kilns located in two sites mainly viz., Dundigal and Maheshwaram. The brick kilns were of different sizes. Having identified the kilns for conducting case studies, the labour process – Pit site workers and moulders, furnace, loaders-un-loaders - was used to prepare the stratified purposive sampling frame. was a stratified or purpose sampling approach. The survey was conducted during the three months of March to May of 2014. The study also involved paying visits to brick kilns school.

#### **Map 2.2**

#### **Map of Telangana Showing Location of the Sites of Research**



Source: Wikimaps.

A primary household level survey on conditions of workers in a sample of ten brick kilns located in the above mentioned villages has been conducted. The brick kilns have a single proprietary mode

of ownership. Table-1 below gives the details of the sample of brick kilns from which the sample of worker households has been drawn for study. While on an average every brick kiln employs 70-80 workers, in all representatives of 82 households consisting of 254 members have been interviewed using structured questionnaire.

**Table 2.2**  
**Sample of Brick kilns and Households Studied**


<b>Name of the Brick Kiln Owner</b>	<b>No.of.Sample Respondents</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Babu Rao	10	12
Bikshapathi	10	12
D.Raju	6	7
G.Madhav	10	12
Mallikarjuna	11	13
P.Malyadri	5	6
Pratap Reddy	7	9
Ramayya	9	11
Ramesh	8	10
Sivayya	6	7
Total	82	100

Source: Primary Household Level Survey 2014

The representative sample of workers has been drawn by dividing the entire brick kiln into its component labour process categories on the basis of activity classification such as; Ring activity involving Digging pits and mud mixing, patris operating in making wet brick blocks and drying, bhatti (furnace) and loading and un-loading activities. Figure 2.1 below provides the proportions of workers in the sample based on the activity sets.



**Figure 2.1**



Source: Primary Household Level Survey, 2014

In addition to this, six farmers including large, medium, small and marginal farmers who have given their lands on various lease agreements to the brick kilns have also been interviewed using a structured questionnaire. Some lease agreements permit exclusively mud excavation up to 2-3 cubic feet, whereas other lease agreements permit only location of brick kilns but not mud excavation and yet others include both. There have also been unstructured discussions with two brick kiln owners. One of these owners is a local and another owner is a migrant from Prakasam district. The study also involved certain experimental methods such as excavation and weighing of mud in the brick kiln adopted to gather information relevant for measurement and conversions of the total quantity of mud used to produce bricks and the total bricks measured in terms of numbers per square feet, used for construction of buildings measured in millions of square-feet area.

### **2.3. Secondary Sources of Data:**

Apart from the primary household level surveys carried out both in the villages of origin as well as the village of destination, this study has consulted several secondary sources to supplement the information required for analysis of the problem. The secondary sources of data consulted in this study include:

The Census data for Orissa 2011, The Bolangir District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd data on list of loan defaulters, Adhikar NGO for data on NREGA's role in stopping migration in Bolangir district, Residential School Data on number of children enrolled from migrant households, Revenue Department Land Records for information on land holdings in case study villages at place of origin,

Annual Health Survey Report-2011-12, Assistant Labour Commissioner's Office in Orissa for data on total number of licensed contractors operating and the total number of migrant workers registered with the licensed contractors, The Ranga Reddy Joint Labour Commissioner's Office in Hyderabad for data on brick kilns in Ranga Reddy district and total number of workers employed in the brick kilns and some basic household information. Apart from these various official sources, reports of World Bank, DFID, Action Aid, NRI, Development Alternatives, Shakti Sustainable Energy Foundation, CRISIL report, News Paper Reports etc., and several other research papers with reference to data collected for an earlier period.

## Chapter 3

### ***Understanding Rural Distress in Eastern India; Unraveling Networks of Veiled Hierarchies***

The contemporary chain migration streams need to be analysed in the background of the above historical conditioning of the development. The brick kiln migration stream from Orissa to Telangana has often been acknowledged as being a fall-out of distress. However, it has simultaneously been the view especially of regulatory authorities that the labour migrating as part of these streams need not necessarily be in any form of bondage. The nature and causes of distress, the nature of migration and the labour relations, the peculiar interface between the rural economy in the place of origin and the economy in the place of destination as well as the socio-cultural practices of the communities have been brought into analysis as constituting various dimensions providing explanations to understand the complexity. In what follows five propositions which have in several ways affected the approach taken by officialdom and constituted the underlying understanding of the policy implementing agencies are given. These propositions (with the exception of the fifth) are opinion of officials holding powerful positions. Whatever may be the text and the spirit of law, the attitudes and effective action of the officialdom is governed by the imagination as represented by these propositions:

- Five propositions under scrutiny:
- Distress has been analysed as a fall out of backwardness which often is associated with external factors such as poor rainfall and consequential drought like conditions;
- The dominant internal reasons provided by regulatory authorities for distress include an idea that large number of the migrant households are either drunkards or indulge in conspicuous consumption beyond their means. These households are therefore responsible for their crisis;
- It is a dominant view amongst regulatory authorities that advance payments are a mere mode of wage payments, which is in itself therefore not in violation of any law and does not call for regulation or prohibition. Advance payments therefore do not signify either bondage or unfreedom in labour relations;
- Yet another dominant view amongst the labour authorities is that workers have of-late become very intelligent and while they borrow advances from the contractors, they call the authorities

and inform them about the fact that they are being taken somewhere by the *sardar* or they play hand-in-glove with NGOs and other agencies to pretend un-freedom and return in the middle of the contract period;

- Finally, amongst the theoreticians the approach to fix the problem is either to prevent migration by generating employment in the rural area in recognition of distress or alternatively scholars who consider migration to be essentially developmental in nature think social security and labour regulation in place of destination is the appropriate solution.

These opinions of the officialdom are verified for their veracity on the basis of a survey done in five villages from Balangir district of Odisha (data in this paper however is only from two villages Bahabal and Kuthurla). The total number of households in Bahabal is 64 households. And the total number of households in Kuthurla is 89. A stratified purposive sampling technique has been adopted to select the set of representative sample households. The households have been chosen to proportionately represent the total households in terms of size of the land holding, social categories (STs, Scs, OBCs, and OCs), Household Size and Migrant and Non-Migrant households. A sample of 12 households from Bahabal and a sample of 20 households from Kuthurla has been drawn from the villages for detailed study. A structured questionnaire as well as individual and group informal interviews have been conducted for a primary household level survey. Apart from this primary level information, secondary data from official sources as well as some NGOs, structured interviews with Collector, Sub-Collector, District Labour Officer, Revenue Inspector as representatives from the government and Contractors and Chote-Sardars as well as Money Lenders have been conducted to supplement the information and to get an unbiased understanding of the problem from other vantage points. In what follows, this paper tries to provide empirical evidence to address the above propositions.

### 3.1. The Origins of the Condition of Distress; The Official Explanation:

#### 3.1.1. The Orissa development report argues that:

A poor and backward state like Orissa having a substantial size of depressed population (nearly 40 per cent SC and ST population) and a backward subsistence-oriented agricultural economy has failed to bridge the development disparities that have long existed between the people and

space at the inter-district level. Till 1992, the State was divided into 13 districts. Among the 13 old and undivided districts only the four coastal districts namely Cuttack, Puri, Baleswar and Ganjam and two districts from the highland region namely Sundargarh and Sambalpur may be characterised as developed or advanced according to the existing development position of the State's economy. Among the backward districts, further, the old and undivided districts namely, Kalahandi, Bolangir, Koraput and Phulbani in the highland region are found to be chronically backward and highly underdeveloped (Meher 1999 122). In recent years, three of the old and undivided backward districts namely, Kalahandi, Bolangir and Koraput in the southwestern part of Orissa have become vulnerable to recurring droughts and famine like situations, which lead to distress migration of the poor during non-agricultural season. They are also considered very backward districts in the country and are popularly known as KBK districts. Needless to say, in a poor and backward state like Orissa, the KBK region is the most backward and poverty stricken belt. (Orissa Development Report, 2003). Further, the report goes on to quote a dated work to drop insights on current situation to argue that 'Poorly distributed rainfall, geological formation resistant to weathering, shallow, sandy and dry nature of land, and intensive shifting cultivation are the major factors, which have been responsible for the depletion of forests in this region' (Senapati and Sahu 1968). However, certainly in terms of minor irrigation and water shed projects as well as technologies and in terms of nature and structure of agriculture, conditions have undergone changes significantly from late sixties to the more contemporary times. Large number of forest dwellers (Scheduled Tribes) engage in commercial agriculture and they cultivate crops including Paddy as well as Cotton, Onions, Pinnate, etc., Yet what might be drawn from the tenor of the phrase is the underlying emphasis on something that seems to almost remained unaltered about the condition – a cause that has become a chronic phenomena that reinforces the distress. The rhetorical nature in which reference is made to distress, researchers might well be overwhelmed by it in a manner, that one might be drawn into accepting the premise uncritically. But even before we surmise that there is indeed distress, we might as well have to verify if the existence of distress is in fact true. Tables 3.1.1 a,b,c,d & e point out that without an exception, irrespective of the landholding sizes, all the households have a deficit in terms of being able to acquire adequate subsistence incomes from the opportunities such as agriculture labour, non-farm labour, forest produce and agricultural production. Almost without an exception all the households therefore borrow loans from private money lenders at an exorbitant interest rates. Tables-3.1.2 a, b, c, d & e show data pertaining to the loans borrowed by the households. On an average in Bahabal about 30%, in Kuthurla about

21%, in Bagjharan about 52%, in Bariali about 83% and in Debripali about 58% of the entire receipts from the rural economy are constituted by borrowings from private unregistered money lenders. Thus, apparently the case for the existence of distress has been made.

However, one might question the premise of what constitutes subsistence? Despite being trivial, a dominant view shaping the attitude of the officialdom and underlying the disinclination to intervene is a view, widely held, that the workers are responsible for their own plight. That the households who constitute the distress migrant workers' stream to brick kilns, engage in conspicuous consumption and especially that they are addicted to alcohol and it is this expenditure that is the real reason why they borrow and then end up taking advances to repay the loans, thus ending up as distress migrant labour. Tables 3.2.1 a, b, c, d and e show what are in the assessment of the officialdom constitute irresponsible consumption. Interestingly, the data suggests that in Bahabal this consumption accounts for 18% of the total expenditure, but it does constitute a relatively significant proportion of (wt.ave 32%) the deficit. In Kuthurla this expenditure constitutes only 20% and 12% of the total expenditures and deficit respectively. In Bagjharan, the figures are respectively 20% and 25%. In Bariali the figures are respectively 18% and 23%. And in Debripali the figures are respectively 16% and 22%. An interesting data to look at in this regard is the corresponding share of expenses related to health, as fractions of the total expenditure and the deficit. For Bagjharan, the figures are 18% and 22% respectively, for Bariali, 15% and 19% respectively, and for Debripali, 17% and 24% respectively. Thus, while the villages can not get over their deficit even if they give up the so-called "conspicuous consumption", it is also striking that the health expenses are similar in magnitude to these consumptions. Thus it is worth noticing that while the officialdom chooses to point out the "conspicuous consumption" as the main reason for the deficit and distress, they choose not to mention the fact that an almost equal burden of expenses faced by the villages is the spending for health, which is in turn due to the fact that public health infrastructure is almost non-existent in the areas we surveyed, and most people have to depend on expensive private institutions when it comes to medical emergencies.

When apparently from the evidence one could deduce that distress is a reality and dependence on debt borrowed from the local money lenders is a reality, the repayment of these loans brings the distress driven chain migration stream as a logical fall-out. As already mentioned people from the representative sample villages quite clearly do not have the means to meet their

expenditures even assuming they give-up their so called conspicuous consumption expenditures. It is to repay these loans and to meet their subsistence consumption requirements that people take advance payments from middlemen contractors and migrate to work in the brick kilns. When in the interviews with the officialdom, questions about the possible existence of bondage due to advance payments was raised, the responses of the regulators had two aspects to their reading of the reality; first the regulators were of the view that advance payments were merely a mode of payment and to the extent that they were voluntarily accepted by the migrants, there was no case for the existence of bonded labour. However, the officers did not stop with mere technical-legal position about their interpretation of the advance payments on the nature of labour relations. The partisan view of officialdom becomes evident in the narrative on how labour have become very 'smart' (meaning capable of cheating). The regulatory authorities have argued with us in course of our interviews that the labour first take advances from the *sardars* and then they call up the police or other civil society organizations and then claim that they have been held in bondage. The whole ploy is meant to get away from the commitment to their contract of laboring in the brick kilns after having benefitted from the advance payments. This study in what follows probes into the veracity of these observations.

The opinion about workers becoming 'smart' is taken up for analysis. The table 3.3.1 a provides the list of the money lenders Table 3.3.1b provides details about a sample of money lenders and Table 3.3.1 c provides a list of traders for some of the villages. Interestingly, the data from Table-3.3.1b suggests that some of the money lenders are themselves operating in the brick kiln migration as labour contractors. Further, it is important to note that with reference to money lending, advance payments, agricultural wage employment and recruitment into the brick kiln employment, inputs supply etc., the structure of the economic transactions operates more like networks than markets. There are limited number of players acting as money lenders or licensed contractors or land lords providing employment to labour in agriculture. Not only are these actors limited in numbers, they operate in multiple interlinked markets. Most of the big landlords are themselves money-lenders for the local villages. Most of the traders in the agricultural inputs and outputs are moneylenders as well. Also, the social composition of the entire class of traders and moneylenders is mostly Marwadis and OBCs (Mehers). This, together with the fact that its mostly the dalit and the tribal families which are worst affected by debts, as is evident from Table 3.6, chalk out distinct social hierarchies between the moneylenders and the borrowers. We also know that information about households spreads fast

in small communities. Scholars like Elinor Ostrom have invoked this observation in a very different context pertaining to management of Common Property Resources. We further know from interviews with the *Chote Sardars* (the village level recruiter on behalf of big contractor), that big contractors have a network of their own and often operate in demarcated villages and rarely recruit from other villages (supposedly belonging to other contractors), other than the one conventionally seen as their set of recruitment villages. There is a tacit understanding thus amongst the contractors and they do exchange information. Most of the contractors belong to the Scheduled Castes and therefore could be seen as wielding very little social power from the point of view of their caste location. However, this section of Schedule Caste elites has very little democratic element in their social roles and therefore may not be seen in turn as having anything to do with the category called '*Dalits*'. The Contractors who happen to be Scheduled Castes however wield tremendous coercive social power despite their social location. The source, structure and the modus-operandi of this social power is quite veiled in the maze of village level social hierarchies and intertwined into the social, political and economic roles of multiple agents and agencies. Based on the interviews with the contractors, we know that the contractors pay certain commissions to village committees. Interestingly these commissions are mediated through religious organizations at the village level that conduct the Jagannath Yatra and other important village level religious ceremonies. The amount is paid by the contractors according to the conventionally demarcated recruitment villages they operate in. The contributions made by contractors are not a voluntarily donated lump-sum amount but calculated per worker recruited to the brick kiln migration stream from the village. The quantum of money currently being paid to the village committees of the religious bodies is Rs.200 per worker. The relationship between the labour contractors and the village level powerful social elites is a long term relationship and this network mediated through village committees is perhaps only one instance, manifesting this relationship. The members of the village committees are once again the same set of actors who are operating in various roles as money lenders, landlords providing agricultural employment, traders in inputs, owners of PDS shops and purchasers of output etc., often belonging to upper castes and OBC communities. The data from Table-3.3.1b presents the details of a sample of the money lenders that clearly depicts the structural interconnections and the network that exists amongst the powerful economic and social actors which is of immense significance for our analysis. One of these money lenders Shiv Prasad Mishra of Bahabal village also is a village temple priest, in-charge of the Jagannath Rath Yatra in the village. Why this institution called the village committee is of immense



significance is because of the fact that it represents the total and complete control that is exercised by the social elites over the structurally interconnected economic lives of the village communities, who form part of the migrant brick kiln workers. We know from the tables 3.1.1 that all the sources of incomes and the entire set of livelihoods and consumption expenditure structures are mediated in several instances by the significance of agricultural labour incomes or the non-farm employment provided as part of the NREGA program, farmers' dependence on input supplies on credit basis, as well as the significant contribution PDS rice plays in being able to reduce the expenditures and thereby in aiding the struggle to achieve subsistence – all of these transactions are mediated by or dependent on the small number of the village level social elites. For instance from the total sample of 20 taken from Kuthrula village 17 respondents were engaging in agricultural labour market and 12 of these respondents were employed by the same landlord Mr. Behera who also happened to be the biggest money lender in the village. It is shocking to learn that in most of the villages in the most backward districts of Orissa, wages are collectively fixed for the ensuing season in a *Gram Sabha*. Imagine the plight of the agricultural labour who are dependent in so many ways on the powerful elites of the village to stand up and assert their bargaining power for a better wage. It is because of the fact that the wage fixation happens in this manner that we find the agricultural wages received by the labour varying between village to village. This significant variation in the wage rates is further evidence to the fact that the economy is operating on the basis of social power of networks rather than on the basis of markets. And to grow 'smart' therefore is an impossibility for the brick kiln migrant workers, since in the backdrop of what has been presented about the village economy, it would amount to economic and social suicide, given the existing structure of control.

The control structures are all pervasive, in our interviews with the contractors, the contractors have stated that all through the path the migrant workers take, they are monitored and controlled by such veiled agencies. In the Kantabanji town, there is the urban Mafia with deep political connections operating along with the police and revenue administration monitoring the movements of the migrant workers who have borrowed advances. The railway officials at the Balangir railway station are also having their cuts. Then as the train crosses Orissa and enters Andhra Pradesh, there are groups of urban Mafia, they have specifically named Mafia groups in Vijayawada and have referred to a Mafia don called Bobbili town's Babbulu. In Telangana region, as well there are local level Mafia that is operating as a monitoring agency. If and only if the labour department, revenue department and other regulatory authorities had the

earnestness and commitment to recognize this entire paraphernalia of how migrant labour are monitored and controlled, they can identify how and why this distress driven migration stream is caught up in a form of bondage. The control that the *Sardars* have on the governance institutions in Orissa could well be seen as a capture, in comparison to the control that *Seths* have inside the Telangana region. Several non-governmental agencies have put the estimated number of migrants at 4.5 lakhs (close to half a million). And the average amount of advance paid by *Sardars* per workers is Rs.15000. Based on this, one can estimate the size of this market in value terms and understand how and why capture of institutions has become a reality in Orissa given the stagnation in other sectors of the economy. In fact the stagnation could well be further reinforced by these massive outflow of migrants in as much as this outflow itself gets seen as the only source whose remittances fuel the demand and circulation of value held by several rent seekers having significant social and political power and who have over the years emerged into the only economic powers in the backdrop of the imploding regulatory institutions. And officials say workers have grown 'smart', it is in fact the officials who have grown 'smart' knowing their helpless condition as part of a governance structure that is effectively controlled by the violators, officials can hardly dare antagonize their real bosses behind the screen. Some of the contractors have told us that they have now successfully diversifying into civil contracts and have taken up some of the massive infrastructure projects being carried out by the Orissa government. The contractors have gone to the extent of stating that they now have an initiative to launch an organization to unite all the contractors operating in Orissa to then effectively influence the Orissa government away from having only local influences and locally some groups do control some Orissa Members of Assembly. The more blatant forms of control are exhibited in the forms of physical violence and brutality. Bashing up under-performers which have sometimes ended up in grievous injuries leading to death of workers, portrayed as suicides, chopping off of hands of workers who have ran away from brick kilns without fulfilling their contracts, sexual abuse of women etc., are forms of violence which are extreme and which might in fact signify responses to resistance by workers, the true violence is all pervasive and endemic to this very structure manifest in the fear of the workers. Workers do not name *sardars*, *Chote Sardars*, *Money Leders*, etc., very easily. It requires lot of persuasion, trust which comes with familiarity with the workers. It is only because we were carrying out this research at the household level with the help of activists who have taken tremendous risk in raising voices against the powerful social agencies, voicing the interests of the communities that people have shared what otherwise would be a closely guarded information.

Having established that distress is a reality based on the way it is constructed in its relationship with subsistence, and recognizing that cultural and addictive consumption is a poor explanation for it, having refuted the observation that workers are getting 'smart', we might have to probe a little deeper into the question of what causes distress and its interconnect with the actual existence of bonded labour like conditions in the labour relations. The typical nature of the overwhelming rhetoric about rainfall, soil and weather etc., referred to earlier in the analysis of distress, as was also evident from the official sermons on backwardness of Balangir often seem to signify wrath of nature, an act of God – as if the soil, rain, weather have all conspired to cause distress– why else is the place unable to generate adequate subsistence? Can there be a better social explanation for the existence of distress?

Table 3.4.1a, b, c, d & e provide evidence that goes to show further how in fact, the structures of control together with the institutional implosion of the regulatory agencies that have been effectively captured by the class of violators, produce the distress. The statistics presented in these tables give data about how income structures of the households alter radically if only the households received what is the going price in the market for some goods or received the stipulated minimum wages. These figures suggest that if and only if the system were to operate according to its own stated norms or having equity in opportunity, in terms of ensuring the market prices or legally stipulated prices, the possible average increase to the incomes of the households range between 70- 182%. With these increases a section of the households, especially those owning lands could actually circumvent the distress while the landless could experience a significant reduction in their deficit. The solution to the problem of distress therefore is to do with circumventing the massive rents that cut into the value workers ought to be getting. The challenge however is to find an agency that is capable of making this happen under conditions where the regulatory bodies have been captured by the violators of law. And it is not surprising therefore to understand why Maoist movement flourishes and finds a relevance and rationale for its existence in such societies.

The rest of the tables (Table no. 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7) give us the average figures of income, debt, etc. based on the three parameters of land holding size, caste and whether the family migrates for brick making work or not. One of the claims made by the officialdom in both states is that families migrate purely out of the desire for economic mobility up the ladder. What our analysis

in terms of the land holding size tells us is that the average size of land holding for migrant families is only 1 acre, whereas the average size of land holding for non-migrants is 5 acres. The average loan taken per year by a migrant family is Rs. 13212, whereas the corresponding figure for the non-migrants is Rs. 12452. The average deficit of a migrant family is Rs. 70177, whereas for the non-migrants, it is Rs. 55455. The average yearly expenditure incurred by the migrant families is Rs. 90919, whereas that for the non-migrants is Rs. 101748, thus ruling out the claims that the migrants get into debt trap because of reckless spending. There are also striking differences in the economics of households based on their social categories. Dalit households are the worst off, according to our survey, with the loan amounts accounting for about 72% of the total income. Next are tribal households, with debts accounting for 62% of the total income. Both the dalit and the tribal households have 4.94 family members on an average. The average deficit of the dalit household is Rs. 88161, as opposed to Rs. 46799 for the tribal households. OBC households are better off than both these communities. Their debt amounts account for 43% of the total income, and their yearly deficit is Rs. 42926. The average total income of the dalit families is Rs. 37669, that of tribal families is Rs. 31321, whereas that of OBC households is Rs. 78130.

#### Conclusion:

We must therefore emphasize that the distress in Eastern India is not an act of God. Nor is it because people have extravagant and irresponsible consumption habits. The distress driven migration streams are not strategies of diversifying incomes that somehow causes social and economic mobility of the poor households nor are the traumatic experiences of people staged in an opportunistic manner to get away with advances. People who take advances do run away sometimes but this happens when the contract is actually violated by the employer either in terms of the conditions of the work promised or the possible use of excessive force at the work place. The reality of the mode of development seems to be one where more number of households are joining the ranks of the distressed rather than successfully overcoming distress under the existing relay of debt and advance payment borrowings. The distress driven migration generates labour relations that does have a veiled control structure, which if recognized would then go towards characterizing these labour relations as constitutive of forms of bondage. The distress and the forms of bondage have been thus structurally generated and are ignored because the structure has engulfed the regulatory bodies themselves. The sense of optimism is

in the fact that people do resist severe exploitation and there have been attempts to organize the workers in the place of origin to fetch better outcomes in the otherwise impossible terrain for collective action which are the places of destination, which seem to be bringing token relief. The solutions however seem to be hinted by the data which suggests that households who have access to land have a better chance to circumvent distress than others and that circumvention of distress as a precondition requires dismantling the structures of control that siphon off value that rightfully belongs to the gatherers, producers and labour.

## **Chapter 4**

### **The Uncivil and De-institutionalizing Labour Relations of Accumulation through Disuse;**

#### **The Case of Brick Kiln Industry in Telangana**

#### **4. The Nature of Labour Relations:**

##### **a. Making Sense of the Circulating Society of Brick Kiln Labour:**

Figures 1.2 to 1.5 in Annexure 1 go to give a broad overview of the different dimensions of the social composition of the workers who constitute the chain migration stream of the Odisha-Telangana brick kiln employment. The evidence suggests that the largest segment of these workers (58 percent) belong to the Scheduled Castes, followed by 22 percent and 19 percent of OBCs and Scheduled Tribes respectively. With reference to the gender composition, almost an equal proportion of male (52 percent) and female (48 percent) workers constitute this employment. The composition of the workers with reference to the age groups suggest that predominantly the workers are between the age groups of 15-41 years. There is a perceptible decline in the proportion of workers participating in the production of bricks beyond 41 years of age. When viewed from the perspective of formal education levels, the largest segment of the workers have had middle school training (37 percent studied up to 6<sup>th</sup> to 8<sup>th</sup> class). This is followed by a significantly large segment of workers who have never been to school (33 percent). Yet another sizable proportion of workers have had only primary level schooling (21 percent). A small section of the workers have also done their matriculation (9 percent). Given the nature of employment in the brick kilns, the last segment certainly comes as a surprise. This not only suggests significant underemployment but could also goes to show how difficult it is for a section of the society to access better employment opportunities despite having educational qualifications.

##### **b. The Rural-Urban Mobility-Relations of Production:**

There is a peculiarity in the interconnectedness of the nature of the agricultural activity of the marginal, small and medium farmers and the decisions pertaining to the timing of circulation, which in turn affects the advance amounts received by the brick kiln migrant worker households. In our interviews with the households migrating as brick kiln workers from Balangir district of Odisha, we found that different households migrate at different points in time. There are some households that

migrate in November, there are the other households that migrate in December and yet others migrate in January. Typically the season of brick production extends up to May. The reasons why the timing of migration varies has numerous reasons both emanating from supply as well as the demand side of this employment. The reasons on the supply side pertain to pressing need of certain households to find alternative employment, in as much as they need to repay the outstanding loans. The probability that this section is constituted by landless households is larger as against those households that are also cultivating on their own lands. In general irrespective of the timing of migration, households with larger number of workers get on an average higher advance amount than a household with smaller sized number of workers. This has something to do with the economies derived from cooperation between the same household members apart from the more important reason which is the reduction in risk for the owner of workers running away from the site of production in the middle of the contract period, having borrowed the advance. It is much difficult for large households to escape than it is for lone individuals. There is therefore also a control dimension associated with the structure of advance payments.

Table-4.4.1

**The Per Person Advance Amounts Paid According to Time of Migration :**

<b>Time of Migration</b>	<b>Calculation of Per Person Advance Amounts Paid</b>
November	Median Advance Paid to the household = Rs.36750
	Average Size of the household = 3 persons
	Per person Advance Paid = Rs. 12250
December	Median Advance Paid to the Household = Rs.36458
	Average size of the household =3.5
	per person Advance Paid =Rs. 10416
January	Median Advance Paid to the Household = Rs.45000

	Average size of the household = 3
	Per person Advance Paid = Rs. 15000

Source: Primary Household Level Survey 2014

From the demand side, the workers recruited in November are used to setup the brick kiln itself to start the production of bricks eventually. And sooner the production begins, larger is the number of bricks produced per person in the season. Thus since those that get recruited in November are likely to produce more bricks assuming that they stay-on until May, they produce more number of bricks and therefore get paid higher advance. The Sardar (contractor) who pays the higher advance on behalf of the Seth (Owner) does so because the Seth is confident of recovering the higher monetary value in terms of higher quantity of bricks produced. However, typically, the number of persons willing to leave the village at this point in time is relatively low considering the fact that certain agricultural activities continue at this point in time back in Odisha. It is because of the complex interplay of the combination of these factors that there is a significant difference in the per person average advance amounts received across different households. It is as a consequence that the median advance amount received by a household becomes a better representative<sup>2</sup> and the advance amount paid per person has been taken on the basis of the average size of the household in the season. What is found is a structure of advance payments which for reasons already mentioned are high in November, in December however when large number of workers are willing to migrate, the per person median advance amount decreases by about 15 percent. And again in January more workers are recruited either because of an expanding constructions in the realty market causing a spurt in demand for bricks or because workers desert the kiln and run away and contractors need replacements to be able to carry-on with the production activity, since investments into purchasing or excavating mud and other in-puts has already been made. Recruitments in such instances are to avoid or reduce the loss. Under these circumstances therefore, this recruitment is demand driven and as a consequence, the per person median advance amounts increase by about 44 percent. The crucial factor therefore to get the highest advance amount is the *holding capacity* of a worker. However, in November there is a rivalry between the alternatives of the agricultural activity carried on by several land owning households who are usually cultivating Cotton, big Rice or Small rice. These households need to stay on to cultivate and harvest these crops after which they also migrate as labour to work in the brick kilns. As rural production

<sup>2</sup> It is relevant here to point out that the French Commission report by Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi also suggests Median incomes to be better representatives of incomes and distribution for social analysis rather than per capita incomes or mean incomes. To quote ‘Median consumption (income, wealth) provides a better measure of what is happening to the “typical” individual or household than average consumption (income or wealth)’ (2008).



systems becomes more unviable, lesser is the holding capacity of the labour, lesser therefore is the per person advance amounts they can bargain for. Figure 4.6.8 in Annexure shows that all the respondents without exception have suggested that the timing of their mobility affects the quality of their employment including amount of advance payments they receive. There is however a pressure acting on the households to migrate leaving the opportunities in agricultural production because of the outstanding loans they need to repay. Money lenders lend credit at 10% per month interest for a maximum of six months, beyond which the rate of interest compounds with principal plus interest being treated as the principal amount. And borrowings are made by households for agriculture, health related contingencies and social obligations as well as for personal consumption requirements. It is therefore that while 96 percent of the respondents have stated that never did a year pass in their entire life-time when they were free of debt, 99 percent of the respondents have stated that the loans outstanding affects their bargaining power with sardars adversely.

c. Rethinking Networks :

The recruitment of labour to the brick kilns operates not as a market but as a network. The analysis of networks and their role built on the basis of mainstream behavioral assumptions reduces networks to mere functionalities. The Networks which basically suggest limited field of transactions are seen as operating as intermittent mechanisms under conditions where imperfect markets are seen to be developing towards becoming perfectly competitive markets. This process of development is gauged on the basis of patterning the networks in turn to determine whether the network is highly personalized or if it is becoming impersonal. The process of the network formation and network influence as it becomes more impersonal is seen as graduating out of a closed or limited transaction space towards an open universe of transactions driven by rational responses to economic or price signals rather than by subjective non-economic considerations. (Mathew O Jackson, 2010; Arrow,1998).

Networks however are not mere functionalities in the realm of economic transactions. Networks are also structures of domination and control. Networks do not transmit information but could also transmit misinformation towards this end. When we interviewed some of the important officials in the Odisha administration, and pointed out that chronic indebtedness seems to be a problem that needs attention, the official said that the reason why banks don't seem to be lending money to certain sections like the brick kiln workers is because they tend to default on the loans. Anand Meher (2015) however points out based on a primary household level survey that all the households that were involved in defaulting on the loans borrowed from cooperative banks in Balangir, belonged to

rich landlords or well to do sections. There was no body enlisted as a defaulter who belonged to the section of the society that migrates as brick kiln workers. That an official in the district administration holds such a view of the brick kiln workers speaks about the systematic misinformation that is fed to agents and agencies whose role it is to intervene in ways that social and economic relations are democratized. That the citadels of power into which brick kiln workers hardly find entry into, have however come under the influence of the powerful vested interests who then feed it with misinformation which effectively disempowers an already marginalized or excluded group, and this is an act of perverse use of networks.

One should also understand that the nature of economic relations in themselves could be entrenched into modes of accumulation which require networks. Take for instance the kind of responses given to questions pertaining to information flows through networks (Annexure 4). While empirically it is found that a larger proportion of workers have found employment in the brick kilns through information provided to them by Sardars or other workers (53%) as against (47%) those who got employed because of family, relatives, friends, and neighborhood (Fig-4.4.1). However, when asked about which particular source of information would they trust more and prefer in case information came from multiple sources, all of them without exception said it was family. Further, if we compare the family as a network institution versus other network institutions such as neighbors or friends etc., we clearly see that whereas the social regulations, sanctions imposed are much more severe in the case of wife in the family, this is not quite the case with other forms of networks (fig-4.5.1 to fig-4.5.6). Quite clearly personalization is linked to control with reference to obligations imposed by social norms and the scope for exercise of physical violence by husband against the wife all of which then extend into a situation where, women in addition to the activity of producing bricks (which as already pointed out in fig-2.2, extends to 12-17 hours) also have to perform two hours of additional household level cooking and cleaning activity (fig 4.2.4). Quite clearly the intra-household control mechanisms cannot be explained away by simplistic time allocation models based on specialized gendered roles. This relationship as part of a form of network has to be therefore seen as a dimension of a coercive relation necessitated and reproduced by a coercive development mode wherein a household is caught up in a highly impoverished condition struggling to produce its subsistence value. Violence, fear, obedience and subordination are as much made a part of the family in its role as a unit of production and reproduction attempting to circumvent its crisis generated by development. This is perhaps one of the most decentralized level of representing the shifting and incidence of costs of this development mode brought about by social mechanisms.

d. The Conditions of Work and Life in Brick Kilns:

The average working hours in the kilns, as observed from the sample survey, is 15 hours a day, without any payment for overtime work. On top of this, in 94% of the worker households, the women workers have to perform all domestic work which takes 2 hours every day on an average. While in many cases (as referred to in another section of this paper), women are married into a family primarily to enable the couple migrate for brick making work, and in other cases the women do not have a choice to not participate in this work, this added task of domestic labour at the worksite leads to trifold exploitation of women within the worker household.

The working conditions are extremely unsafe. Workers are forced to work with no protective gear. The only leave they are allowed is one day per week, other than that they are not entitled to any holidays, except Holi. They have no benefits of PF, or ESI, or any other social security arrangements. According to our sample survey, every worker faces 14 minor accidents per season on an average. One of the common forms of accidents is electrocution. Every season some people lose their lives because of electrocution. This is known to happen because the electricity connection at most of the kilns are illegal and therefore no proper safety precautions are taken with respect to electric lines. The reason for this in turn can be traced to the fact that most of the times the lease agreements between the brick kiln owner and the farmer leasing out his agricultural land for the industry do not follow proper official process. Thus most of these transactions happen outside the purview of law, without proper permissions and regulations.

The worker families are put up in small homesteads of size 10 ft by 10 ft, mostly with tin roofs. Though the homesteads are provided with electricity connection, there is no facility for lavatories, or bathrooms. The women workers undergo regular sexual harassments, mostly from the kiln managements, because of the fact that there is no safe bathroom facility for them. Though most kilns have bore-well connection, which supplies drinking water to the workers, they have to depend on common wells and tanks for other water needs. These tanks are already severely polluted from all kinds of activities and particularly from the pollutants from the kilns. Using this water regularly leads to serious physical problems, such as skin disease, etc., for the workers. The main source of fuel used by the workers is firewood, which according to the local villagers is leading to rapid depletion of greenery in the area. The workers get to spend no social time with family, friends, and community at the worksite. There is no communication or interaction between workers in neighbouring kilns. The only real social time available to the workers is during the weekly market. But even at the market place, the workers are kept under strict surveillance of the kiln management.

Though most of the workers, the way they are chosen in the first place, are able bodied and healthy in order for them to pull off the hard labour involved, they exhaust themselves physically and irrevocably by the end of the season. This coincides with the high mortality rates of people in Western Odisha, which we talk about elsewhere in this paper. But anyway illnesses lung infections, throat infections, upper-respiratory problems, eye problems, body pains are common. And there is serious lack of proper medical assistance everytime a worker falls sick. In the case of sickness, its mostly the family of the worker which has to take care, without any or nominal assistance from the kiln management. 28% of the children at worksite are reported to be sick.

The practice of putting workers up in the worksite itself, and the phenomenon of employing entire family units, are the main tools to ensure effective and efficient exploitation of the workers through intimidation, hostage, surveillance and threat of violence.

e. The Morbid Circulation between Debt and Advance:

What needs to be recognized is that underlying these abominable conditions of work and life is an unending saga of chronic indebtedness and borrowing of advances. Fig4.7.1 suggests that 96 percent of the workers have always been in debt, Table 8.1 shows that close 60 percent have not reported their debts. This is also partly because with the advance amounts, workers clear their debts. However, after having lived in the place of destination and incurred the expenditures while here, towards the end of the typical six months of activity extending up to May, 37 percent of the worker households return with a negative balance in their account. The implication being that they would have to borrow. Another 21 percent of the worker households have less than ten thousand rupees left as savings or remittances and another 15 percent have less than fifteen thousand rupees as savings or remittances and yet other 7 percent are left with less than twenty five thousand. And when distributed across the average household size of three persons, the implication is that close to 43 percent of the worker households are left approximately with Rs.3000-Rs.8000 each to return back to their places of origin. When spread across the rest of the six months, each individual worker leaving aside their dependents is left with Rs.500 to Rs.1400 (approximately) per month. Quite clearly 80 percent of this labour is returning back with highly inadequate earnings for ordinary consumption requirements, to have savings that can go as investments to improve their production systems back in the place of origin is remote (Fig4.8.1). It is this condition of perpetual distress and indebtedness based subsistence that drives them into accepting the strenuous and exerting activity levels of 14-17 hours of work. It is pertinent to note here that of the total population

of 1648997 people in Balangir, close to 7,20,000 people constitute its workforce (Census, 2011) and of these an estimated 2,78,641 workers migrate to Andhra Pradesh and Telangana States (2008 figure 4.8.3). Since the proportion of the workers working in the brick kilns is considerably high, and 54 percent of these workers work for 16-18 hours, there is every reason to believe that the crude death rate figures, which happen to be the highest for Balangir amongst all the districts of Odisha are a consequence to the morbidity and bodily depletion that these workers suffer during the course of this tenuous employment (fig-4.8.2). The 'right against right' in determining the limits to the working day being clearly absent taking its toll in terms of the life span, this mode of employment could hardly be characterized as ordinary contract. These statistics go to represent the nature of the economy and the development process these workers have got entrenched into. To understand what explains this mode of employment entailing bodily depletion, one has to understand the structural interconnections of this morbid circulation between debt and advance payments.

f. Monopoly, Oligarchy and Multiple Controls:

It is pertinent to observe that fig-4.7.3 shows that 36 percent of the workers know one or two money lenders from whom they could borrow loans. The maximum number of money lenders any worker has ever known is four. Further, fig-4.7.4 suggests that 59 percent of the workers have actually borrowed only from one money lender. And yet another 32 percent of the workers have borrowed from two money lenders more than once. Thus, 91 percent of the workers are actually dependent on two or three money lenders. The recruitment to the brick kiln work does not augur any better. Fig-4.6.1 suggests that while 47 percent of the workers have been recruited by one or two *sardars*, the maximum number of *sardars* that recruit from the village from where the workers migrate is four. Further, fig-4.6.4 shows that 98 percent of the workers have said that big *sardars* collude and distribute the labour sourcing villages for recruitment amongst themselves. It is also true as suggested by fig 4.6.5 that given the cruelty sometimes workers have to face in terms of physical and sexual abuse being an additional risk always accompanying any new employment, workers generally tend to prefer a known devil to the unknown and therefore tend to approach the same *sardar* over the years. The crucial dimension however is that while the numbers of money lenders and the recruiting agents, the *sardars* is limited, wherein effective both these markets are either monopolies or oligopolies, fig 4.7.6 suggests that there is active interaction between money lenders and recruiting agents. This collaboration also acts as security against default for both the agents giving money informally. But effectively it also opens up the possibility for knowing the vulnerability

of the workers with reference to the information pertaining to the outstanding debt which hampers the workers' bargaining power. There is also a tacit agreement therefore that large number of workers are not recruited during active agricultural season since number of these money lenders are also landlords holding large tracts of land. The effect of this oligarchy on the employment is very evident in the fact that fig 4.6.2, 95 percent of workers did not have an opportunity to compare advance amounts, 42 percent of workers either do not have an opportunity to know about the working conditions at the place of destination or know it only through the *sardars*. Fig 4.6.6 shows that 61 percent of workers have actually had no opportunity to bargain either on advances, living expense allowances or wage rates. They accepted whatever was offered to them by the *sardars*. This explains how this chain migration stream has reproduced itself systematically for over two and half decades now. This morbid circulation involving bodily depletion of workers is almost an all encompassing phenomena. The workers in course of their labour activity in the brick kilns, are made to do to the agricultural lands and common property assets of the rural economy exactly what they are forced to do to their bodies.

#### 4.1. Morbidity Meets Degradation – The Nature of Land Relations to the Production System:

##### g. Farmers and the Lease Contracts:

Of the six farmers we interviewed, all of them have been indebted. One of the farmer became indebted because he had attempted to dig a bore-well (11 times) for irrigating his agriculture but they failed leaving them with a big debt. Each attempt cost him Rs.50,000. There was another farmer who spent huge money on getting his five year old child treated when he was struck with Pneumonia and although the household spent close to 80 lakh rupees, the child did not survive. In course of this expenditure, the farmer lost everything. Yet another farmer spent money to perform the wedding of his daughter but eventually the husband deserted her and she became mentally deranged following which the household incurred lot of expenditure on treating her. This farmer also happened to be an absentee landlord. It is such expenditures that have pushed the farmers despite being reluctant, into accepting to lease their lands out to the brick kilns. The lease contracts are of different types; a lease contract which permits the brick kilns to be located on the agricultural land and to excavate the land (usually up to 3 cubic feet of land); a second type of lease could be leasing out the land for only setting up the brick kiln but not permitting mud in the agricultural land to be excavated; a third type of leasing out could consist of only leasing-out for the purpose of excavation of the top soil but does not permitting setting up of the brick kiln.

#### h. Bricks, Lands and Ponds:

A minimum viable size to start a brick kiln is five acres of land. Excavation of mud first began in Dundigal around 1978-79. However, it was not as extensive at that point in time. It was around the late eighties and early nineties that mud excavation became extensive. By 1999 the brick kilns started to operate by buying mud from outside the village. It was also during this period that the village lake started to dry up. The farmers point out that the village tanks were getting recharged with rainwater which flowed into the lake from various streams that channeled the rainwater from forest lands. However, over the years, these forest lands have all been encroached by different sections of the politically well connected elites and as a consequence the village water bodies started to deplete. Almost simultaneously with the depletion of the village water bodies there was a transition already being witnessed wherein by late eighties, lands which were used to cultivate traditional food crops like Jowar, Bajra, Ragi, Maize etc., started to shift towards paddy cultivation which was unlike the traditional crops was water intensive. This then brought in place of village water bodies, the increased use of bore-wells. The massive expansion in the bore-well use led to a situation wherein today the ground water table has sunk to a point where bore-well as deep as 500-600 feet also fail to get water. This has made agriculture increasingly expensive, risky and often unviable thus causing the land to shift away from agriculture use to use by brick kilns. In Dundigal village the entire agricultural land which is not under the *auicut (receiving village lake canal irrigation)* extends up to 300 acres of land. All the three hundred acres of land has been excavated up to a depth of 2.5 to 3 cubic feet. The Auicut land it is argued has gravel which makes this mud unusable. However, over the years, the construction sector seems to have undergone a change and the preference for light weight bricks has increased. To produce light weight bricks, clay instead of red mud is used. Clay is in turn excavated from village lakes. Whereas in 1975-76 an acre of land's mud was excavated at a throw-away price of Rs.4000-Rs.5000, today excavation of an acre of land up to 2.5 to 3 cubic feet depth acquires the farmer close to Rs.250,000. With the booming construction sector in the city of Hyderabad, the demand for bricks started to go up and with it, the number of brick kilns in the rural areas around Hyderabad city also increased several folds. As the bore-wells started to experience a drop in the quantum of water, this was inadequate for agriculture but was just sufficient for brick kilns. Agricultural lands with bore-wells thus became the preferred sites for setting-up brick kilns. The current composition of the making of bricks is constituted by the following proportions; for every 100 tons of mud (recently being drawn from village lakes instead of agricultural lands and this quantity is equal to 20 tractor loads of clay/mud), 20 tons of Fly ash, NTPC ash and red mud are combined. A crude estimation by the brick kiln owners is that with an

acre of land assuming that all the mud until 2.5 cubic feet is usable for making bricks, about 20 lakh bricks can be produced.

i. Expanding Realty and Depleting Reality:

What is given below is a calculation suggesting the relationship between the urban construction sector's expansion and its impact on agricultural lands as mediated by the brick kiln industry.

Estimated supply of Residential real estate in Hyderabad for 2014-2015: 47 million sqft (CRB Customized Research Bulletin, CRISIL Research) = 1079 acres of land  
Number of bricks required per sqft built-up area: 8  
Total number of bricks required for 2014-2015: 376000000  
Proportionate amounts of raw materials required:  
100 tons of village tanks mud + 20 tons of fly ash, NTPC ash and red mud. Thus, 5/6th of the weight of bricks comes from village tank mud.  
Weight of 1 (wet) brick: 2 kgs  
Hence, total weight of mud required for 376000000 bricks: 626666666.666666667 kg  
1 cu ft of mud weighs 25 kgs  
Thus, total volume of mud = 25066666.666666667 cu ft  
Average depth of pits dug: 2.5 ft  
Thus, total area of land required just for mud: 10026666.666666667 sq ft = 230 acres

This is the total area of agricultural land required solely for supplying mud for brick making to cater to the new constructions coming up in Hyderabad this year. We haven't factored in the area of agricultural land that is being used to set up the brick kiln itself. We also haven't factored in agricultural lands that are being rendered unsuitable for agriculture because of pollution caused to the land and water sources due to the brick industry. Neither have we factored in loss of agriculture due to rapid depletion of water table in catering to such urban centers. We have of course assumed that the residential projects all use mud bricks, and the commercial projects use cement/lightweight bricks, which constitute a different industry. This assumption is bound to be inaccurate, but this is just to give ourselves some idea of the scale of depletion of the agricultural topsoil. **The ratio of agricultural land used to area under construction is 1:4.7.** Thus, for constructing every 5 sqft of residential area, 1 sqft of agricultural land is being lost permanently/semi-permanently. Thus, agricultural resources are being diverted into the highly speculative real estate economy at an alarming rate. To give an idea of the speculative nature of the industry, buyers belonging to other states that make up an estimated 70% of the demand base for residential real estate. The absorption numbers in 2014 have plummeted over 27% Y-o-Y (OIndia Real Estate Outlook, Residential and Office, Jan to June 2014 - Frank Knight).



## The Disuse of Institutions Un-civility and De-institutionalization:

The range of regulatory failures involved in the boom of the brick kiln sector in the Telangana region include some of the following:

1. Mines and Minerals Department – Payment of Royalties for excavation of mud;
2. Panchayat Raj – norms concerning Village lakes and tanks – auctioning through consensus in villages;
3. Revenue Department – WALTA Act
4. Electricity Department – Subsidized slab rates for agriculture transferred informally to brick kilns;
5. Factories Act – Registration, Safety Conditions etc.,
6. Labour Department – Inter-State Migrant Labour Act, Contract Labour Act, Minimum Wages etc - labour regulations

### 4.2. Conclusions; Emergent Future of Brick Kiln Industry and The Consequences for Development and Labour:

While increased over exploitation of labour has brought social indignation, the massive depletion of the top soil from agricultural lands and village lakes is making it increasingly difficult to procure these resources. While overexploitation of labour has led to increasing desertions by workers much before the agreed contract time, with reference to the product, there are substitutes that have emerged.

Sriman Naveen (2015) who has studied the interface between construction sector and the brick kiln industry and its substitutes has found that brick kilns are not being preferred by large construction companies. He argues that the large scale construction companies prefer cement bricks also called sponge bricks that are relative of lower weight and greater standardization and durability. It seems that although the mud brick makers have diversified into light weight bricks, it may not be as easy for these producers to diversify into cement bricks. It may not in fact be possible for the brick producers to carry on with light bricks production itself considering the fact that the Telangana government has taken up what it calls the mission Kakatiya under which there is a plan to revive village lakes and provide for development of minor irrigation. If such investments actually are made brick producers may soon have no area to source their raw materials from. And with reference to the cement bricks, cement bricks making is likely to be predominantly captured by large scale producers like L&T etc., who adopt more large scale high technology automated production

systems. Commercial constructions and high valued villas and apartments have shown greater preference for cement bricks. It is only in public constructions and low valued residential constructions where mud bricks continue to be used. If at all the green field realty amongst middle and lower middle classes for residential purposes takes-off, there can be a lease of life for the mud-brick making industry, if other dynamics already mentioned above do not hinder the growth of the industry. However, in dealing with low income categories there are some times issues pertaining to delayed payments which could in turn hamper the brick kiln producers who operate with credit borrowed at high interest rates (3%-5% per month). Considering therefore the increased risks and uncertainties, costs and scarcities, it would seem to be the case therefore, that this industry must be seen as something that is seeing its way out in future.

## **Chapter 5**

### ***Conclusion; The Developmental and Agency Challenges; Future Directions***

#### **5.0. Brick Kiln Industry; Development and Future Directions:**

To comment on the future of the brick kiln industry, the evidence suggests that this industry faces a major upheaval in the future. The challenge before this industry is multifaceted. Firstly, we need to understand that the realty sector itself has become segmented. This segmentation could broadly be identified as (a) Core realty (b) Peripheral and Greenfield Realty. The core realty is the realty sector developing in the metropolis proper. Here, major commercial as well as high valued multi-storied or duplex and villa constructions are increasingly moving away from mud-bricks and light bricks to sponge-bricks made with cement-Vermacolate-fly-ash like inputs. These bricks are very light in weight and permit the construction of several floors. Skyscrapers have an advantage in seeking bricks that are light in weight, considering the fact that multi-storied buildings could protect structural integrity better by building light weighted walls upon very large and deep pillars. Thus, with reference to core realty markets the mud bricks have bleak future. However, this is not to write-off the brick industry. It seems mud-bricks will continue to be the construction material for Greenfield realty which however is contingent upon the expansion of Greenfield industrialization. Several farmers and other traditional services based households have diversified into rentier classes by renting rooms to migrant workers who are working in industries and other service activities. Apart from this, interestingly, mud-bricks and clay-bricks are being used by constructions involving the public sector or public-private partnerships or outsourced public sector activity. This can be considered as the Peripheral Realty sector. The reason why mud-bricks or clay-bricks continue to be used seems to be linked to the fact that these brick producers operate with 'benami' capital, provided by powerful black-moneyed classes having clout in the government from supply side, and operating through more flexible informal contracts which in turn permit manipulating indents leaving greater scope for pilferages on the demand side. It is because of these perverse reasons that the mud-bricks and clay-bricks industry will continue to find markets in the Peripheral Realty segments. Secondly, while there have been attempts by small producers to both mechanize the traditional brick making as well as diversify into cement bricks, but these have been unsuccessful. Thirdly, as already pointed out, with increasing loss of top soil, every new site that brick makers seem to consider for digging mud, there seems to be increased risk of not finding adequate mud for a viable or even thinner chance of a profitable venture. Brick making is therefore being perceived as an industry with high risk. Therefore, the net effect suggests that large number of

producers operating under conditions of high risk and shrinking markets but a section finding patronage by some in the government is the possible future of this industry. Under these circumstances, the number of workers this industry is likely to absorb will decrease. Under conditions of increased risk and dwindling markets and therefore prices and revenues, increased exploitation and cheating of the workers could be anticipated. While the conditions of workers in the brick kilns might deteriorate where there are no agencies of intervention, the conditions of workers who cannot any longer join these labour markets with shrinking opportunities is likely to be much worse, unless they find alternative avenues. These conditions have their consequences for how the institutions and social relations in the regions linked to these markets would undergo transformation.

The rural-urban continuum is in the form wherein we find that in the rural hinterlands, the transition over the past six decades has witnessed a process which has been in several ways accentuated by the neo-liberal development. This development has caused a shift in the nature of semi-feudal relations from Hegemony to Domination and Coercion. With traditional hierarchical structures increasingly losing their moral indoctrination capacity as a source for wielding social power, they have instead become increasingly dependent on economic domination to reinforce semi-feudal domination in terms of caste and other institutional structures wherein non-economic forms of social hierarchy gets reinforced. In the urban economy, the small medium and large capital have increasingly tended to move from domination to coercion by employing corrupt and criminalized bureaucrats and technocrats, Mafiosi with business and political connections and by employing the legitimate state itself to deliver this coercive force. And in this process, the state has shown mixed tendencies of using welfare policies partly to co-opt the exploited classes into the development process which could be seen as legitimization of accumulation (Kalyan Sanyal, 2007). In other instances, welfare state has been a mode of exercising domination to control citizens. Those citizens that are politically active against the dominant classes could lose entitlements. On the other hand, the state has come to develop a collusion with capital to coerce poor and marginalized citizens by exercise of violence (Michael Levien). The rural-urban continuum with respect to development that emerges is in the form of the increasing role for uncivil forms of domination and coercion (often taking very violent forms) often in violation of constitutional and legal rights of citizens. This process of uncivil development includes but is not necessarily restricted to the State. The un-civility and its development extends to other social and political spaces as well.

In this social space, the class based multi-caste unity amongst the dominant collusions and caste, ethnicity, kinship and family mediated class fragmentation amongst the subordinated and

exploited groups is observed. It is very interesting to observe that large number of contractors operating in Odisha in the brick kiln related recruitment of workers belong to Scheduled castes. On the basis of a fragmented frame of purely caste based analysis, there are very interesting dimensions that have emerged. The Scheduled caste contractors are paying commissions/tips to upper caste Brahmins and other communities to act as their henchmen in being able to control the labour. And this is where a class collusion seems to exist amongst the dominant groups belonging to different caste groups. However, to consider this to be a social mobility in any generic sense, the problem is that large sections of the working class that gets brutally exploited by this collusion also is drawn from predominantly Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. With reference to the classes that get exploited, caste, ethnicity, community, kinship, family etc., are the basis on which networks for entering and sustaining in the labour markets depends. In this sense, there is a material base for the reproduction of the networks and through networks the reproduction of caste and other fragmentations. Without these identities both the exclusive participation in the chain migration streams that are so crucial to face distress and the economies of collective subsistence consumption which help them cope with low incomes and severally insecure conditions of poverty would not be possible. By strengthening the semi-feudal structures not in the mode of hegemony but in the mode of domination, the dominant classes seek to essentially retain the reality of caste that ensures fragmentation of the working class which for the working classes has come to find its own instrumentalist relevance. This is a peculiar formation which therefore has been reproducing itself over two and a half decades now. The networks are therefore not about imperfect markets and transient phases, or about efficient alternative mechanisms of coordination. Networks are about how networks have come to lay the structural foundations towards fulfilling the objectives of the dominant as well as the subordinate groups in very different ways. While on one hand networks have successfully converted hegemony into domination and domination into coercion for the accumulating classes, they have come to sub-serve the role as structural foundations for coping with domination and coercion for the oppressed and exploited social groups and classes.

Perhaps the contractors operating in Odisha have an inkling of what is likely to be a bleak future for the brick kiln industry. In our interviews, the contractors have told us that they are diversifying into other businesses and especially into civil contracts. The Government of Odisha has for long not addressed the problems of brick kiln migrants with the kind of seriousness it deserves. Perhaps the cynical political masters are content with the fact that there is so much money flowing into and circulating with the Odisha economy from a neighboring state because of the brick kiln industry. While the Sardars and Seths may diversify their investments the future of the Patris is in jeopardy. What is the

future of these lakhs of workers? While some workers could still continue to be accommodated in the Greenfield and Peripheral Realty, whether the extensiveness of Greenfield Realty would offset the contraction of the Core Realty is contingent upon the expansion of manufacturing and service sector employing migrant workers. A section of the next generation relatively well educated young workers from these households might find employment avenues in the secondary and tertiary informal employment. But under the existing circumstances, the possibility of such an expansion of the secondary and tertiary sectors seems unlikely. It is therefore that the question as to what will happen to these workers in the event of the brick kiln employment shrinking significantly becomes pertinent.

With the need for increased exploitation to face adverse market conditions, it seems likely that the forms of coercion of workers are likely to become more organized than what they currently are. This is where a possibility for the emergence of certain Hindutva organizations to deliver this objective exists. The collusion of the contractors and the Jagannath festival committee is but one insight into what could be a much larger and more systematically organized structures of controlling workers. Under the current circumstances how the Hindutva forces could reinforce the development agenda could be seen from the way the brick kiln labour relations are operationalized. This organized violence may have its counter in possible rise in the Maoist movement. In the net effect various form of civil strife is very likely.

Away from these possibilities in the worst case scenario, while the debt-advance circulation is linked to self-employed-production linked inputs, subsistence and contingent (especially health related) costs and the social and cultural life related expenditures, with the possible withdrawal of the advance following contraction of the brick kiln employment, if debts cannot be repaid, it may have consequences leading to asset dispossession or suicides.

The time has come, more than two and a half decades have passed and the Odisha government must now do something to generate opportunities for people inside Odisha. As of now the Odisha government seems to be blissfully oblivious to the future of these lakhs of workers. There seems to be no systematic policy or program to handle the impending crisis. As already mentioned in the fourth chapter the lackluster manner in which the MGNREGA programs have been implemented have failed to generate any meaningful asset formation which could improve the number of employment days in terms of asset creation that complements the current production systems. Further, the debt-advance circulation is essentially a credit issue and not an income security issue. The need is to have a credit program for these households alongside effective public assets creation which could contribute to

generating economies complementing the production activity. There does not seem to be anything worth mentioning from the field with the exception of the statement made by the district collector that there is some contemplation underway about providing credit. This however is in discussion phase and one does not know if the vested interests would let any effective program to emerge.

The only initiative worth mentioning seems to be the residential schools for children. We have, as part of the field study, visited a residential school which is run specially for the children of the migrant labour. While it is a very important mode of intervention, we learn from our interviews with the civil social organizations that run these schools that the finances allocated for this activity and the scales of their operations is not just inadequate but miniscule in comparison to the enormity of the challenge. The money allotted per student is a paltry amount of Rs.150-170 within which food and non-food expenditures including expenditures on materials relating to education are to be procured within this amount. While the finance allocated is paltry, even this is a privilege considering the fact that the number of children who have access to such education is very limited. The data which has been compiled on the basis of the total number of school going age children in the sample villages has been taken as the universe from which the proportion of migrant households has been calculated on the basis of field study data. This figure then concerns the cohort that concerns our analysis. The total number of school going age children from the migrant households has then been compared with the total number of children who are enrolled into the residential schools based on the data provided to us by the enrollment registry at the residential school. Not all our sample villages have been represented in the residential school registers. From the data available, the results are given in the following table.

Table-5.1.1

Number of Migrant School Going Children as % of  
Total School Going Age children in Migrant Households:

1 Village	2 Total School Going Age Children in Migrant Households	3 Total Children Enrolled in the Primary, Upper Primary & Secondary Schools	3 as a % of 2
Bahabal	75	NA	-
Kuthurla	32	NA	-
Bagjharan	134	40	30
Bariali	37	NA	-
Debripali	149	46	31

Source: Village Level Census Data 2011; Primary Survey Data 2013-14;  
Government Survey Data Pertaining to Total Students in Primary/Upper  
Primary and Secondary Schools 2013-14.

The above table shows that only 30 percent of the total school going age group children from migrant households are admitted to the government run schools. What is happening to the other 70 percent is not accurately known. A section of the students might be going to private schools. However, given the levels of poverty, this proportion could be very small. From the rest, a section of children accompany their parents to the brick kilns and there are some schools being run at the place of destination. The quality of education imparted in such schools however is deplorable. Some of the narratives about these schools match with the descriptions Frederick Engels gives in his classic work 'Conditions of Working Class in Britain'. Some of the semi-literate and illiterate supervisors act as teachers in these schools. The purpose seems to be more to ensure that children do not constrain the rigorous work regime of the brick kiln workers rather than imparting education to the children. Again an intervention that could have been extremely pertinent has found itself both in the place of origin as well as the place of destination being implemented in a casual and irresponsible manner. The implications are enormous considering the fact that the out of school children proportion from the already disadvantaged children is so large. There is a possible intergenerational reproduction of the disadvantage.



## 5.1. Correcting the Conditions; Challenges and Possibilities:

In the case of the migration of workers from western Odisha to the brick kilns located in Telangana, which is the central question of this study, the myth of the competitive markets gets unraveled. While apparently it is true that the migrants do earn higher incomes as a consequence to migrating as brick kiln workers to Telangana, to deduce therefore that migration is an ordinary rational choice would be erroneous. A deeper probing by this study has revealed that while the rural households in Bolangir are on one hand incurring inflated expenditures on account of usury, on the other hand these households earn incomes which are much below the market price in the form of price for forest-produce, wages, agricultural products etc., Thus, the rural-urban income differentials need to be understood not as outcomes of ordinary relative market prices but as outcomes of various forms of social controls by the dominant economic classes as against the vulnerabilities of the households experiencing domination and exploitation. The rural-urban income differentials do not signify in any exclusive way the differences in productivity or value added by the rural-urban activities. It is as a result of this condition that households are getting caught up in chronic indebtedness despite diversifying their activities and engaging in multiple-livelihoods strategies. It is this indebtedness for even subsistence requirements, such as addressing food security or health or homestead related expenditures that underlies the characterization of this migration as being constituted by distress. While there is no denial that with respect to the average rainfall the region does exhibit a problem, this study clearly shows that to a large extent, the distress is generated by the social relations of domination, control and coercion underlying the nature of economic transactions. In addition to the economic transactions, the myths and misinformation held by the bureaucracy and regulatory authorities responsible for the governance as sacred facts is yet another manifestation of these underlying social relations where the oppressed and the exploited do not have as much access to the eyes and ears of the government<sup>3</sup>. In this sense the disadvantage in the economic realm extends to the institutional realm as well. In several instances officials willingly trade their senses for bribes, underlying this vulnerability of the system could be a caste based networks. Added to this, a similar distorted view was held by the bank officials who were in a way rationalizing denial of access to institutional credit to the migrant households, because they were under the impression that a large number of migrant

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<sup>3</sup> The likes of Mr.S.R.Sankaran are almost extinct. While to break free from the clutches of institutional capture by the elites, such high levels of commitment from officers is called for, the nature of the political elites leaves very little scope for young officers to evolve into similar role models. Young officers very rarely at the risk of being victimized, are willing to antagonize the powerful for a principle.

households are defaulters. This myth however has also been exposed by recent research (Anand Meher, 2015).

Underlying this capture of the market and of governance is the developmental process that has on one hand weakened the production systems on which large number of households depend on preventing the development of these production systems in terms of productivity and diversification. On the other, and more significantly, the highly skewed distribution of assets – especially land has also contributed to the systematic reproduction of the social asymmetries. Incomes and assets do not affect standards of living alone, they affect the autonomy, liberties, freedoms and dignity of the social actors and go to determine the substance of the civil and political institutions. Adverse economic processes that have engulfed the oppressed and the exploited in this sense systematically reproduce the structures of dependence of these households on the perpetrators of this oppression and exploitation due to which there is failure of social or political correction of the distorted nature of economic transactions. Upon the edifice of such a political economy, institutions that seem to be vestiges of semi-feudalism such as the village committees and Jagannath festival committees stand. These institutions act as norm setting and social regulatory institutions, imposing sanctions on those seen as violating the social norms. The membership into these institutions is based on caste and such other attributive social power which is getting reinforced due to dependent relations and challenging it becomes a formidable social challenge because of the economic domination of these social forces. Democratization and rationalization of institutions thus is constrained. In addition to this rural political economy, and partly finding niches in the distorted economic transactions in combination with the irrational and undemocratic institutional structures is the development of certain neo-rich classes – from pilferages of public activity and also from illegality and criminality as modes of economic activity which have also gone unchecked– the fallout is the rise of rural and urban localized Mafiosi and other forms of un-civility often having connections with political parties and public representatives in government, which has become a characteristic feature of the current development process that is underway. It is in the backdrop of this larger structure that the migration of labour from western Odisha to the brick kilns of Telangana needs to be analyzed.

Labour in distress caught up in the above stated political-economy enters the process of circulation between debt and advance borrowings – working masses are caught up in chronic poverty, to whom development connotes development of insecurity, hegemonic controls reinforced through domination, vulnerability, fear, disorganization, disempowerment, disenfranchisement and self-exploitation through caste, ethnic, familial and kinship ties. For the working poor this process has also meant that caste, ethnic, linguist, regional and communal identities become resources for building social networks which

help in deriving economies associated with subsistence as a consequence to collective consumption by households as a network. While it is observed that this condition constrains class solidity by fragmenting them because of the materiality of the mode of their participation in the economy, there is however a convergence of class interest of the elites cutting across caste, ethnic or linguistic and regional identities. There is thus an asymmetry in class formation as well across the dominating and exploiting social groups as against the oppressed and exploited social groups.

Circulation between the debt and advance payments in the case under scrutiny is suggestive of mutual interpenetration of modified semi-feudal structures of dominance in the rural hinterlands and capitalist accumulation linked sometimes independently to small and medium sized capital or otherwise mediated through small and medium sized capital to big financial capital and speculative economy. While accumulation process finds itself prone to high risks and uncertainties, the nature and size of capital alongside with its proximity to big capital or otherwise, determines its capacity and modes through which capital manages to circumvent legal regulations and standards to grapple with the regulation related costs. Upper caste networks play a significant role in instrumentalizing the coordination required between the brick kiln owners, regulatory authorities, local to state to national level governments and big capital for such maneuvers around legal regulations and standards. At this level there is enmeshing of legality-illegality, formality-informality, civility–un-civility, contracting-criminality, freedom – un-freedom, deliberation- fear, democracy –tyranny, and rationality of the profit maximizers extends in a diabolical manner to perpetuation of prejudice/parochialism and even brazen violation of rule of law extending into forms of brutality. It is like a bundle of complex knots that have got intertwined into a structure of mutuality based not only on economic but social, cultural, political and symbolic structures that generate alongside economic force, extra-economic force in a manner that while accumulation of certain private actors accentuates, on several other non-economic parameters of development there is deprivation, denudation, degradation and degeneration. Various elements of the process belonging to multiple modes, multiple systems of production, multiple forms of property rights, social, cultural and political forms of power seem to be getting reinforced and transformed in a complex way. It would be erroneous to read the developmental experience of such a reality in singularities of metrics, binaries of structures, linearities of processes or uniformity of directionality, based on deductive frames. The inquiry has to be concrete and contextualized, and analytical frame has to be composite capable of apparently representing a contradictory and paradoxical levels of reality being articulated simultaneously. Some anecdotes to provide an insight into these complexities are given below.

While we were at Bahabal village carrying out our field study, we took a break for lunch. And while all of us involved in the study along with another elderly gentlemen who was a retired teacher in the local area were having our lunch one Mr. Sharma walked up to us and asked what is it that we were doing in the village. We tried explaining to him that we were trying to understand what is the condition of the labour who were migrating to brick kilns located in Hyderabad, back in their place of origin. He looked quite displeased with our presence. He asked us cynically, 'what will happen if you study?' (implying- would it matter to the reality?). Then he went on to say, 'there have been several people earlier also trying to do something. There was one guy who tried to increase access to credit for these workers. He was murdered. This is what happens if you try doing something here'. After a while when Mr. Sharma left, the teacher accompanying us got very agitated. He said that Mr. Sharma actually intended to threaten us. We later learnt that Mr. Sharma was a big landlord, who was also a priest in the village temple, he was also a member of the village committee because of his caste as well as class status. Because of his position as a priest he was also in-charge of the Jagannath festival committee and above all, he was a money lender and was also running a small retail shop selling household provisions. We later did detailed interview with him as one of the respondent samples. Based on the evidence from the household interviews we realized that Mr.Sharma had given us a grossly understated value of his income and did not admit that he lends money. People like Mr.Sharma are feared by the villagers. During the course of our talk, Mr.Sharma emphatically said, 'I am not afraid of the Maoists. They came to me once and I spoke to them without fear and sent them back'.

Vestiges of feudal authority not merely survive but thrive, however, institutional structures and modes have certainly altered. The village committee is not an elected body. It is a social institution based on social attributes based hierarchies. However, interestingly elected representatives like the sarpanch are also members of this informal body. This in a way lends legitimacy to what otherwise is an extra-legal, extra-judicial, extra-constitutional structure of authority – playing the roles of legislating, at times executing as well as adjudicating about local conflicts.

As already pointed out in the third chapter , the village committees and the Jagannath festival committees in the regions receive commission from contractors. These commissions are calculated as a certain quantity of money per worker recruited from the village.

In yet another instance we were interviewing two farmers who were also part of the labour migrating to brick kilns. And during the course of our interview we realized that this household was being lent money by a money lender at relatively lower interest rate. We grew curious and probed further. The answer we got was that this household has been traditionally working with the landlord. The relationship between the money lenders' household and this borrowing household has existed for

at least over two generations. We asked, 'but money lending is a business and in a village usually households do have personal familiarity with one another. Why only this household enjoys this discount?' The respondent said no, it's not like ordinary familiarity or personal ties. 'It is more like the relationship between lord Rama and the loyal Hanuman'. We then proceeded into a mode of humor. We said 'if money lender is lord Rama, who is Ravana then?'. After some rounds of sarcasm, the respondent said, 'yes, but this money lender once promised to give a big gift of Rs.10,000 for my daughter's wedding, but when the wedding came, he avoided me'. What we inferred from this episode was that although social construction of 'divinity and mortal existence, superiority and inferiority, generosity and loyalty' are invoked to construct contemporary social relations across money lenders and borrowers, contractors and workers, political representatives and citizens, such semi-feudal constructions survive more on domination (economic monopoly) than on hegemony. The moral authority systematically constructed through cultural, social indoctrinations, rituals and other institutional attachments and practices have either considerably weakened or ceased, but the vestiges of these relations and symbolisms assert themselves through economic dependencies.

This peculiar employment of the civic authority based officialdom as well as the criminals in the mafia to become ad hoc managerial and supervisory staff for the contractors ensuring monitoring of the transit of workers from the place of origin to the place of destination, is suggestive of yet another peculiar interpenetration of this multilayered reality. An interpenetration of legality and illegality, of the civic and the uncivil social formations, of authority and criminality.

A further evidence to this complex reality was found in the implementation of government programs like the MGNREGA meant to ameliorate the condition of distress. As already pointed out the watershed dug in the village was made shallow. This, the villagers told us was a consequence to sabotage by the elites. It is interesting to observe how the contractor and other middlemen classes have come to hold positions of governance to implement a program like MGNREGA which has legislated not to use any middlemen or contractors. At another instance, in Bariali village, one of the dalit respondents told us that no dalit household in the village is given MGNREGS work by the local government. The paradox is apparent and consequences obvious.

Officials are aware of and believe in what are usually the narrative of contractors, owners, landlords and money lenders. That the ears and minds of the officials are systematically captured and selective information fed through advisors, clerical staff etc, inside the office and through peer groups of the officialdom as part of their social interactions was also communicated to us by our respondents. And in the worse case scenarios the officials themselves have a share in the rents. When officials make erroneous observations, it is difficult to differentiate the ill informed from the ill intended corrupt

ones. In addition to this, the upper-caste elite bureaucrats themselves hold highly prejudicial views about the lower caste labour. For instance, that the workers drink a lot and it is this mode of expenditure that causes indebtedness and distress was assumed to be common sense when it comes to the behavior, culture and choices of 'illiterate' dalits. Similarly, elite bureaucrats are easily taken in by the view that this exploitation of workers is required for development of the nation. The bureaucrats in Telangana similarly were of the view that it is the workers who are cheating the brick kiln owners who are in turn portrayed as entrepreneurs. It certainly suggests how and by how much the violators of law have penetrated the coteries of authority to capture the citadels of regulation. The labour have on the other hand no access and nobody to tell their story to impress upon officials that what they hold to be fact, in fact, is a misrepresentation because the worker is an outcaste and not a citizen of the socio-cultural-legal-economic world constructed for and by the State and the exploiters. An official thus would require immense commitment to be able to cut through this maze of fabrications and connect to the facts, and this commitment in itself does involve risks.

In yet another instance the authors themselves were witnesses to an episode. Workers in a brick kiln located in Maheshwaram were being held forcefully and on informing the district collector an MRO was sent to record the statement of the workers. The collector of Ranga Reddy did respond swiftly and sent an MRO to record the statements of the workers despite the fact that it was very late in the night and on a weekend. However, the substance of regulation begins from here. The workers were telling the MRO that they were beaten up by the supervisor. And they also narrated an instance where there was an altercation amongst workers. The MRO recorded only the second incident and took thumb impressions of the workers on what was purportedly workers' statement. This is in addition to the fact that the aggrieved workers were not compensated, not even reimbursed for the work they had already put in, not officially recognized as bonded labour, not even given basic transport and food allowances to travel back safely to their villages. This episode was video-graphed by an activist.

All the above instances are not about bringing appropriate laws or making corrections to institutions to enforce norms. The problem is that the reality seems to operate in complete divergence from law and norms and the victims have very little resources to correct this process. And it is at this level that the dualism between individual rational voluntary consent based decisions and cynical compulsive coerced (extending beyond economic force into forms of violence) decisions under choicelessness falls flat. It might be erroneous to apply ordinary rational choice frame to conditions where alternatives do not exist for the actors to choose from or where both choices are only choices between alternative forms of injury (Samuels and Schmidz).

And permeating all such outcomes are networks. Networks are not a prerogative of labour. From village committees to cabinet ministers, from landlords, money lenders, contractors to the seths, from informants to the Mafia- networks permeate every transaction. And the crucial role of networks does not seem to be to enhance efficiency of functionalities or to enhance efficiency as coordination mechanisms. Networks are in such unfree labour markets instruments of coercion and control and institutionalized forms of monopoly/oligopoly, violence, domination, hegemony, closure, segmentation, discrimination and exclusion, suffered by various workers.

Undoing the power of these networks rather than promoting them should be the aim of the policy. A comprehensive program involving some of the following measures might help achieve this objective :

- Identification of the distressed households away from ordinary poor households;
- Profiling of the asset structure to identify the landless or unviable landholding households;
- land reforms and redistribution of land to provide such households with viable landholdings;
- Providing the white-cards to every such household on priority basis within a specified time frame;
- Development of irrigation infrastructure and MGNREGA could be effectively implemented towards complementing such asset generation in terms of minor irrigation development;
- Developing public health systems;
- Further expansion in the quantities of food provided through PDS to 70kgs per month to the distressed households from the current 25kgs;
- Developing availability of credit at low or even zero interest rate for the distressed households;
- The debt repayment could be in installments and must have flexible time scales;
- ensuring the delinking of the credit market-product, labour, and input markets;
- Procurement of minor-forest produce by organizations such as the Girijan Cooperatives rather than by middlemen ensuring payment of market prices to the Adivasi households;
- The GCCs could also supply the household consumables at reasonable prices through retail outlets instead of the current mechanism controlled by middlemen traders;
- Promoting agricultural cooperatives – to supply inputs, credit, provide extension services and procure products or at least facilitate farmers to access markets by providing transportation;
- Abolition of the practice of village sabha based community-heads controlled agriculture labour wage determination;

- Promotion of rural non-farm employment by identifying viable activities that could be strategically upgraded with reference to technologies and up-scaled for economies – some of the consumables demanded by rural households could be part of these production systems;
- Systematic drive to identify migrant households and contractors;
- Systematic drive to ensure that children from migrant households are admitted to schools;
- Care arrangements for aged belonging to migrant households;
- Allocation of adequate finances and scaling up the number of residential schools on the basis of the requirement;
- Registering all the brick kilns;
- Formation of brick kiln cooperatives and helping the small producers to diversify into sponge-brick production so that highly mechanized multi-national firms do not monopolize the market with very little employment generation;
- Complementing the efforts towards unionization of the brick kiln workers;
- Strict implementation of minimum wages and other relevant labour laws;
- Making social security programs mobile

These are some feasible concrete policy measures that this study could suggest towards ameliorating the conditions of the households caught up in the distress driven debt-advance circular chain migration streams from Western Odisha to the brick kilns located in Telangana.

## **5.2. Initiating A Theoretical Debate:**

The semi-feudal structures it is clear have been weakening with reference to the structures of hegemonic control exercised through feudal institutional and social relational mechanisms. While it is true therefore that the new forms of bondage are centered around the market and accumulation processes, this is not the same as stating however that the semi-feudal structures have therefore ceased. The neo-liberal market mechanisms contribute to informalization of the labour relations and contribute to the displacement of the standards setting exercise that exists in a welfare state interventionist mode and increasingly leads to arbitrary voluntarism based ad hoc patronage systems of protection drawn into markets. Neo-liberal modes of accumulation contribute to disorganization of workers in their collectivization against capital and generates modes of collectivization of workers in a survival mode. These new forms of collectivization mechanisms are often grounded on identities that are neither modern in their origins and perpetuations nor contribute or evolve towards homogenization of labour as a precondition for abstract labour power based social valuations nor operate like a market



but limit themselves to networks based labour circulations. These characterizations are emphatically visible in unorganized production systems involving deskilled (so called low skilled or unskilled) workers. The implications theoretically are far reaching. Neo-liberalism in its new modes of accumulation has contributed to the above stated transformations in the capital-labour relations which brew extreme inequalities. The intensification of inequalities alongside the informalization and disorganization of the labour organizations, voluntarism governing vulnerable and insecure labour whose circulation operates through social networks leads to a peculiar social formation which quite often finds challenging institutional and relational structures and processes embedded into the economic processes which are very different from ordinary market relations imagined as operating or driven by pure economic influences. The evidence pertaining to this research also quite clearly reflects the existence of influences beyond pure economic variables. The question that needs analysis beyond this point pertains to the characterization of these influences as is debated by Lerch. In the influences characterized as extra economic force, where do we get to see these influences, in what forms and modes? This is where David Havey's understanding that the 'force' in the concept of 'extra economic force', is economic in nature emanating from finance capital has been adequately critiqued by Lerch and Levine. However, going beyond this, one of the major conceptualization has been the social structures of accumulation framework which recognizes these extra economic forces as mediating all economic outcomes. While, this recognition in itself is a major step forward in de-centering and de-essentializing the analytical framework from a rigid base-superstructure formulation, suggesting that institutions themselves can have a major role to play in determining the nature of production relations as well as in determining the distributional outcomes mediated by structures of control of labour by capital to achieve cost-cutting as suggested by Barbara Harriss-White, this in itself may not be a comprehensive representation of the processes and outcomes underlying this complex formation, this claim needs further explanation.

If we imagine the entire labour process as constituted by the means of production and the labour power in the conventional Marxist formulation to the effect of stating that the control over the means of production leads to control over the labour process, subsistence and therefore over labour power, this can be interestingly reformulated in the current context. Means of production as instruments of control are produced and in this sense, production is seen as being constituted by two sectors viz., capital goods sector and a consumer goods sector. The capital goods sector produces its own means as well as the means of production used to produce the consumption goods and it is the ownership (and therefore the private property) from where the power emanates. To extend this logic and state that

property rights and therefore the control over means of production are not the only sources of power providing the means of control over labour process and therefore labour power is to contend that the social structures are the intangible means of production (influencing the quantum of labour power available for absorption as if the ability to absorb labour power of the mean of production were enhanced and in reducing the value of the necessary labour as if the value of subsistence goods were subsumed under the regime of enhanced productivity of subsistence goods) whose forms of ownership could extend beyond the institution of private property and in this sense could therefore extend into extra economic forms. If we then treat the social structures as a means that is being consumed by capital in a form that generates control, the question that begs an answer is which is that sector where this produced means of production is being produced? Answering this question requires us to recognize that when semi-feudal structures thoroughly embed themselves into a neo-liberal accumulation process, while there is no denial that these structures have an important role of complimenting that process of accumulation, it also needs to be asserted that the actors involved in the production of these means of control are in a sector were a social process of production of modes of violence, domination, discrimination, humiliation etc., a peculiar sector which finds impunity under the neo-liberal regime that generates levels of inequality that depletes and destroys reciprocity and social conditions for any remote claim to natural liberties. From the vantage point of neo-liberal modes of accumulation, semi-feudal structures become functional necessities feeding the process of accumulation through extra economic force, neo-liberalism for semi-feudal structures becomes functionally sufficient condition that depletes the civil and political formations producing claims to natural liberties and constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights and rule of law. In this sense, the use of various forms of violence is not the sole prerogative of the State but can extend beyond into what could be seen as the 'uncivil' society that does not recognize what Marx called the 'right against right' mediating the relation between capital and labour. The impunity provided to these forms of force by non-state actors and its social manifestations are not adequately captured if we believe that the pecuniary effects of cost cutting comprehensively capture in itself the essence of the social production undertaken by a socially mediated production. These symbolic, customary, reproductions of semi-feudal orders and its increased re-articulation not as hegemony but as domination within the neo-liberal accumulative process need to be adequately appreciated and analyzed. This study has contributed towards producing evidence that attempts at probing insights into this less researched terrain.

Table-1.1a &amp;b

Data on Average Annual Income and Expenditure of Households Bahabal Village, Balangir

Total Number of Households 64 – Sample Size- 12 households (1 money lender)

Category of Average Income & Expenditure of Household/Annum			Income From Farm+Non-Farm Labour + Forest Produce  Rs./(% in total income excluding loan receipts)	Income From Agricultural Production  Rs./(% in total income excluding loan receipts)	Food and Non-Food expenditure  Rs.	Loan Borrowed/ Interest on Loans (@10% for 6 months)  Rs.	Total Deficit/ Savings  Rs.	Income From Brick Kiln Migration Total Advances + Living Expenses + Balance Payments (%) & (Net Income) Rs.
teristics of Households								
ioc	Size of HH /Dep	Migrnt/ N- Migrnt						
ST	6 (2)	MG	18200 (20)	13850 (15)	67680	9000 (8.9)* + 5400 (7.3)	35630	59200 (65) (23570)
			Frm- 7200 (40)					
			N -Frm 10000 (55)					
			Forst- 1000 (5)					
ST	7 (2)	MG	14100 (16)	16315 (18)	54700	7000 (7.2)* + 4200 (7.1)	30885	59200 (66) (28315)
			Frm 4200 (30)					
			N-Frm 8400 (60)					
			Forst 1500 (10)					
ST	8 (4)	NMG	18200 (44)	23420 (56)	52450	6333(13.2)* + 3800 (6.7)	14630	- (14630)
			Frm 3600 (20)					
			N-Frm 9600 (53)					
			Forst 5000 (27)					
ST	3 (-)	MG	11400 (16)	6360 (9)	44000	15000 (17.4)* + 9000 (16.9)	35280	53000 (75) (17720)
			Frm 1200 (10.5)					
			N-Frm -----					
			Forst 10200 (89.5)					

\*Total Receipts Including Loan – Rest of the figures in parenthesis exclude loan receipts.

of Average Income & expenditure of household/Annum			Income From Farm+Non-Farm Labour + Forest Produce  Rs./(% in total income excluding loan receipts)		Income From Agricultural Production  Rs./ ( % in total income excluding loan receipts)	Food and Non-Food expenditure  Rs.	Loan Borrowed/ Interest on Loans (@10% for 6 months)  Rs.	Total Deficit/ Savings  Rs.	Income From Brick Kiln Migration Total Advances + Living Expenses + Balance Payments (%) & (Net Income) Rs.
Characteristics of Households									
Socio category	Size of HH /Dep	Migrnt/ N-Migrn							
ST	5(3)	NM	2860 (13)		19990 (87)	56480	3000 (11.6)* + 1800 (3)	35430	- (35430)
			Frm-	360 (13)					
			N -Frm	-					
			Forst-	2500 (87)					
ST	5(1)	M	2860 (13)		860**(4)	91652	3000 (11.7) + 1800 (2)	89732	18800 (83) (70932)
			Frm	360 (13)					
			N-Frm	-					
			Forst	2500 (87)					
ST	8(3)	M	16200 (22)		34500 (47)	66087	7250*** (8.9) + 3090	18477	23000 (31) (4523)
			Frm	9600 (59)					
			N-Frm	-					
			Forst	6600 (41)					
OBC	5(1)	M	900 (1)		-	87580	9000 (11.7)* + 5400 (5.8)	92080	66866 (99) (25214)
			Frm	900 (100)					
			N-Frm	-					
			Forst	-					

Receipts Including Loan – Rest of the figures in parenthesis exclude loan receipts. \*\* Inputs supplied by member. \*\*\* Part SHG Loan @ 2% pa.

			Income From Farm+Non-Farm Labour + Forest Produce		Income From Agricultural Production	Food and Non-Food expenditure	Loan Borrowed/ Interest on Loans (@10% for 6 months)	Total Deficit/ Savings	Income From Brick Kiln Migration Total Advances + Living Expenses + Balance Payments (%) & (Net Income) Rs.
of Average Income & expenditure of Household/Annum			Rs./(% in total income excluding loan receipts)		Rs./ ( % in total income excluding loan receipts)	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
Characteristics of Households									
Socio	Size	Migrnt/							
Category	of HH /Dep	N- Migrnt							
SC	4(1)	M	12800 (25.8)		11180 (22.6)	32880	11000 (18)* + 6600 (16.7)	15500	25600 (51.6) (10100)
			Frm-	10800 (84)					
			N-Frm	-					
			Forst-	2000 (16)					
ST	3(1)	M	16600 (18)		3510 (4)	83070	10000 (9.9)* + 6000 (5.7)	68960	70800 (78) (1840)
			Frm	5400 (33)					
			N-Frm	-					
			Forst	11200 (67)					
ST	5(2)	NM	17200 (58)		12420 (42)	76000	10000 (25.2)* + 6000 (7)	52380	- (52380)
			Frm	-					
			N-Frm	16000 (92)					
			Forst	1200 (8)					
ST	2(-)	NM	12400 (34)		23920 (66)	54170	3000 (7.5)+ 1800	19150	- (19150)
			Frm	3600					
			Pens	3600					
			Forst	5200					

\*Total Receipts Including Loan – Rest of the figures in parenthesis exclude loan receipts.

**Observations:**

1. 100% households have deficit income with respect to their expenditure.
2. 38% of the Hh going to brick kilns fail to circumvent the deficit.

• Table-3.1.1b

Category of Average Income & Expenditure of Household/Annum				Income From Farm+Non-Farm Labour + Forest Produce  Rs./(% in total income excluding loan receipts)		Income From Agricultural Production  Rs./( % in total income excluding loan receipts)	Food and Non-Food expenditure  Rs.	Loan Borrowed/ Interest on Loans (@10% for 6 months)  Rs.	Total Deficit/ Savings  Rs.
Characteristics of Households									
Land Acres	Soc Catgry	Size of HH /Dep	Migrnt/ N-Migrn						
0.5	ST	5 (1)	MG	5290 (12)		-500 (-1)	82345	17500 (28)* + 4375	37055
				Frm-	1790 (34)				
				N -Frm	1500 (28)				
				Forst-	2000 (38)				
0	ST	1 (0)	MG	2200 (14)		0 (0)	17890	0 (0)* + 0	2490
				Frm	2200 (100)				
				N-Frm	0 (0)				
				Forst	0 (0)				
0	SC	3 (2)	MG	7641 (20)		0 (0)	57690	15000 (28)* + 9000	19248
				Frm	441 (6)				
				N-Frm	4200 (55)				
				Forst	3000 (39)				
0	SC	7 (2)	MG	3801 (5)		0 (0)	82607	24997 (25)* + 7504	8456
				Frm	1603 (42)				
				N-Frm	2198 (58)				
				Forst	0 (0)				

\*Total Receipts Including Loan – Rest of the figures in parenthesis exclude loan receipts.

--- - denotes that we did not get the sought information. This happened only with the big landlords

Category of Average Income & Expenditure of Household/Annum				Income From Farm+Non-Farm Labour + Forest Produce  Rs./(% in total income excluding loan receipts)	Income From Agricultural Production  Rs./ ( % in total income excluding loan receipts)	Food and Non-Food expenditure  Rs.	Loan Borrowed/ Interest on Loans (@10% for 6 months)  Rs.	Total Deficit/ Savings  Rs.	Income From Brick Kiln Migration Total Advances + Living Expenses + Balance Payments (%) & (Net Income) Rs.
Characteristics of Households									
Land Acres	Soc Catg ry	Size of HH /Dep	Migrnt/ N-Migr n						

0.5	SC	5(2)	M	1260 (3)		0 (0)	55200	3000 (7)* + 1800	14340
				Frm	960 (76)				
				N-Frm	300 (24)				
				Forst	0 (0)				
0	OBC	6(3)	M	2700 (5)		0 (0)	64566	10002 (15)+ 6000	6768
				Frm	2400 (89)				
				Pens	300 (11)				
				Forst	0 (0)				

0	OBC	1(0)	NM	1200 (100)		0 (0)	8940	0 (0)* + 0	7740	0 (0) (1200)
				Frm-	1200 (100)					
				N -Frm	0 (0)					
				Forst-	0 (0)					
2.4	OBC	4(2)	NM	9168 (103)		-290 (-3)	80660	20000 (69)* + 12000	71782	0 (0) (8878)
				Frm	2100 (23)					
				N-Frm	4668 (51)					
				Forst	2400 (26)					
0	ST	2(0)	M	2960 (22)		0 (0)	31570	3000 (18)* + 1800	18343	10267 (78) (13227)
				Frm	960 (32)					
				N-Frm	2000 (68)					
				Forst	0 (0)					

Category of Average Income & Expenditure of Household/Annum				Income From Farm+Non Farm Labour + Forest Produce  Rs./(% in total income excluding loan receipts)	Income From Agricultural Production  Rs./(% in total income excluding loan receipts)	Food and Non Food expenditure  Rs.	Loan Borrowed/ Interest on Loans (@10% for 6 months)  Rs.	Total Deficit/ Savings  Rs.	Income From Brick Kiln Migration Total Advances + Living Expenses + Balance Payments (%) & (Net Income) Rs.
Characteristics of Households									
Landed Acres	Social Category	Size of HH /Dep	Migrant/ N-Migrant						

60	OBC	6(2)	NM	0 (0)		0 (0)	136122	0 (0)* + 0	---	0 (0) (---)
				Frm	0 (0)					
				N-Frm	0 (0)					
				Forst	0 (0)					
4	OBC	6(3)	NM	7278 (20)		-9240 (-26)	57078	34800 (49)* + 21300	21240	37800 (105) (35838)
				Frm	3600 (49)					
				N-Frm	1680 (23)					
				Forst	1998 (28)					

13	ST	5(2)	NM	6360 (11)		52130 (89)	50680	5000 (8)* + 3000	7810	0 (0) (58490)
				Frm	0 (0)					
				N-Frm	3360 (53)					
0	SC	6(3)	M	870 (2)		0 (0)	122958	23334 (32)* + 13998	72540	49548 (98) (50418)
				Frm	870 (100)					
				N-Frm	0 (0)					
				Forst	0 (0)					

6.5	ST	5(1)	NM	182500 (108)		-13000 (-8)	236060	0 (0)* + 0	---	0 (0) (169500)
				Frm	0 (0)					
				N-Frm	182500 (100)					
				Forst	0 (0)					

**Observations:**

- 80% households have deficit income with respect to their expenditure.



Table 3.1.1 c

Data on Annual Average Income and Expenditure in Bagjharan village, Balangir

Land Holdi ng (acre s)	So c. Ca t.	HH siz e	D ep en de nt s	M G/ N M G	Income from farm + Production		Income from Agri.		Loan borro wed/In terest on loans	Total defici t/savi ngs	Total income from brick kiln (%) (Net income)
					Rs. (% of total income excluding receipts)	Rs. (% of total income excluding loan receipts)	Rs. (% of total income excluding loan receipts)	Expe ndit ure			
4.85	ST	8	5	M G	<b>39000 (40)</b> Frm- 0 (0) Non-frm - 31500 (81) Forest - 7500 (19)				27000 (28) + 8100 (8)	- 11010	<b>19867</b> (26) (30877)
0	ST	4	2	M G	<b>33400 (69)</b> Frm- 14400 (43) Non-frm - 12000 (36) Forest - 7000 (21)				0 (0) + 0 (0)	<b>29840</b>	<b>14667</b> (44) (- 15173)
3	ST	5	2	N M G	<b>12700 (100)</b> Frm- 700 (6) Non-frm - 7200 (57) Forest - 4800 (38)				15000 (118) + 9000 (71)	<b>78556</b>	<b>0 (0)</b> (-78556)
2.5	ST	4	0	N M G	<b>6000 (-63)</b> Frm- 6000 (100) Non-frm - 0 (0) Forest - 0 (0)				2000 (-21) + 0 (0)	<b>77240</b>	<b>0 (0)</b> (-77240)
1.25	ST	5	3	M G	<b>16300 (59)</b> Frm- 4400 (27) Non-frm - 6000 (37) Forest - 5900 (36)				17500 (63) + 10500 (38)	<b>13825</b> <b>0</b>	<b>21333</b> (331) (- 116917)

6	ST	4	2	M G	<b>4900 (33)</b> Frm- 2400 (49) Non-frm - 0 (0) Forest - 2500 (51)	<b>0 (0)</b>	6625 0	3500 (24) + 1650 (11)	<b>9867</b> (201) (- 51483)
0.5	ST	5	1	M G	<b>52200 (103)</b> Frm- 30000 (57) Non-frm - 7200 (14) Forest - 15000 (29)	<b>-1800 (-4)</b>	4632 0	0 (0) + 0 (0)	<b>500 (1)</b> (4580)
1.5	ST	7	0	N M G	<b>33160 (99)</b> Frm- 10560 (32) Non-frm - 17600 (53) Forest - 5000 (15)	<b>260 (1)</b>	5646 0	10000 (30) + 3000 (9)	<b>0 (0)</b> (-23040)
3	ST	6	3	M G	<b>11500 (31)</b> Frm- 0 (0) Non-frm - 4500 (39) Forest - 7000 (61)	<b>3300 (9)</b>	7939 6	12000 (32) + 3600 (10)	<b>22467</b> (152) (-42129)
19	ST	10	2	N M G	<b>26500 (-98)</b> Frm- 0 (0) Non-frm - 0 (0) Forest - 26500 (100)	<b>-53500 (198)</b>	9422 3	25000 (-93) + 3000 (-11)	<b>0 (0)</b> (- 121223)
0	SC	4	3	M G	<b>12400 (75)</b> Frm- 4200 (34) Non-frm - 4200 (34) Forest - 4000 (32)	<b>0 (0)</b>	9790 0	25000 (95) + 15000 (57)	<b>13967</b> (113) (-71533)
0	SC	4	2	M G	<b>28700 (170)</b> Frm- 1500 (5) Non-frm - 26000 (91) Forest - 1200 (4)	<b>0 (0)</b>	7128 0	10000 (59) + 3600 (21)	<b>16833</b> (0) (- 54447)
2	SC	8	4	N M G	<b>7000 (40)</b> Frm- 2200 (31) Non-frm - 1500 (21) Forest - 3300 (47)	<b>10360 (60)</b>	1045 00	30000 (173) + 10500 (60)	<b>0 (0)</b> (-87140)

0.7	SC	5	1	M G	<b>20500 (84)</b> Frm- 18000 (88) Non-frm - 700 (3) Forest - 1800 (9)	<b>-2500 (-10)</b>	1376 70	17500 (97) + 10500 (58)	<b>119670</b>	<b>0 (0)</b> (-119670)
6	O BC	6	1	N M G	<b>66000 (94)</b> Frm- 0 (0) Non-frm - 66000 (100) Forest - 0 (0)	<b>4100 (6)</b>	9410 0	2000 (3) + 1200 (2)	<b>24000</b>	<b>0 (0)</b> (-24000)
2.5	O BC	9	6	M G	<b>2000 (2)</b> Frm- 0 (0) Non-frm - 2000 (100) Forest - 0 (0)	<b>66180 (83)</b>	9007 0	7500 (9) + 4500 (6)	<b>21890</b>	<b>11867</b> (17) (-10023)
32	O BC	5	2	N M G	<b>71600 (-766)</b> Frm- 0 (0) Non-frm - 71600 (100) Forest - 0 (0)	<b>-80950 (866)</b>	1420 00	0 (0) + 0 (0)	<b>151350</b>	<b>0 (0)</b> (-151350)
0.5	O BC	7	4	M G	<b>3060 (8)</b> Frm- 3060 (100) Non-frm - 0 (0) Forest - 0 (0)	<b>5000 (13)</b>	5124 8	7250 (18) + 0 (0)	<b>43188</b>	<b>31867</b> (395) (-11321)
20	O BC	8	4	N M G	<b>42000 (28)</b> Frm- 0 (0) Non-frm - 42000 (100) Forest - 0 (0)	<b>108000 (72)</b>	4983 65	60000 (40) + 21600 (14)	<b>348365</b>	<b>0 (0)</b> (-348365)
4	OT HE RS	9	5	N M G	<b>0 (0)</b> Frm- 0 (0) Non-frm - 0 (0) Forest - 0 (0)	<b>0 (0)</b>	1844 90	10000 (0) + 3000 (0)	<b>184490</b>	<b>0 (0)</b> (-184490)
2.5	OT HE RS	4	2	N M G	<b>7200 (22)</b> Frm- 0 (0) Non-frm - 7200 (100) Forest - 0 (0)	<b>25200 (78)</b>	5260 5	45000 (139) + 9600 (30)	<b>20205</b>	<b>0 (0)</b> (-20205)

Table3. 1.1 d

Data on Annual Average Income and Expenditure in Bariali village, Balangir

Land Holding (acres)	Social Caste	HH size	Dependents	MG / NM G	Income from farm + non-farm + forest produce Rs. (% of total income excluding loan receipts)	Income from Agri. Production Rs. (% of total income excluding loan receipts)	Expenditure	Loan borrowed/ interest on loans	Total deficit / savings	Total income from brick kiln (%) (Net income)
0	ST	5	1	MG	<b>25000 (32)</b> Frm- 3000 (12) Non-frm - 18000 (72) Forest - 4000 (16)	<b>0 (0)</b>	93523	9000 (12) + 0 (0)	<b>68523</b>	<b>53200</b> (213) (- 15323)
0	ST	3	1	MG	<b>12000 (74)</b> Frm- 6000 (50) Non-frm - 0 (0) Forest - 6000 (50)	<b>0 (0)</b>	57400	0 (0) + 0 (0)	<b>45400</b>	<b>4300</b> (36) (- 41100)
4	ST	5	2	NM G	<b>13000 (45)</b> Frm- 0 (0) Non-frm - 9000 (69) Forest - 4000 (31)	<b>15700 (55)</b>	64320	9000 (31) + 0 (0)	<b>35620</b>	<b>0 (0)</b> (- 35620)
2	ST	6	4	NM G	<b>10600 (102)</b> Frm- 5600 (53) Non-frm - 2000 (19) Forest - 3000 (28)	<b>-200 (-2)</b>	52040	6000 (58) + 0 (0)	<b>41640</b>	<b>0 (0)</b> (- 41640)
5	S	6	2	MG	<b>11530 (25)</b>	<b>7080 (15)</b>	4649	0 (0) +	<b>27880</b>	<b>28000</b>

	T				Frm- 1530 (13) Non-frm - 10000 (87) Forest - 0 (0)		0	0 (0)		(150) (120)
2	S T	1	1	NM G	<b>11000 (100)</b> Frm- 0 (0) Non-frm - 0 (0) Forest - 11000 (100)	<b>0 (0)</b>	2232 0	5000 (45) + 1200 (11)	<b>11320</b>	<b>0 (0)</b> (- 11320)
5	S T	5	3	MG	<b>5100 (42)</b> Frm- 2100 (41) Non-frm - 2000 (39) Forest - 1000 (20)	<b>-1110 (-9)</b>	4117 0	750 (6) + 450 (4)	<b>37180</b>	<b>8100</b> (203) (- 29080)
3	S T	5	2	NM G	<b>3000 (7500)</b> Frm- 0 (0) Non-frm - 3000 (100) Forest - 0 (0)	<b>-2960 (-7400)</b>	7605 2	0 (0) + 0 (0)	<b>76012</b>	<b>0 (0)</b> (- 76012)
1.35	S T	4	2	NM G	<b>29000 (88)</b> Frm- 11250 (39) Non-frm - 13500 (47) Forest - 4250 (15)	<b>4000 (12)</b>	6432 0	3750 (11) + 450 (1)	<b>31320</b>	<b>0 (0)</b> (- 31320)
6	S T	2	0	NM G	<b>2000 (26)</b> Frm- 2000 (100) Non-frm - 0 (0) Forest - 0 (0)	<b>5615 (74)</b>	5243 0	24000 (315) + 0 (0)	<b>44815</b>	<b>0 (0)</b> (- 44815)
1	S T	8	4	NM G	<b>3750 (147)</b> Frm- 3150 (84) Non-frm - 0 (0) Forest - 600 (16)	<b>-1200 (- 47)</b>	1143 40	15000 (588) + 7500 (294)	<b>11179 0</b>	<b>0 (0)</b> (- 111790)
0.45	S T	5	0	NM G	<b>82000 (103)</b> Frm- 0 (0) Non-frm - 82000 (100) Forest - 0 (0)	<b>-2000 (-3)</b>	1370 05	10000 (13) + 1200 (2)	<b>57005</b>	<b>0 (0) (- 57005)</b>

18	S T	8	2	NM G	<b>0 (0)</b> Frm- 0 (0) Non-frm - 0 (0) Forest - 0 (0)	<b>24300</b> <b>(100)</b>	7298 5	0 (0) + 0 (0)	<b>48685</b>	<b>0 (0) (-</b> <b>48685)</b>
0	S T	2	2	NM G	<b>1440 (100)</b> Frm- 1440 (100) Non-frm - 0 (0) Forest - 0 (0)	<b>0 (0)</b>	3410 5	3500 (243) + 2100 (146)	<b>32665</b>	<b>0 (0) (-</b> <b>32665)</b>
0	S C	5	3	MG	<b>8000 (36)</b> Frm- 3800 (48) Non-frm - 0 (0) Forest - 4200 (53)	<b>0 (0)</b>	6807 5	10000 (45) + 6000 (27)	<b>60075</b>	<b>14000</b> (175) (- 46075)
1	S C	5	2	MG	<b>4200 (12)</b> Frm- 1200 (29) Non-frm - 1000 (24) Forest - 2000 (48)	<b>-6500 (-</b> <b>19)</b>	1042 80	25000 (48) + 4500 (9)	<b>10658</b> <b>0</b>	<b>54267 (-</b> <b>2359)</b> (- 52313)
0	S C	3	1	MG	<b>4490 (21)</b> Frm- 2890 (64) Non-frm - 0 (0) Forest - 1600 (36)	<b>0 (0)</b>	5980 0	15000 (71) + 9000 (43)	<b>55310</b>	<b>16667</b> (371) (- 38643)
2.5	S C	5	2	NM G	<b>3000 (-395)</b> Frm- 2000 (67) Non-frm - 0 (0) Forest - 1000 (33)	<b>-3760</b> <b>(495)</b>	3914 8	20000 (- 2632) + 6000 (-789)	<b>39908</b>	<b>0 (0) (-</b> <b>39908)</b>
1.7	O B C	4	1	MG	<b>5400 (19)</b> Frm- 700 (13) Non-frm - 2700 (50) Forest - 2000 (37)	<b>-3360 (-</b> <b>12)</b>	5910 4	1500 (5) + 900 (3)	<b>57064</b>	<b>26933</b> (1320) (- 30131)
0	O	5	3	MG	<b>37800 (62)</b>	<b>0 (0)</b>	1650	50000	<b>12724</b>	<b>23273</b>

	B				Frm- 13600 (36)		45	(82) +	5	(62)
	C				Non-frm - 19200 (51)			24000		(-
					Forest - 5000 (13)			(39)		103972)

**Table 3.1.1 e**

**Data on Annual Average Income and Expenditure in Debripali village, Balangir**

Land Holding (acres)	Sex of Head of Household	HH size	Dependents	M/G/NM/G	Income from farm + non-farm + forest produce Rs. (% of total income excluding loan receipts)	Income from Agri. Production Rs. (% of total income excluding loan receipts)	Expenditure	Loan borrowed/interest on loans	Total deficit/savings	Total income from brick kiln (%) (Net income)
0.5	ST	4	1	M/G	<b>12510 (31)</b> Frm- 2500 (20) Non-frm - 10010 (80) Forest - 0 (0)	<b>0 (0)</b>	33930	3500 (9) + 2850 (7)	<b>21420</b>	<b>27800</b> (222) (6380)
0	SC	2	1	NM/G	<b>3000 (100)</b> Frm- 0 (0) Non-frm - 3000 (100) Forest - 0 (0)	<b>0 (0)</b>	28055	2500 (83) + 750 (25)	<b>25055</b>	<b>0 (0)</b> (- 25055)
0	SC	6	1	M/G	<b>66100 (67)</b> Frm- 5100 (8) Non-frm - 60000 (91) Forest - 1000 (2)	<b>0 (0)</b>	72820	25000 (22) + 15000 (13)	<b>6720</b>	<b>45467</b> (69) (38747)
0	ST	2	2	M/G	<b>0 (0)</b> Frm- 0 (0)	<b>6960 (28)</b>	63186	10000 (31) +	<b>56226</b>	<b>25733</b> (370)

					Non-frm - 0 (0) Forest - 0 (0)			3000 (9)		(- 30493)
0	S C	8	4	M G	<b>11100 (23)</b> Frm- 10500 (95) Non-frm - 0 (0) Forest - 600 (5)	<b>0 (0)</b>	1303 06	26500 (54) + 15900 (32)	<b>11920</b> <b>6</b>	<b>37867</b> (341) (- 81339)
8	S T	7	1	M G	<b>38400 (45)</b> Frm- 0 (0) Non-frm - 38400 (100) Forest - 0 (0)	<b>26215</b> <b>(31)</b>	1225 90	17500 (19) + 2850 (3)	<b>57975</b>	<b>28867</b> (45) (- 29108)
0	S T	2	1	NM G	<b>8700 (100)</b> Frm- 2100 (24) Non-frm - 6600 (76) Forest - 0 (0)	<b>0 (0)</b>	3276 6	6500 (75) + 3900 (45)	<b>24066</b>	<b>0 (0)</b> (- 24066)
0	S T	6	4	NM G	<b>3600 (100)</b> Frm- 0 (0) Non-frm - 3600 (100) Forest - 0 (0)	<b>0 (0)</b>	1350	3500 (97) + 1050 (29)	-2250	<b>0 (0)</b> (2250)
2	S T	4	0	M G	<b>3300 (34)</b> Frm- 0 (0) Non-frm - 0 (0) Forest - 3300 (100)	<b>0 (0)</b>	1042 92	0 (0) + 0 (0)	<b>10099</b> <b>2</b>	<b>6333</b> (192) (- 94659)
1	S C	8	1	M G	<b>8100 (15)</b> Frm- 5400 (67) Non-frm - 0 (0) Forest - 2700 (33)	<b>0 (0)</b>	1310 92	25000 (37) + 10650 (16)	<b>12299</b> <b>2</b>	<b>58600</b> (723) (- 64392)
2	O B C	4	0	NM G	<b>0 (0)</b> Frm- 0 (0) Non-frm - 0 (0) Forest - 0 (0)	<b>12420</b> <b>(100)</b>	6588 0	29000 (233) + 6000 (48)	<b>53460</b>	<b>0 (0)</b> (- 53460)
0	S	3	1	M	<b>17010 (60)</b>	<b>0 (0)</b>	8364	35000	<b>66630</b>	<b>11400</b>



	T			G	Frm- 15810 (93) Non-frm - 0 (0) Forest - 1200 (7)		0	(123) + 10500 (37)		(67) (- 55230)
1	S C	5	1	M G	<b>13000 (23)</b> Frm- 13000 (100) Non-frm - 0 (0) Forest - 0 (0)	<b>800 (1)</b>	1642 55	15000 (21) + 9000 (13)	<b>15045</b> <b>5</b>	<b>56533</b> (410) (- 93922)
3.5	O B C	8	3	NM G	<b>182500 (100)</b> Frm- 0 (0) Non-frm - 182500 (100) Forest - 0 (0)	<b>0 (0)</b>	2419 90	60000 (33) + 9000 (5)	<b>59490</b>	<b>0 (0)</b> (- 59490)
2.27	S T	8	4	NM G	<b>2040 (3)</b> Frm- 560 (27) Non-frm - 780 (38) Forest - 700 (34)	<b>75750</b> <b>(97)</b>	2106 32	6000 (8) + 5400 (7)	<b>13284</b> <b>2</b>	<b>0 (0)</b> (- 132842)
1.5	S C	2	2	NM G	<b>3100 (105)</b> Frm- 400 (13) Non-frm - 0 (0) Forest - 2700 (87)	<b>-150 (-5)</b>	1157 37	6000 (203) + 5400 (183)	<b>11278</b> <b>7</b>	<b>0 (0)</b> (- 112787)
0	S T	4	2	M G	<b>38600 (89)</b> Frm- 22000 (57) Non-frm - 16000 (41) Forest - 600 (2)	<b>0 (0)</b>	7499 0	7500 (17) + 6750 (16)	<b>36390</b>	<b>4933</b> (13) (- 31457)
0.8	S T	5	3	M G	<b>2060 (10)</b> Frm- 1360 (66) Non-frm - 0 (0) Forest - 700 (34)	<b>-2430 (-12)</b>	7553 0	4500 (19) + 810 (3)	<b>75900</b>	<b>24500</b> (-6622) (- 51400)
0.5	S C	3	1	M G	<b>2100 (31)</b> Frm- 2100 (100) Non-frm - 0 (0)	<b>300 (4)</b>	1040 00	5500 (49) + 3300	<b>10160</b> <b>0</b>	<b>8800</b> (367) (-)

					Forest - 0 (0)			(29)		92800)
					<b>36000 (39)</b>			22500		<b>77667</b>
					Frm- 18000 (50)			(20) +		(208)
	S			M	Non-frm - 18000 (50)		1837	13500	14630	(-
0.17	C	6	1	G	Forest - 0 (0)	<b>1400 (2)</b>	00	(12)	0	68633)

- Table 3.1.2 a - Bahabal Village Details

### Indebtedness as a Proportion of Rural Incomes

Land Holding	Social Category	Size of the Household (Dependents)	Migrant/ Non-Migrant HH	Average Annual Income at Place of Origin	Average Annual Loan Borrowed	Loan as a Percentage of Rural Receipts
20	ST	6 (2)	MG	37450	9000	19.3
12	ST	7 (2)	MG	31275	7000	18.2
4	ST	8 (4)	NMG	46220	6333	12
1.35	ST	3 (-)	MG	19320	15000	43.7
4	ST	5(3)	NM	24910	3000	10.7
2.5	ST	5(1)	M	7060	3000	29.8
10	ST	8(3)	M	50460	7250	12.5
LL	OBC	5(1)	M	900	9000	90.9
2.5	SC	4(1)	M	23880	11000	31.5
3	ST	3(1)	M	21900	10000	31.3
2	ST	5(2)	NM	27620	10000	26.5

Overall average 29.6

**Indebtedness as a Proportion of Rural Incomes**

Land Holding	Social Category	Size of the Household (Dependents)	Migrant/ Non-Migrant HH	Average Annual Income at Place of Origin	Average Annual Loan Borrowed	Loan as a Percentage of Rural Receipts
0.5	ST	5 (1)	M	45290	17500	28
0	ST	1 (0)	M	15400	0	0
0	SC	3 (2)	M	38442	15000	28
0	SC	7 (2)	M	74151	24997	25
0	SC	7(4)	M	65702	24003	27
0	OBC	2(2)	NM	14820	3000	17
0	OBC	5(1)	M	77865	20000	20
0	SC	1(0)	M	11220	2800	20
0	ST	3(1)	M	26538	14001	35
3	ST	4(1)	NM	12785	2600	17
0.5	SC	5(2)	M	40860	3000	7
0	OBC	6(3)	M	57798	10002	15
0	OBC	1(0)	NM	1200	0	0
2.4	OBC	4(2)	NM	8878	20000	69
0	ST	2(0)	M	13227	3000	18
60	OBC	6(2)	NM	---	0	0
4	OBC	6(3)	NM	35838	34800	49
13	ST	5(2)	NM	58490	5000	8
0	SC	6(3)	M	50418	23334	32
6.5	ST	5(1)	NM	169500	0	0

**Overall average: 20.7%**

**Table 3.1.2 c**

**Indebtedness as a proportion of Rural Income**

**Bagjharan village**

<b>Land Holding</b>	<b>Soc. Category</b>	<b>Size of HH</b>	<b>Dependents</b>	<b>Migrant/Non-migrant</b>	<b>Income at source</b>	<b>Annual Loan</b>	<b>% of loan out of total income at source</b>
4.85	ST	8	5	MG	76750	27000	28
0	ST	4	2	MG	33400	0	0
3	ST	5	2	NMG	12700	15000	118
2.5	ST	4	0	NMG	-9460	2000	-21
1.25	ST	5	3	MG	6450	17500	63
6	ST	4	2	MG	4900	3500	24
0.5	ST	5	1	MG	50400	0	0
1.5	ST	7	0	NMG	33420	10000	30
3	ST	6	3	MG	14800	12000	32
19	ST	10	2	NMG	-27000	25000	-93
0	SC	4	3	MG	12400	25000	95
0	SC	4	2	MG	28700	10000	59
2	SC	8	4	NMG	17360	30000	173
0.7	SC	5	1	MG	18000	17500	97
6	OBC	6	1	NMG	70100	2000	3
2.5	OBC	9	6	MG	68180	7500	9
32	OBC	5	2	NMG	-9350	0	0
0.5	OBC	7	4	MG	8060	7250	18
20	OBC	8	4	NMG	150000	60000	40
4	OTHERS	9	5	NMG	0	10000	
2.5	OTHERS	4	2	NMG	32400	45000	139

**Average = 52**

**Table 3.1.2 d**

**Indebtedness as a proportion of Rural Income**

**Bariali village**

<b>Land Holding</b>	<b>Soc. Category</b>	<b>Size of HH</b>	<b>Dependents</b>	<b>Migrant/Non-migrant</b>	<b>Income at source</b>	<b>Annual Loan</b>	<b>% of loan out of total income at source</b>
0	ST	5	1	MG	25000	9000	12
0	ST	3	1	MG	12000	0	0
4	ST	5	2	NMG	28700	9000	31
2	ST	6	4	NMG	10400	6000	58
5	ST	6	2	MG	18610	0	0
2	ST	1	1	NMG	11000	5000	45
5	ST	5	3	MG	3990	750	6
3	ST	5	2	NMG	40	0	0
1.35	ST	4	2	NMG	33000	3750	11
6	ST	2	0	NMG	7615	24000	315
1	ST	8	4	NMG	2550	15000	588
0.45	ST	5	0	NMG	80000	10000	13
18	ST	8	2	NMG	24300	0	0
0	ST	2	2	NMG	1440	3500	243
0	SC	5	3	MG	8000	10000	45
1	SC	5	2	MG	-2300	25000	48
0	SC	3	1	MG	4490	15000	71
2.5	SC	5	2	NMG	-760	20000	-2632
1.7	OBC	4	1	MG	2040	1500	5
0	OBC	5	3	MG	37800	50000	82

**Average = 83**

**Table 3.1.2 d**

**Indebtedness as a proportion of Rural Income**

**Debripali village**

<b>Land Holding</b>	<b>Soc. Category</b>	<b>Size of HH</b>	<b>Dependents</b>	<b>Migrant/Non-migrant</b>	<b>Income at source</b>	<b>Annual Loan</b>	<b>% of loan out of total income at source</b>
0.5	ST	4	1	MG	12510	3500	9
0	SC	2	1	NMG	3000	2500	83
0	SC	6	1	MG	66100	25000	22
0	ST	2	2	MG	6960	10000	31
0	SC	8	4	MG	11100	26500	54
8	ST	7	1	MG	64615	17500	19
0	ST	2	1	NMG	8700	6500	75
0	ST	6	4	NMG	3600	3500	97
2	ST	4	0	MG	3300	0	0
1	SC	8	1	MG	8100	25000	37
2	OBC	4	0	NMG	12420	29000	233
0	ST	3	1	MG	17010	35000	123
1	SC	5	1	MG	13800	15000	21
3.5	OBC	8	3	NMG	182500	60000	33
2.27	ST	8	4	NMG	77790	6000	8
1.5	SC	2	2	NMG	2950	6000	203
0	ST	4	2	MG	38600	7500	17
0.8	ST	5	3	MG	-370	4500	19
0.5	SC	3	1	MG	2400	5500	49
0.17	SC	6	1	MG	37400	22500	20
							Average = 58

Table 3.2.1 a&amp;b

Festivals, Functions, Gifts, Alcohol and Gutka Expenditure as a Proportion of Total Expenditure

Table-3.2.1a Bahabal Village Details

Land Holding	Social Category	Size of the Household (Dependents)	Migrant/ Non-Migrant HH	Festival, Functions, Gifts, Alcohol and Gutka Expenditure 1	Total 2A Expenditure/ 2B Deficit 2		1 as % of 2A & 2B	
					A	B	A	B
20	ST	6 (2)	MG	8880	67680	35630	13	25
12	ST	7 (2)	MG	7820	54700	23725	14	33
4	ST	8 (4)	NMG	9160	52450	9630	17	95
1.35	ST	3 (-)	MG	6360	44000	25080	14	25
4	ST	5(3)	NM	20480	56480	33370	36	61
2.5	ST	5(1)	M	20480	91652	86392	22	24
10	ST	8(3)	M	17016	66087	15627	26	109
LL	OBC	5(1)	M	22280	92980	86680	24	26
2.5	SC	4(1)	M	2380	50480	8480	5	28
3	ST	3(1)	M	13300	89290	67170	15	20
2	ST	5(2)	NM	14000	82000	54380	17	26
Average							18	Wt.ave.32



Table 3.2.1b Kuthurla Village Details

Land Holding	Social Category	Size of the Household (Dependents)	Migrant/ Non-Migrant HH	Festival, Functions, Gifts, Alcohol and Gutka Expenditure 1	Total 2A Expenditure/ 2B Deficit 2		1 as % of 2A & 2B
					A	B	A/B
0.5	ST	5 (1)	M	5210	82345	37055	6
0	ST	1 (0)	M	2540	17890	2490	14
0	SC	3 (2)	M	2000	57690	19248	3
0	SC	7 (2)	M	11000	82607	8456	13
0	SC	7(4)	M	3250	111377	45675	3
0	OBC	2(2)	NM	5140	50660	35840	10
0	OBC	5(1)	M	12650	114410	36545	11
0	SC	1(0)	M	920	10320	-900	9
0	ST	3(1)	M	26840	104481	77943	26
3	ST	4(1)	NM	22380	80980	68195	28
0.5	SC	5(2)	M	5240	55200	14340	9
0	OBC	6(3)	M	6160	64566	6768	10
0	OBC	1(0)	NM	1260	8940	7740	14
2.4	OBC	4(2)	NM	10260	80660	71782	13
0	ST	2(0)	M	660	31570	18343	2
60	OBC	6(2)	NM	12620	136122	--	9
4	OBC	6(3)	NM	8680	57078	21240	15
13	ST	5(2)	NM	8100	50680	-7810	16
0	SC	6(3)	M	22620	122958	72540	18
6.5	ST	5(1)	NM	21000	236060	--	9
Average							12
Wt. Avg							12

Table3. 2.1 c

## Bagjharan village details

Lan d Hold ing	Soc . Cat ego ry	Siz e of HH	D ep en de nt s	Mig rant /No n- mig rant	Expenditure on tobacco, alcohol, festivals, functions, gifts, etc. (1)	Total expen diture (2A)	Def icit (2B )	He alt h (3)	1 as % of 2A	1 as % of 2B	3 as % of 2A	3 as % of 2B
0	ST	4	2	MG	23740	63240	298 40	20 00	38	80	3	7
3	ST	5	2	NM G	17750	91256	785 56	16 25 0	19	23	18	21
2.5	ST	4	0	NM G	7800	67780	772 40	13 00	12	10	2	2
1.25	ST	5	3	MG	39800	144700	138 250	97 50	28	29	7	7
6	ST	4	2	MG	12300	66250	613 50	88 00	19	20	13	14
1.5	ST	7	0	NM G	5520	56460	230 40	90 00	10	24	16	39
3	ST	6	3	MG	15040	79396	645 96	15 00 0	19	23	19	23
19	ST	10	2	NM G	25500	94223	121 223	17 00 0	27	21	18	14
0	SC	4	3	MG	20600	97900	855 00	17 50 0	21	24	18	20

0	SC	4	2	MG	16040	71280	71280	16500	23	23	23	23
2	SC	8	4	NM G	8500	104500	87140	40	8	10	39	47
0.7	SC	5	1	MG	10000	137670	119750	670	7	8	13	15
6	OB C	6	1	NM G	16000	94100	240500	0	17	67	28	110
2.5	OB C	9	6	MG	5480	90070	2185500	90	6	25	6	25
32	OB C	5	2	NM G	17000	142000	1513000	350	12	11	2	2
0.5	OB C	7	4	MG	5228	51248	431800	88	10	12	31	37
20	OB C	8	4	NM G	174365	498365	348600	365	35	50	14	20
4	OT HE RS	9	5	NM G	17240	184490	184500	490	9	9	40	40
2.5	OT HE RS	4	2	NM G	2225	52605	202000	05	4	11	40	104

**Wt.**   **Wt.**   **Wt.**   **Wt.**  
**Av**   **Av**   **Av**   **Av**  
**g.**   **g.**   **g.**   **g.**  
**20**   **25**   **18**   **22**

Table 3.2.1 d

## Bariali village details

Lan d Hold ing	Soc . Cat ego ry	Siz e of HH	D ep en de nt s	Mig rant /No n- mig rant	Expenditure on tobacco, alcohol, festivals, functions, gifts, etc. (1)	Total expen diture (2A)	De fici t (2 B)	He alt h (3)	1 as % of 2A	1 as % of 2B	3 as % of 2A	3 as % of 2B
0	ST	5	1	MG	33800	93523	68 52 3	60 00	36	49	6	9
0	ST	3	1	MG	10440	57400	45 40 0	20 00	18	23	3	4
4	ST	5	2	NM G	31000	64320	35 62 0	36 00	48	87	6	10
2	ST	6	4	NM G	11300	52040	41 64 0	10 0	22	27	0	0
5	ST	6	2	MG	14340	46490	27 88 0	0	31	51	0	0
2	ST	1	1	NM G	5200	22320	11 32 0	75 00	23	46	34	66
5	ST	5	3	MG	7240	41170	37 18 0	30 00	18	19	7	8
3	ST	5	2	NM G	9292	76052	76 01 2	20 00	12	12	3	3

1.35	ST	4	2	NM G	12000	64320	31 32 0	60 0	19	38	1	2
6	ST	2	0	NM G	9840	52430	44 81 5	14 20 0	19	22	27	32
1	ST	8	4	NM G	14560	11434 0	11 17 90	35 60 0	13	13	31	32
0.45	ST	5	0	NM G	8595	13700 5	57 00 5	40 00 0	6	15	29	70
18	ST	8	2	NM G	10300	72985	48 68 5	0	14	21	0	0
0	ST	2	2	NM G	7700	34105	32 66 5	18 50	23	24	5	6
0	SC	5	3	MG	3100	68075	60 07 5	20 00	5	5	3	3
1	SC	5	2	MG	9000	10428 0	10 65 80	40 50 0	9	8	39	38
0	SC	3	1	MG	10540	59800. 05	55 31 0.0 5	24 00	18	19	4	4
2.5	SC	5	2	NM G	17360	39148. 33333	39 90 8.3 33	80 0	44	43	2	2

							3					
1.7	OB C	4	1	MG	13580	59104	57 06 4	26 00	23	24	4	5
0	OB C	5	3	MG	13500	16504 5	12 72 45	45 00 0	8	11	27	35
									<b>Wt.</b>	<b>Wt.</b>	<b>Wt.</b>	<b>Wt.</b>
									<b>Av</b>	<b>Av</b>	<b>Av</b>	<b>Av</b>
									<b>g.</b>	<b>g.</b>	<b>g.</b>	<b>g.</b>
									<b>18</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>19</b>

**Table 3.2.1 d**  
**Debripali village details**

<b>Lan d Hold ing</b>	<b>Soc . Cat ego ry</b>	<b>Siz e of HH</b>	<b>D ep en de nt s</b>	<b>Mig rant /No n- mig rant</b>	<b>Expenditure on tobacco, alcohol, festivals, functions, gifts, etc. (1)</b>	<b>Total expen diture (2A)</b>	<b>Def icit (2B )</b>	<b>He alt h (3)</b>	<b>1 as % of 2A</b>	<b>1 as % of 2B</b>	<b>3 as % of 2A</b>	<b>3 as % of 2B</b>
0.5	ST	4	1	MG	5660	33930	214 20	15 00	17	26	4	7
0	SC	2	1	NM G	5560	28055	250 55	14 00	20	22	5	6
0	SC	6	1	MG	7760	72820	672 0	47 00	11	115	6	70
0	ST	2	2	MG	11600	63186	562 26	12 00	18	21	19	21
0	SC	8	4	MG	18520	130306	119 206	13 10	14	16	10	11

								0				
8	ST	7	1	MG	10020	122590	579 75	26 30 0	8	17	21	45
0	ST	2	1	NM G	6880	32766	240 66	80 0	21	29	2	3
2	ST	4	0	MG	20000	104292	100 992	10 20 0	19	20	10	10
1	SC	8	1	MG	26180	131092	122 992	27 75 0	20	21	21	23
2	OB C	4	0	NM G	7080	65880	534 60	10 00	11	13	2	2
0	ST	3	1	MG	6740	83640	666 30	25 00 0	8	10	30	38
1	SC	5	1	MG	11240	164255	150 455	31 32 5	7	7	19	21
3.5	OB C	8	3	NM G	11040	241990	594 90	49 00 0	5	19	20	82
2.27	ST	8	4	NM G	46200	210632	132 842	44 15 0	22	35	21	33
1.5	SC	2	2	NM G	72900	115737 .05	112 787 .05	70 00	63	65	6	6
0	ST	4	2	MG	15840	74990	363 90	16 00	21	44	2	4

0.8	ST	5	3	MG	4340	75530	75900	1600	6	6	21	21
0.5	SC	3	1	MG	4680	104000	101600	3120	5	5	30	31
0.17	SC	6	1	MG	32200	183700	146300	5240	18	22	29	36
									<b>Wt.</b>	<b>Wt.</b>	<b>Wt.</b>	<b>Wt.</b>
									<b>Av</b>	<b>Av</b>	<b>Av</b>	<b>Av</b>
									<b>g.</b>	<b>g.</b>	<b>g.</b>	<b>g.</b>
									<b>16</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>24</b>

**Table 3.3.1 a**

**List of Money Lenders**

	Source
1.	Munapali Meher
2.	Shambhu Mishra
3.	Miniketan Meher
4.	Judhistira Naik
5.	Baikuntha Suna,
6.	Rabi Sahu,
7.	Purushottam Misra,
8.	Dhruva Meher
9.	Shiva Misra,
10.	Gopa
11.	Bhulia
12.	Ram Prasad
13.	Manoranjan
14.	Hajaru,



15.	Mahindra Bishi
16.	Kharag Malchandan
17.	Chhelia Paluabahal
18.	Ghanasyam Nag
19.	Jagannath Khamari
20.	Sudam Meher
21.	Dambaru Meher
22.	Trilochan Pani
23.	Kailash Sabar
24.	Ganesh Meher
25.	Kunja Panda
26.	Buthi Meher
27.	Laxmidhar Meher
28.	Parma Behera
29.	Khema Bangula
30.	Upas Chandra Bag
31.	Krupasindhu Meher
32.	Muna Mandal
33.	Kabita Jena
34.	Raja Meher
35.	Omkar Singh
36.	Bhakta Meher
37.	Sona Bhoi
38.	Lochan Meher
39.	Kuma Meher
40.	Kailash Chandan
41.	Nruparaj Behera
42.	Dr. Pradeep Meher
43.	Nrupa Bangula
44.	Gauda Saril

45.	Kangalu Meher
46.	Khema Dharua
47.	Bhima Meher
48.	Khirod Meher
49.	Jale Kumbhar
50.	Khema Majhi
51.	Bhuja Meher
52.	Marwadis in Lathore
53.	Ajay Agarwal
54.	School master (Bariali)
55.	Village committee (Bariali)
56.	Indira Jagruti SHG (Bariali)
57.	Sarpanch (Debripali)

**Table 3.3.1b**

<b>Name of the Money Lender</b>	<b>Details</b>
Behera family (OBC)	biggest moneylenders, biggest employers of agricultural labour, 60 acres land
Omkar Singh (Rajput)	brick kiln contractor
Bhakta Meher (OBC)	trader in agricultural inputs, stays in Nandupala panchayat
Sona Bhoi (ST)	big landlord, village shop owner, trader of agri outputs (ST)
Lochan Meher (OBC)	Trader
Shambhu Mishra (Brahmin)	Seed & Fertiliser Supplier
Manoranjan Suar (Brahmin)	Seed and Fertiliser Supplier
Miniketan Meher	Seed and Fertiliser Supplier and Trader
Shiv Prasad Mishra (Brahmin)	Temple Priest

**Table 3.3.1 c****LIST OF TRADERS**

Kuthurla/Mohorapadar/Bagjharan area

Khema (Dandamunda)
Khetra Meher
Bhajany Behera
Feroze
Bipin Meher
Baratha Barihar (Munsi)
Baikuntha suna
Kabita Jena
Bipin Meher
Tikalal meher

Bariali/Lathore area

Marwaris of lathore
Markand
Dharua(Checker)
Kurtam
Sahoo(Turekela)
Kanhai Majhi
Ganesh
Naragan Majhi (Boriali)
Bhima Meher
Bhuja Meher
Ghasiram Agarwal
Sudhar sabar
Sanjith
Gaontia of Bariali

Debripali/Tentulmunda area

Checker Belpada
-----------------

Sankar Agrawal, Belpada
Sudam Meher
Shyam Sunder (marwadi)
Dambaru Meher
Fakir Bhoi (Tentulmunda)
Ganesh Meher (Munsi)
Ravi Barge (contractor)
Jagan Aggarwal
Diga Sahu
Dhujapati Nayak
Gopal Nag
Kunja Abasti
Buthi Meher
Parasu Meher
Madhu Sudan Naik (Sarpanch, Debripali)
Ex-Sarpanch, Debripali

Table 3.4.1 a - BAHABAL

Category of Average Income & Expenditure of Household/Annum				Income From Farm+Non-Farm Labour + Forest Produce  Rs./(% in total income excluding loan receipts)	Income From Agricultural Production  Rs./(% in total income excluding loan receipts)	Food and Non-Food expenditure  Rs.	Loan Borrowed/ Interest on Loans (@10% for 6 months)  Rs.	Total Deficit/ Savings  Rs.	Income From Brick Kiln Migration Total Advances + Living Expenses + Balance Payments (%) & (Net Income) Rs.
Characteristics of Households									
Land Acres	Soc Cat	Size of HH /Dep	Mig/ N-Mig						
2.5	ST	5(1)	M	2860 (13) Frm 360 (13) N-Frm - Forst 2500 (87)	860**(4)	91652	3000 (11.7) + 1800 (2)	89732	18800 (83) (70932)
2.5	ST	5(1)	M	11256 (17) Frm 840 () N-Frm - Forst 10416 ()	10020 (15)	91652	3000 (4.3) + 60	70436	45000 (68) (25436) (64)
2.5	SC	4(1)	M	12800 (25.8) Frm- 10800 (84) N -Frm - Forst- 2000 (16)	11180 (22.6)	32880	11000 (18)* + 6600 (16.7)	15500	25600 (51.6) (10100)
2.5	SC	4(1)	M	33533 (47) Frm 25200 N-Frm Forst 8333 + Mahul	11120 (16)	32880	11000 (13) + 220	11553	26000 (37) (37553) (372%)

Frm @ 140 per day wage; Forst Kendu leaf @ 2.5 per Kerry as against 0.20 per Kerry; Brick Kilns @ 300 per 1000 bricks

Category of Average Income & Expenditure of Household/Annum				Income From Farm+Non-Farm Labour + Forest Produce  Rs./(% in total income excluding loan receipts)		Income From Agricultural Production  Rs./(% in total income excluding loan receipts)	Food and Non-Food expenditure  Rs.	Loan Borrowed/ Interest on Loans (@10% for 6 months)  Rs.	Total Deficit/ Savings  Rs.	Income From Brick Kiln Migration Total Advances + Living Expenses + Balance Payments (%) & (Net Income) Rs.
Characteristics of Households										
3	ST	3(1)	M	16600 (18)		3510 (4)	83070	10000 (9.9)* + 6000 (5.7)	68960	70800 (78) (1840)
				Frm	5400 (33)					
				N-Frm	-					
				Forst	11200 (67)					
3	ST	3(1)	M	59266		5700	99070	10000 + 200	34304	75000 (40696) 2211%
				Frm	12600					
				N-Frm	-					
				Forst	46666					
2	ST	5(2)	NM	17200 (58)		12420 (42)	76000	10000 (25.2)* + 6000 (7)	52380	- (52380)
				Frm	-					
				N-Frm	16000 (92)					
				Forst	1200 (8)					
2	ST	5(2)	NM	21000		10220 (45)	76000	10000 (*) + 200 ()	44780	- (44780) 15%
				Frm	-					
				N-Frm	16000					
				Forst	5000					

Frm @ 140 per day wage; Forst Kendu leaf @ 2.5 per Kerry as against 0.20 per Kerry; Brick Kilns @ 300 per 1000 bricks

Category of Average Income & Expenditure of Household/Annum				Income From Farm+Non-Farm Labour + Forest Produce  Rs./(% in total income excluding loan receipts)		Income From Agricultural Production  Rs./(% in total income excluding loan receipts)	Food and Non-Food expenditure  Rs.	Loan Borrowed/ Interest on Loans (@10% for 6 months)  Rs.	Total Deficit/ Savings  Rs.	Income From Brick Kiln Migration Total Advances + Living Expenses + Balance Payments (%) & (Net Income) Rs.
Characteristics of Households										
I	OB C	5(1)	M	900 (3)		-	87580	9000 (11.7)* + 5400 (5.8)	86680	66866 (97) (19814)
				Frm	900 (100)					
				N-Frm	-					
				Forst	-					
II	OB C	5(1)	M	2100		-	87580	9000 + 180	85660	99000 (13340) 169%
				Frm	2100					
				N-Frm	-					
				Forst	-					
	ST	5(3)	NM	2860 (13)		19990 (87)	56480	3000 (11.6)* + 1800 (3)	35430	- (35430)
				Frm-	360 (13)					
				N-Frm	-					
				Forst-	2500 (87)					
4	ST	5(3)	NM	11256		33610	56480	3000 + 60	11684	- (11684) 33%
				Frm-	840					
				N-Frm	-					
				Forst-	10416					

Average increase of income is about 130% with third observation being ignored since it is an exception.



Category of Average Income & Expenditure of Household/Annum				Income From Farm+Non-Farm Labour + Forest Produce  Rs./(% in total income excluding loan receipts)	Income From Agricultural Production  Rs./ % in total income excluding loan receipts)	Food and Non-Food expenditure  Rs.	Loan Borrowed/ Interest on Loans (@10% for 6 months)  Rs.	Total Deficit/ Savings  Rs.	Income From Brick Kiln Migration Total Advances + Living Expenses + Balance Payments (%) & (Net Income) Rs.
Characteristics of Households									
Land Acres	Soc Catgr y	Size of HH /Dep	Migrnt/ N-Migr n						
0.5	ST	5 (1)	M	5290 (12) Frm- 1790 (34) N-Frm 1500 (28) Forst- 2000 (38)	-500 (-1)	82345	17500 (28)* + 4375	37055	40500 (89) (45290)
Projected				12873 Frm- 3040 N-Frm 1500 Forst- 8333	-500 (0)	82345	17500 (28)* + 175	14772	51000 (75) (67573)
0	ST	1 (0)	M	2200 (14) Frm 2200 (100) N-Frm 0 (0) Forst 0 (0)	0 (0)	17890	0 (0)* + 0	2490	13200 (86) (15400)
0	ST	1 (0)	M	3700 Frm 3700 N-Frm 0 Forst 0	0 (0)	17890	0 (0)* + 0	9810	24000 (87) (27700)
0	SC	3 (2)	M	7641 (20) Frm 441 (6) N-Frm 4200 (55) Forst 3000 (39)	0 (0)	57690	15000 (28)* + 9000	19248	30801 (80) (38442)
0	SC	3 (2)	M	17441 Frm 741 N-Frm 4200	0 (0)	57690	15000 (28)* + 150	48601	80000 (75) (10629)

Frm @ 140 per day wage; Forst Kendu leaf @ 2.5 per Kerry as against 0.20 per Kerry; Brick Kilns @ 300 per 1000 bricks

0	SC	7 (2)	M	3801 (5)		0 (0)	82607	24997 (25)* + 7504	8456	70350 (95) (74151)
				Frm	1603 (42)					
				N-Frm	2198 (58)					
				Forst	0 (0)					
0	SC	7 (2)	M	5201		0 (0)	82607	24997 (25)* + 250	7848	78000 (86) (90455)
				Frm	3003					
				N-Frm	2198					
				Forst	0					
0	SC	7(4)	M	2702 (4)		0 (0)	111377	24003 (27)* + 14399	45675	63000 (96) (65702)
				Frm-	2702 (100)					
				N -Frm	0 (0)					
				Forst-	0 (0)					
0	SC	7(4)	M	4802		0 (0)	111377	24003 (27)* + 240	2416	90000 (83) (108961)
				Frm-	4802					
				N -Frm	0					
				Forst-	0					
0	OBC	2(2)	NM	1920 (13)		0 (0)	50660	3000 (17) + 1800	35840	12900 (87) (14820)
				Frm	920 (47)					
				N-Frm	0					
				Forst	1000 (53)					
0	OBC	2(2)	NM	5687 ()		0 (0)	50660	3000 (17) + 30	21078	22125 (75) (29582)
				Frm	1520 ()					
				N-Frm	0					
				Forst	4167 ()					
0	OBC	5(1)	M	13200 (17)		0 (0)	114410	20000 (20) + 8400	36545	64665 (83) (77865)
				Frm	1200 (9)					
				N-Frm	10000 (76)					
				Forst	2000 (15)					
0	OBC	5(1)	M	20283 ()		0 (0)	114410	20000 (20) + 200	2927	83000 (74) (111483)
				Frm	1950 ()					
				N-Frm	10000 ()					
				Forst	8333 ()					
0	SC	1(0)	M	1920 (17)		0 (0)	10320	2800 (20)* + 1680	900	9300 (83) (11220)
				Frm	1920 (100)					
				N-Frm	0 (0)					
				Forst	0 (0)					
0	SC	1(0)	M	3120 ()		0 (0)	10320	2800 (20)* + 28	21452	27000 (85) (31772)
				Frm	3120 (100)					
				N-Frm	0 (0)					
				Forst	0 (0)					
0	ST	3(1)	M	1839 (7)		0 (0)	104481	14001 (35)* + 8400	77943	24699 (93) (26538)
				Frm-	1839 (100)					
				N -Frm	0 (0)					
				Forst-	0 (0)					

0	ST	3(1)	M	3039 ()		0 (0)	104481	14001 (35)* + 140	60932	32250 (74) (43549)
				Frm-	3039 (100)					
				N-Frm	0 (0)					
				Forst-	0 (0)					
3	ST	4(1)	NM	15595 (122)		-2810 (-22)	80980	2600 (17)* + 1560	68195	0 (0) (12785)
				Frm	1260 (8)					
				N-Frm	11335 (73)					
				Forst	3000 (19)					
3	ST	4(1)	NM	25845 ()		-3770 ()	80980	2600 (17)* + 26	57371	0 (0) (23609)
				Frm	2010 ()					
				N-Frm	11335 ()					
				Forst	12500 ()					
0.5	SC	5(2)	M	1260 (3)		0 (0)	55200	3000 (7)* + 1800	14340	39600 (97) (40860)
				Frm	960 (76)					
				N-Frm	300 (24)					
				Forst	0 (0)					
0.5	SC	5(2)	M	2010 ()		0 (0)	55200	3000 (7)* + 30	6420	45000 (92) (48780)
				Frm	1710 ()					
				N-Frm	300 ()					
				Forst	0 (0)					
0	OBC	6(3)	M	2700 (5)		0 (0)	64566	10002 (15)+ 6000	6768	55098 (95) (57798)
				Frm	2400 (89)					
				Pens	300 (11)					
				Forst	0 (0)					
0	OBC	6(3)	M	4200 ()		0 (0)	64566	10002 (15)+ 100	5534	60000 (86) (70100)
				Frm	3900 ()					
				Pens	300 ()					
				Forst	0 (0)					
0	OBC	1(0)	NM	1200 (100)		0 (0)	8940	0 (0)* + 0	7740	0 (0) (1200)
				Frm-	1200 (100)					
				N-Frm	0 (0)					
				Forst-	0 (0)					
0	OBC	1(0)	NM	2000 (100)		0 (0)	8940	0 (0)* + 0	6940	0 (0) (2000)
				Frm-	2000 (100)					
				N-Frm	0 (0)					
				Forst-	0 (0)					
2.4	OBC	4(2)	NM	9168 (103)		-290 (-3)	80660	20000 (69)* + 12000	71782	0 (0) (8878)
				Frm	2100 (23)					
				N-Frm	4668 (51)					
				Forst	2400 (26)					
2.4	OBC	4(2)	NM	18368 ()		-590 ()	80660	20000 (69)* + 200	63853	0 (0) (16808)
				Frm	3700 ()					
				N-Frm	4668 ()					
				Forst	10000 ()					
0	ST	2(0)	M	2960 (22)		0 (0)	31570	3000 (18)* + 1800	18343	10267 (78) (13227)
				Frm	960 (32)					
				N-Frm	2000 (68)					
				Forst	0 (0)					



<b>0</b>	ST	2(0)	M	3560 ( )		0 (0)	31570	3000 (18)* + 30	<b>11240</b>	15000 (74) (20330)
				Frm	1560 ( )					
				N-Frm	2000 ( )					
				Forst	0 (0)					
<b>60</b>	OBC	6(2)	NM	0 (0)		0 (0)	136122	0 (0)* + 0	---	0 (0) (---)
				Frm	0 (0)					
				N-Frm	0 (0)					
				Forst	0 (0)					
<b>60</b>	OBC	6(2)	NM	0 (0)		0 (0)	136122	0 (0)* + 0	---	0 (0) (---)
				Frm	0 (0)					
				N-Frm	0 (0)					
				Forst	0 (0)					
<b>4</b>	OBC	6(3)	NM	7278 (20)		-9240 (-26)	57078	34800 (49)* + 21300	<b>21240</b>	37800 (105) (35838)
				Frm	3600 (49)					
				N-Frm	1680 (23)					
				Forst	1998 (28)					
<b>4</b>	OBC	6(3)	NM	16005 ( )		-9858 ( )	57078	34800 (49)* + 348	6021	36000 (57) (63099)
				Frm	6000 ( )					
				N-Frm	1680 ( )					
				Forst	8325 ( )					
<b>13</b>	ST	5(2)	NM	6360 (11)		52130 (89)	50680	5000 (8)* + 3000	7810	0 (0) (58490)
				Frm	0 (0)					
				N-Frm	3360 (53)					
				Forst	3000 (47)					
<b>13</b>	ST	5(2)	NM	15860 (11)		61810 (89)	50680	5000 (8)* + 50	29940	0 (0) (80620)
				Frm	0 (0)					
				N-Frm	3360 (53)					
				Forst	12500 (47)					
<b>0</b>	SC	6(3)	M	870 (2)		0 (0)	122958	23334 (32)* + 13998	<b>72540</b>	49548 (98) (50418)
				Frm	870 (100)					
				N-Frm	0 (0)					
				Forst	0 (0)					
<b>0</b>	SC	6(3)	M	1470 (2)		0 (0)	122958	23334 (32)* + 233	<b>61198</b>	46525 (75) (61760)
				Frm	1470 (100)					
				N-Frm	0 (0)					
				Forst	0 (0)					
<b>6.5</b>	ST	5(1)	NM	182500 (108)		-13000 (-8)	236060	0 (0)* + 0	---	0 (0) (16950 0)
				Frm	0 (0)					
				N-Frm	182500 (100)					
				Forst	0 (0)					
<b>6.5</b>	ST	5(1)	NM	182500 (108)		-18320 (-8)	236060	0 (0)* + 0	---	0 (0) (16418 0)
				Frm	0 (0)					
				N-Frm	182500 (100)					
				Forst	0 (0)					

**Frm @ 140 per day wage; Forst Kendu leaf @ 2.5 per Kerry as against 0.20 per Kerry; Brick Kilns @ 300 per 1000 bricks**

**Denotes the current economics of the household**

**Denotes the economics if the households had direct access to the market, without intermediaries, and if the Government ensured them payment of minimum wages/**

Similarly we compute the estimated income for the remaining 3 villages.

**Table3. 4.1 c – BAGJHARAN**

<b>Caste</b>	<b>Land(acres)</b>	<b>Net income of household</b>	<b>Corrected net income</b>	<b>Net increase</b>	<b>% increase</b>
ST	4.85	30877	143090	112213	363
ST	0	-15173	108060	123233	812
ST	3	-78556	1894	80450	102
ST	2.5	-77240	-72960	4280	6
ST	1.25	-116917	10275	127192	109
ST	6	-51483	515	51998	101
ST	0.5	4580	211580	207000	4520
ST	1.5	-23040	56640	79680	346
ST	3	-42129	66384	108513	258
ST	19	-121223	226777	348000	287
SC	0	-71533	41850	113383	159
SC	0	-54447	-29280	25167	46
SC	2	-87140	-36940	50200	58
SC	0.7	-119670	-70095	49575	41
OBC	6	-24000	2680	26680	111
OBC	2.5	-10023	51035	61058	609
OBC	0.5	-11321	20336	31658	280
OTHERS	2.5	-20205	8945	29150	144
	<b>Average</b>	<b>-49369</b>	<b>41155</b>	<b>90524</b>	<b>464</b>

**Table 3.4.1 d – BARIALI**

<b>Caste</b>	<b>Land(acres)</b>	<b>Net income of household</b>	<b>Corrected net income</b>	<b>Net increase</b>	<b>% increase</b>
ST	0	-15323	78887	94210	615
ST	0	-41100	69600	110700	269
ST	4	-35620	14290	49910	140
ST	2	-41640	-1400	40240	97
ST	5	120	34885	34765	28971
ST	2	-11320	134330	145650	1287

ST	5	-29080	-5121	23959	82
ST	3	-76012	-75512	500	1
ST	1.35	-31320	28443	59763	191
ST	6	-44815	-37055	7760	17
ST	1	-111790	-60365	51425	46
ST	0.45	-57005	-15905	41100	72
ST	0	-32665	-29030	3635	11
SC	0	-46075	28225	74300	161
SC	1	-52313	22770	75083	144
SC	0	-38643	-23815	14828	38
SC	2.5	-39908	-20108	19800	50
OBC	1.7	-30131	25038	55168	183
OBC	0	-103972	45555	149527	144
	<b>Average</b>	<b>-44137</b>	<b>11248</b>	<b>55385</b>	<b>1712</b>

**Table 3.4.1 e – DEBRIPALI**

<b>Caste</b>	<b>Land(acres)</b>	<b>Net income of household</b>	<b>Corrected net income</b>	<b>Net increase</b>	<b>% increase</b>
ST	0.5	6380	48145	41765	655
SC	0	-25055	-23530	1525	6
SC	0	38747	86780	48033	124
ST	0	-30493	1674	32167	105
SC	0	-81339	-22721	58618	72
ST	8	-29108	1000	30108	103
ST	0	-24066	-18881	5185	22
ST	0	2250	3265	1015	45
ST	2	-94659	-37075	57583	61
SC	1	-64392	53608	118000	183
OBC	2	-53460	-47750	5710	11
ST	0	-55230	19425	74655	135
SC	1	-93922	-38780	55142	59
OBC	3.5	-59490	-5090	54400	91

ST	2.27	-132842	-77322	55520	42
SC	1.5	-112787	-66497	46290	41
ST	0	-31457	-2815	28642	91
ST	0.8	-51400	-372	51028	99
SC	0.5	-92800	-48505	44295	48
SC	0.17	-68633	3975	72608	106
	<b>Average</b>	<b>-52688</b>	<b>-8573</b>	<b>44115</b>	<b>105</b>

**Table 3.5**

**Loan and income patterns w.r.t. migration**

	<b>Non-migrant</b>	<b>Migrant</b>
<b>Land (acres)</b>	5	1
<b>Income at Source</b>	30606	20742
<b>Loan taken</b>	12452	13212
<b>Deficit</b>	55455	70177
<b>Expenditure</b>	101748	90919
<b>Health</b>	17405	14687

**Table 3.6**

**Loan and income patterns across different social categories**

<b>ST</b>		<b>per member</b>
<b>Avg. Net income</b>	-44329	-8973
<b>Avg. Loan taken</b>	8588	1739
<b>Avg. Loan repayment</b>	11202	2268
<b>Avg. % of loan out of income</b>	62	12
<b>Avg. Total income</b>	31321	6340
<b>Avg. Deficit</b>	51328	10390
<b>Avg. Expenditure</b>	73729	14925

Avg. Family size 4.94

SC		per member
Avg. Net income	-63119	-12777
Avg. Loan taken	17531	3549
Avg. Loan repayment	26194	5302
Avg. % of loan out of income	72	15
Avg. Total income	37669	7625
Avg. Deficit	88161	17846
Avg. Expenditure	100789	20403

Avg. Family size 4.94

OBC		per member
Avg. Net income	-88012	-14150
Avg. Loan taken	24139	3881
Avg. Loan repayment	31606	5081
Avg. % of loan out of income	43	7
Avg. Total income	78130	12561
Avg. Deficit	55191	8873
Avg. Expenditure	156422	25148

Avg. Family size 6.22

**Table 3.7**

**Loan and income details according to size of landholdings**

Landless (0 acres)			
Avg. Net income			-36798
Avg. Loan taken			14059
Avg. Loan repayment			20915



<b>Avg. % of loan out of income</b>			65
<b>Avg. Total income</b>			33642
<b>Avg. Deficit</b>			51399
<b>Avg. Expenditure</b>			70440

<b>Marginal (0 to 3.5 acres)</b>			
<b>Avg. Net income</b>			-59713
<b>Avg. Loan taken</b>			13774
<b>Avg. Loan repayment</b>			18576
<b>Avg. % of loan out of income</b>			69
<b>Avg. Total income</b>			37760
<b>Avg. Deficit</b>			74579
<b>Avg. Expenditure</b>			97473

<b>Small (3.5 to 5 acres)</b>			
<b>Avg. Net income</b>			-49639
<b>Avg. Loan taken</b>			9350
<b>Avg. Loan repayment</b>			11660
<b>Avg. % of loan out of income</b>			16
<b>Avg. Total income</b>			36803
<b>Avg. Deficit</b>			66745
<b>Avg. Expenditure</b>			80442

<b>Medium (5 to 10 acres)</b>			
<b>Avg. Net income</b>			-40099
<b>Avg. Loan taken</b>			11750
<b>Avg. Loan repayment</b>			13175
<b>Avg. % of loan out of income</b>			13
<b>Avg. Total income</b>			46491
<b>Avg. Deficit</b>			42675

Avg. Expenditure			83843
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### Annexure for 4<sup>th</sup> Chapter

Fig-4.1.2

### Social Background Data of Sample Brick Kiln Workers




Fig-4.1.3




Fig-4.1.4





Fig-4.1.5



Source: Primary Household Level Survey 2014

Fig-4.2.1

**An Overview of Work Environment**




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


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


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


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



Fig-4.2.6



Source: Primary Household Level Survey 2014

Living Conditions

Fig-4.3.1




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


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


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


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


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




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


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



Fig-4.3.9



**Networks:**

Fig-4.4.1





Fig-4.4.2



Intra-Household and Network Relations of Labour

Fig-4.5.1




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


Fig-4.5.3




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




Fig-4.5.5



**Fig-4.5.6**



Sardars & The Nature of Recruitment

Fig-4.6.1




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


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


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


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


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


Fig-4.6.7







Fig-4.6.8



Source: Primary Household Level Survey 2014

**Debts, Money Lenders & Nature of Credit Markets**

Fig-4.7.1




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


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


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


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


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



Table- 4.8.1 Loans and Advances

no	Average Advance	Average Loans	Income	Total 6months Expt	Income-Tot. Expn
1	63500	12500	50000	44664	5336
2	35000		35000	34344	8344
3	61666.66667	15000	46666.66667	40163	6501.666667
4	77500	15000	62500	49404	13096
5	37500	20000	37500	43364	-7864
6	58333.33333		58333.33333	44644	13689.33333
7	25000		25000	24324	476
8	26666.66667	20000	16666.66667	30695	-4038.333333
9	23666.66667		23666.66667	38084	-2387.333333
10	37500	25000	2500	30382	-17812
11	45000	10000	25000	18128	16862
12	40000		40000	31882	18048
13	53750	10000	43750	31944	11806
14	40666.66667	7500	22166.66667	25281	7785.666667
15	36300	25000	11300	23236	-11736
16	26000		26000	18655	7245
17	26000	26000	26000	19124	6876
18	27000	50000	-3000	18381	-21881
19	25000	12500	-12500	3563	-16083
20	27500	25000	2500	22561	-20061
21	38000	50000	38004	38404	-404
22	33250		33250	25184	8066
23	52000		52000	20124	31876
24	48000	20000	28000	31284	-1584
25	26350	29000	29000	15772	12328
26	24000	20000	4000	20552	-16552
27	70000		70000	25521	48079
28	55000		55000	25856	29144
29	30000		30000	27350	22650
30	30000		30000	38361	-28361
31	29500		29500	15661	13839
32	29000		29000	19701	8299
33	29000		29000	16065	12935
34	70000		70000	27821	42179
35	25000		25000	23781	1219
36	14000		14000	10003	3997
37	33333.33333		33333.33333	34978	3333.333333
38	36350		36350	39870	-2420
39	35000		35000	27644	7356
40	58000		58000	60729	-11729
41	31666.66667		31666.66667	34844	-3177.333333
42	32500		32500	31484	23016
43	5750	15000	-5250	9540	-14790
44	26500		26500	18595	7905
45	16250	12500	2750	30625	-17885
46	26666.66667	20000	6666.66667	15195	-6528.333333
47	15000		15000	7290	7710
48	60000		60000	25190	34810
49	43000		43000	38366	-40866
50	43000		43000	30080	12920
51	25000		25000	8442	6658
52	29500		29500	15672	13827
53	60000	15000	45000	45284	-284
54	45000	10000	35000	34124	876
55	67300	50000	37300	36424	-18924
56	50000	15000	35000	37084	-2084
57	30000	10000	20000	36172	-16172
58	30000		30000	33383	-3383
59	45000	15000	30000	32644	-22644
60	45000	25000	20000	26945	-16045
61	47300	40000	7300	43403	-33503
62	30000		30000	40204	-8204
63	500000		500000	42285	456715
64	30000		30000	18575	11425
65	18000	20000	-1000	21901	-2901
66	10233.33333		10233.33333	21793	-11561.66667
67	11333.33333		11333.33333	12103	-771.6666667
68	37000	5000	32000	36610	-4610
69	46730		46730	31110	14640
70	58333.33333	5000	52333.33333	48555	4778.333333
71	40000		40000	31430	8570
72	47000		47000	28180	18820
73	27500		27500	17403	10097
74	30000		30000	26561	23439
75	45000		45000	26261	18739
76	65000		65000	25581	39419
77	65000		65000	37031	27969
78	30666.66667		30666.66667	18918	10748.66667
79	23333.33333		23333.33333	15325	8933.333333
80	30000		30000	17155	12845
81			17451		0
82	26000		26000	18661	7339

Fig 4.8.2



: Odisha Annual Health Survey, 2011-12, Vital Statistics Division Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India

**Fig 4.8.3**

TODAY'S PAPER » NATIONAL » OTHER STATES

BHUBANESWAR, October 18, 2011

## **Orissa, AP to sign agreement on welfare of migrant labour**

SATYASUNDAR BARIK

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*The two States, Union government and ILO will be part of the institutional mechanism*

Orissa and Andhra Pradesh are all set to sign an inter-state agreement to take care of migrant labour working in unorganised sectors such as in brick kilns and construction sites.

The two State governments, Union government and International Labour Organisation will be part of the institutional mechanism as envisaged under the draft agreement.

The agreement, first of its kind in the country, was mooted when reports of Oriya migrant labour being subjected to torture in hands of labour contractors and brick kiln manufacturers in Andhra Pradesh came pouring in.

Despite several interventions by the State Labour Commission and non-government organisations, no real improvement in condition of migrant labour in worksites could be achieved.

Main objective behind entering into an agreement is to ensure payment of legitimate wage and provide good working condition to migrant labour, A. C. Padhiary, Orissa Labour Commissioner, told *The Hindu*, here on Monday.

“Under the draft agreement, responsibilities of both the State governments have been clearly defined. Andhra Pradesh government will ensure payment of minimum wage, supervision of working condition, extension of health service, provision of ration cards and facilitating education for children of migrant labour,” Mr. Padhiary said.

### **State-level cell**

He said Orissa government on its part would send migrant labour by duly registering them through district-level migration cell. “There will be State-level cell and interstate committee to resolve various issues associated with migrant labour.”

ILO will facilitate time-to-time orientation for leaders of migrant labour and officials to be deputed to monitor migration issues.

Mapping of population of migrant labour moving to Andhra Pradesh for working in unorganised sectors would be carried out.

Lakhs of migrant labour especially from poverty-stricken KBK region of Orissa go to Rangareddy, Nalgonda and Visakhapatnam districts of Andhra Pradesh every year to work in brick kilns.

As per an estimate 3,46,471 and 2,78,641 labourers from Kalahandi and Bolangir had gone to Andhra Pradesh as brick kiln workers in 2008-09.

Other two districts Nuapada and Sonepur of Orissa also send sizeable migrant labourer population to Andhra Pradesh.

However, officially total number of labourers migrating from Orissa to Andhra Pradesh hardly crosses one lakh.

“If an interstate agreement reached to extend welfare programmes, there would be no better news for this marginalised section of the society.

Migrant labour are often subjected to torture while their children are deprived from education. These labourers work and live in unhygienic condition,” said Umi Daniel, an activist who works in migration issues.

State Labour Commissioner said if the agreement results in improvement in condition of migrant labour, similar pacts would be signed with other State governments.

About 20 lakh labourers migrate from the State every year.

Highest 9 lakh labourers from Ganjam districts alone go to Gujarat.

- 
- The idea is to ensure payment of wages and provide good working condition
  - ILO will facilitate time-to-time orientation for leaders of migrant labour

## Annexure for Chapter 5

Below are the estimates for the number of school going migrant family children, village wise.

Fractions of families migrating village wise

Bahabal- 0.67

Kuthurla- 0.62

Bagjharan- 0.52

Bariali- 0.45

Debripali-

0.65

Number of Migrant School Going Children as % of

Total School Going Age children in Migrant Households:

1 Village	2 Total School Going Age Children in Migrant Households	3 Total Children Enrolled in the Primary, Upper Primary & Secondary Schools	3 as a % of 2
Bahabal	75	NA	-
Kuthurla	32	NA	-
Bagjharan	134	40	30
Bariali	37	NA	-
Debripali	149	46	31

Column 2 source: derived from Census 2011 data and field study data 2013-14 for migrant families.

Column 3 Source: Survey data collected by Odisha Government 2012-13 for select villages in Balangir.

## Annexure of Photographs












































































































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